Conservatorship of The Person & Estate of Luke C.)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. ZE028129 Lisa Jaskol, Judge. Affirmed.

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Lauren Black, Assistant County Counsel, and William C. Sias, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.

SEGAL, ACTING P. J.

INTRODUCTION

Luke C. appeals from the trial court's order appointing Public Guardian of Los Angeles the conservator of Luke's person and estate pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350 et seq.) Luke argues the trial court improperly coerced him to waive his right to a jury trial by telling him he could have either a court trial that day or, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, a jury trial in eight months. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The LPS Act

"The LPS Act authorizes the superior court to establish a conservatorship of a person who is gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder." (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 139; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350.)^[1] "An LPS conservatorship automatically terminates after one year, and reappointment of the conservator must be sought by petition." (Conservatorship of John L., at p. 143; see § 5361.) "The proposed conservatee is entitled to demand a jury trial on the issue of his or her grave disability," including on a petition "to reestablish a conservatorship after its automatic expiration . . . ." (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 541-542; see § 5350, subd. (d)(1), (3).)

B. Public Guardian Files a Petition for an Order Reappointing It Conservator of Luke's Person and Estate

In 2004 the superior court found Luke was gravely disabled and appointed Public Guardian as conservator of Luke's person. In February 2005 the court also appointed Public Guardian as conservator of Luke's estate. Between 2005 and 2019 the superior court annually granted petitions by Public Guardian to be reappointed.

Public Guardian filed the petition for reappointment that is the subject of this appeal in July 2020. At the time, the conservatorship was scheduled to terminate on September 6, 2020. On August 12, 2020 the court held a hearing, during which counsel for Luke asked the court to appoint an expert witness under Evidence Code section 730 to evaluate whether Luke had a grave disability. The trial court granted the request and, with the stipulation of Luke's counsel, ordered the conservatorship to remain in effect. In September and October 2020, the trial court granted requests by counsel for Luke to continue the trial on the petition, again ordering that the conservatorship remain in effect. At a November 16, 2020 hearing, at which Luke did not appear, counsel for Luke asked the court to set the matter for a court trial, "presumably with a waiver done that day . . . ." The court set the petition for trial on January 11, 2021, again ordering the conservatorship to remain in effect.

C. Luke Waives His Right to a Jury Trial

Luke appeared via video conference at the January 11, 2021 trial. At the beginning of the proceeding, the following exchange occurred:

"The Court: Okay, so there are two kinds of trials that you can have. One kind is called a court trial, and in a court trial, the judge hears all the evidence and then the judge makes a decision whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that you're gravely disabled. So that's a court trial. The other kind of trial is called a jury trial. In a jury trial, 12 people from the community come to court, and those 12 people hear all the evidence and then they decide if the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that you're gravely disabled. In order to find that you're gravely disabled, all 12 jurors have to reach that decision. So you have a choice: Either you can have a court trial with a judge, or you could have a jury trial with the 12 people from the community.

"Luke: Whatever gets me off conservatorship fastest. Couple names of some places I can go to. I wrote them down.

"The Court: Well, so first things first. Do you want to have a court trial with the judge or a jury trial with the 12 members of the community? And if we do-just so you know, if we have a court trial, we can do it today and we can do it right now. If we have a jury trial, it will probably be about eight months from now. So do you know-

"Luke: Your time, Your Honor.

"The Court: Don't worry about me. It's really what you want.

"Luke: Yeah. I told her yeah. I was telling her about that right now. Anyway, judge trial please.

"The Court: Okay, thank you. So you're giving up your right to a jury trial?

"Luke: Yes, ma'am."

D. The Court Grants the Petition

The court trial commenced shortly after Luke waived his right to a jury trial. Dr. Gary Freedman-Harvey, a forensic psychologist, testified for Public Guardian and said that, in his opinion, Luke was gravely disabled. Dr. Freedman-Harvey reviewed Luke's medical records, consulted with staff at Luke's treatment facility, and interviewed Luke. According to Dr. Freedman-Harvey, Luke suffered from schizophrenia and had no insight into his disorder. His symptoms included "delusional and perfunctory thought processes" and a "limited amount of ability to engage in reasoning or thoughts about his current situation . . . ." Dr. Freedman-Harvey stated that, if the court terminated the conservatorship and Luke left his treatment facility, Luke would not be able to feed, shelter, and clothe himself, nor would he take the medications prescribed for his disorder. Dr. Freedman-Harvey also observed that Luke did not have a viable plan for finding a place to live.

Luke testified that, in his opinion, he suffered from "just anxiety mainly" and that he might be bipolar, but that he did not suffer from schizophrenia. Luke stated that, if he were released from his treatment facility, he would continue to seek mental health treatment and take his prescribed medications.

The court found Luke was gravely disabled, granted the petition, and reappointed Public Guardian as conservator of Luke's person and estate. Luke timely appealed.^[2]

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

As stated, on a petition to reappoint a conservator under the LPS Act, a conservatee has the right to a jury trial on the issue of whether he is gravely disabled. (Conservatorship of Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 541-542; see § 5350, subd. (d)(1), (3).) According to Luke, the trial court coerced him to waive his right to a jury trial by telling him on the day of trial he could have a court trial that day or a jury trial in eight months.

The parties disagree on the applicable standard of review. Luke argues the same standards that govern whether a trial court has coerced a criminal defendant to waive his or her right to a jury trial govern whether a trial court has coerced a proposed conservatee in an LPS proceedings to waive his or her right to a jury trial. Public Guardian argues the standards that govern jury trial waivers in civil actions, not criminal actions, govern jury trial waivers in LPS proceedings. But Public Guardian does not explain whether there is any meaningful difference between civil and criminal proceedings when a party contends the trial court coerced a jury waiver, or what the difference is. Because we do not need to resolve this issue to decide the appeal, we assume without deciding that standards in a criminal proceeding govern whether a trial court has coerced a waiver in an LPS proceeding.

In criminal proceedings, "'a defendant's waiver of the right to jury trial may not be accepted by the court unless it is knowing and intelligent, that is, "'"made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it, "'" as well as voluntary "'"in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than

intimidation, coercion, or deception."'"'" (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166; see People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 305 (Collins).) The requirement that the defendant's waiver be voluntary prohibits the state, "whether its source is executive, legislative, or judicial in nature," from coercing a defendant to waive his or her right to a jury trial. (Collins, at p. 306; see People v. Dixon (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 985, 990 (Dixon).) As the Supreme Court stated in Collins, this prohibition is based on the principle that "the state may not punish a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right, or promise leniency to a defendant for refraining from the exercise of that right." (Collins, at pp. 305-306; accord, People v. Quintanilla (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 406, 413; Dixon, at p. 990.) "The line of decisions prohibiting such coercion condemns 'the State's unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who had chosen to exercise a legal right,' and recognizes that '[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort [citation], and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is "patently unconstitutional."'" (Collins, at p. 306; see Dixon, at p. 990.) Courts examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a defendant has voluntarily waived his or her jury trial right. (See People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) ["We uphold the...