Conte v. Goodwin

VINCENT J. CONTE, Plaintiff, v. ZACHARY GOODWIN et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 19-8333

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

January 15, 2021

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Zachary Goodwin, Marek Napierala, Marcus O. Hicks ("Commissioner Hicks"), New Jersey Department of Corrections ("NJDOC"), and New Jersey State Prison ("NJSP") (collectively, "Defendants"). (ECF No. 38.) Plaintiff Vincent J. Conte ("Plaintiff") opposes. (ECF No. 42.) The Court has decided this matter based upon the written submissions of the parties and without oral argument, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 38) is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

This case arises from a medical episode Plaintiff experienced in 2018. Plaintiff is an inmate at NJSP in Trenton, New Jersey. (Am. Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 29.) NJSP is a state prison operated by NJDOC. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that on December 2, 2018, he was ordered by an NJSP sergeant to provide a urine sample for drug testing within a two-hour time period. (Id. ¶ 17-18.) At the beginning of this two-hour window, Plaintiff suffered "cardiovascular obstruction, greatly diminishing his heart function, blood flow, and oxygen uptake." (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff displayed characteristic symptoms of a heart attack, including chest pains, shortness of breath, and profuse sweating. (Id.) Plaintiff also clutched his chest, gasped for oxygen, and wiped his sweat. (Id. ¶ 20.)

Defendants Goodwin and Napierala ("Officers") were the corrections officers assigned to the facility where Plaintiff was required to provide his urine sample. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff alleges that he "immediately brought his heart attack to the attention of [Officers] Goodwin and Napierala." (Id. ¶ 22.) He informed the Officers of his chest pains, shortness of breath, and profuse sweating. (Id.) He stated that he felt "as though his heart was malfunctioning" and "expressed his fear of dying in prison." (Id.) Plaintiff then asked Officers Goodwin and Napierala to provide immediate medical treatment by calling an emergency code in accordance with NJDOC procedures. (Id. ¶ 23.)

In response, Plaintiff alleges that the Officers laughed and "pok[ed] fun at [his] heart attack and associated symptoms." (Id.) They told Plaintiff that no medical attention would be provided "unless and until" he submitted his urine sample. (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff tried to urinate, but instead defecated. (Id. ¶ 28.) The Officers allegedly responded with laughter and told other inmates what had happened. (Id.) Plaintiff managed to urinate ninety minutes later. (Id. ¶ 29.) Instead of calling an emergency code, the Officers issued Plaintiff an ad hoc medical pass, which required Plaintiff to walk to the infirmary rather than be transported in a wheelchair or gurney. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff asserts that the walk placed "undue stress on his heart and further delayed much-needed medical attention." (Id. ¶ 45.)

Upon arrival at the infirmary, medical staff immediately treated Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 35.) A nurse administered an electrocardiogram and gave orders to call 911. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 38.) Plaintiffwas then transported by ambulance to St. Francis Medical Center. (Id. ¶ 40.) At St. Francis, Plaintiff was diagnosed with ST-Elevation Myocardial Infarction, indicating that one of the major arteries in his heart was blocked. (Id. ¶ 40.) The medical staff proceeded with "urgent cardiac catheterization" and placed a stent in Plaintiff's artery to attempt to restore normal blood flow. (Id. ¶¶ 41-43.)

Plaintiff maintains that the delay in medical treatment caused by the Officers' refusal to call an emergency code resulted in physical and emotional injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 46-48.) As a result of the delay, Plaintiff suffers from reduced life expectancy, respiratory difficulties, dizziness, disequilibrium, and reduced mobility. (Id. ¶ 46.) He has also experienced emotional distress, including feelings of shame, humiliation, anger, paranoia, fear, insomnia, anxiety, nervousness, worry, depression, and "loss of enjoyment of a normal life." (Id. ¶¶ 47, 91.)

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the Complaint pro se on March 11, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) The Court screened the Complaint and granted Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Pro Bono Counsel. (ECF No. 6.) Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint approximately fifteen months later. (ECF No. 28.)¹

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on July 20, 2020. (ECF No. 29.) The Amended Complaint alleges seven counts: (1) deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers Goodwin and Napierala (id. ¶¶ 62-64); (2) deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment and § 1983 against Officers Goodwin and Napierala (id. ¶¶ 65-67); (3) failure-to-intervene under § 1983 against Officers Goodwin and Napierala (id. ¶¶68-76); (4) failure-to-train under § 1983 against Commissioner Hicks, NJDOC, and NJSP (id. ¶¶ 77-83); (5) violation of Article I, paragraph 12 of the New Jersey constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA") against all Defendants (id. ¶¶ 84-86); (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") against all Defendants (id. ¶¶ 87-92); and (7) negligence against all Defendants (id. ¶¶ 93-97). Plaintiff seeks punitive damages, among other forms of relief.

On August 27, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 38.) Plaintiff filed an Opposition (ECF No. 42) and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 43). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is presently before the Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). "The defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented." Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court should conduct a three-part analysis. Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). "First, the court must 'take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court must "review[] the complaint to strike conclusory allegations." Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Finally, the court must assume the veracity of all well-pleaded factual allegations and "determine whether the facts are sufficient to show that plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.'" Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563. If the complaint does not demonstrate more than a "mere possibility of misconduct," it must be dismissed. See Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

DISCUSSION

I. Section 1983 Claims Against Officers Goodwin and Napierala

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil action for the deprivation of rights against every person who, "under color" of state law, deprives another person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff alleges that Officers Goodwin and Napierala violated the Eighth Amendment, as enforced through § 1983, in their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims are: (1) that the Officers were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; (2) that the Officers were deliberately indifferent to his conditions of confinement; and (3) that the Officers failed to intervene during his medical emergency. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 62-76.)

Defendants argue that Officers Goodwin and Napierala are immune from suit in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment. (Defs.' Br. at 6, ECF No. 38-4.) They also argue that Plaintiff has not stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment against the Officers individually, and even if Plaintiff had stated a claim, that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 9-16.)

A. Claims Against Officers Goodwin and Napierala in Their Official Capacities

For a violation of § 1983 to occur, a "person" must be "acting under the color of state law." Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000). State officers sued in their official capacities are not "persons" for purposes of § 1983, see Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), "because they assume the identity of the government that employs them," Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-27 (1991). Moreover, suits against state employees in their official capacities for damages run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits federalcourts from hearing actions against a state. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996). Therefore, the Court dismisses all § 1983 claims against Officers Goodwin and Napierala in their official capacities.

Section 1983, however, permits suits against state employees as individuals. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30-31. So, the Court will next consider whether Plaintiff has adequately pled his Eighth Amendment claims against Officers Goodwin and Napierala individually.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff's Serious Medical Needs

Plaintiff's first claim under the Eighth Amendment is that Officers Goodwin and Napierala were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. From the outset, the Court notes that it previously concluded that Plaintiff's deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim withstood Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) scrutiny. In 2019, Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 1-2.) As required, the Court screened Plaintiff...