Contreras v. Heritage Univ.

669 F.Supp.3d 1061

Yadira CONTRERAS, Erica Kroneck, Kyle Olson,and Hendry ("Cody") Rodman III, Plaintiffs, v. HERITAGE UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

NO. 2:22-CV-3034-TOR

United States District Court, E.D. Washington

Signed April 18, 2023

Lara R. Hruska, Sydney Arizona Bay, Cedar Law PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiffs.

Paul Joseph Triesch, Keating Bucklin & McCormack Inc., PS, Seattle, WA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THOMAS O. RICE, United States District Judge

BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19). This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the record and files herein and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This matter arises from the revocation of accreditation from Defendant Heritage University's Physician Assistant program. The following facts are not in dispute except where noted.

Plaintiffs Yadira Contreras, Erica Kroneck, Kyle Olson, and Hendry (Cody) Rodman III were enrolled in Defendant's Physician Assistant ("PA") program and began the program in the summer of 2020 as part of Cohort 6. ECF No. 19 at 9-10. Graduation from an accredited PA program is a prerequisite to taking the Physician Assistant National Certifying Examination ("PANCE"), which is required for licensure as a Physician Assistant. ECF No. 22 at 1-2, ¶¶ 3-5. The Accreditation Review Commission on Education for the Physician Assistant ("ARC-PA") oversees a program's accreditation. Id. at 2, ¶ 5.

In 2012, Defendant was initially granted provisional accreditation by ARC-PA, but the status was later changed to probationary. Id., ¶¶ 6-7. Probationary accreditation is conferred when a program does not meet the ARC-PA Standards, as described in the ARC-PA Accreditations Standards for Physician Assistant Education ("Standards"). See ECF No. 20-1. The ARC-PA Standards indicate the "sponsoring institution" is responsible for "teaching out currently matriculated students in accordance with the institution's regional accreditor or federal law in the event of program closure and/or loss of accreditation." ECF No. 22 at 4, ¶ 13. The Standards define "teaching out" as "[a]llowing students already in the program to complete their education or assisting them in enrolling in an ARC-PA accredited program in which they can continue their education." Id.

Defendant's program was under the probationary accreditation status at the time of Plaintiffs' enrollment. Id. at 5, ¶ 23. Plaintiffs were aware of the probationary status. Id. Defendant's website and Student Handbook contained statements regarding the accreditation status and specifically noted that ARC-PA conferred probationary status on programs that fail to meet accreditation requirements as specified by ARC-PA. Id. at 3, ¶ 11, at 6, ¶ 24. It further stated that if a program continued to fail to comply with the Standards, the program was at risk of having accreditation withdrawn. See ECF No. 20-6 at 7. The website and Handbook directed questions about the accreditation status to Defendant's administrators. Id.

Prior to beginning coursework, Plaintiffs signed the Student Handbook, acknowledging they read and understood the terms and conditions contained therein, including the accreditation status, and that they had the opportunity to ask questions and receive answers about the accreditation status. ECF No. 22 at 6, ¶¶ 26-27. Prior to signing the Student Handbook, Plaintiffs assert they were repeatedly reassured the probationary status would not affect their ability to graduate from an accredited program. ECF No. 42 at 6, ¶ 23. Thereafter, Plaintiffs each began coursework, completing and receiving credit for the Summer 2020 semester. ECF No. 22 at 7, ¶ 29. Plaintiffs Olson, Kroneck, and Rodman also completed and received credits for the Fall 2020 and Spring 2021 semesters. Id., ¶ 30.

During the Summer 2020 semester, Plaintiff Contreras began experiencing mental health difficulties that impacted her education. Id. at 8, ¶ 36. Contreras received testing accommodations in August 2020. Id. at 9, ¶ 37. In September 2020, Contreras voluntarily withdrew from Cohort 6. Id., ¶ 43. Contreras disputes the characterization as a "voluntary withdrawal" and asserts she "decelerated from the program with the understanding that she would return to Cohort 7 the following year." ECF No. 42 at 10, ¶ 43. Contreras does not explain how her characterization is materially different from Defendant's. Consequently, Contreras did not complete the Fall 2020 semester as part of Cohort 6. ECF No. 22 at 10, ¶ 45. Although the deadline for tuition reimbursement had passed, Defendant returned $11,469 of Contreras's Fall 2020 tuition. Id., ¶ 46.

On October 23, 2020, ARC-PA notified Defendant it was withdrawing accreditation. Id. at 7, ¶ 28. Defendant responded that it would "teach out" all remaining students, including those in Cohort 6, as required by the ARC-PA Standards, but ARC-PA denied the attempt, stating Defendant would only be permitted to "teach out" those students scheduled to graduate in May 2021, and only if ARC-PA approved a teach out plan submitted by Defendant. ECF Nos. 20-9; 20-10; 20-11. As to any student expected to graduate beyond May 2021, including Plaintiffs, ARC-PA indicated it expected Defendant to "use its best efforts" to assist those students in transferring to other ARC-PA accredited programs. ECF Nos. 20-11; 20-12 at 3. ARC-PA further stated Defendant was required to "continue those efforts until all such students have transferred into another program." ECF No. 20-12 at 3.

Plaintiffs dispute that Defendant's accreditation was withdrawn by ARC-PA and contend that Defendant withdrew its accreditation voluntarily. ECF No. 42 at 8, ¶ 28. Plaintiffs cite to a letter dated October 31, 2020 from Defendant to ARC-PA stating Defendant was "voluntarily withdrawing from the [ARC-PA] accreditation process." ECF No. 20-9. However, the letter was sent in response to the Notice of Adverse Action that Defendant received on October 23, 2020, notifying Defendant that its accreditation had been withdrawn by ARC-PA. ECF No. 20-8 at 2. The Notice outlines Defendant's possible next steps, including appeal or voluntary withdraw from the process. Id. at 10. Plaintiffs do not cite any evidence indicating Defendant had control over its accreditation status.

The parties do not dispute that Defendant did not appeal its accreditation revocation and did not further seek to enforce the teach out provision after its initial attempt was denied by ARC-PA. ECF No. 45 at 4-5, ¶ 22. However, Defendant asserts there is no evidence of a factual basis upon which Defendant could have challenged the accreditation revocation. Id. Defendant claims it elected not to challenge the revocation in order to protect the accredited graduation of Cohort 5. Id. Plaintiffs do not cite any evidence suggesting Defendant would have succeeded on an appeal. Although not explicitly stated by either party, it appears a voluntary withdrawal would permit Defendant to reapply for accreditation at a later date. ECF Nos. 20-12 at 3; 29-6 at 5. Failure to appeal or voluntarily withdrawal would have resulted in a final revocation of accreditation. ECF No. 20-8 at 10.

Following the loss of accreditation, Defendant claims it "took steps to mitigate harm" to Plaintiffs Olson, Kroneck, and Rodman by paying them various sums of money. ECF No. 22 at 12, ¶¶ 57-59. Plaintiffs assert they were not "paid" by Defendant but were reimbursed or refunded for portions of the costs they incurred after the loss of accreditation. ECF No. 42 at 13-14, ¶¶ 57-59. Plaintiffs do not explain how their characterization is materially different from Defendant's. Additionally, Defendant attempted to place Plaintiffs Olson, Kroneck, and Rodman in other ARC-PA accredited PA programs. ECF No. 22 at 11, ¶ 55. Defendant also attempted to place Contreras in another accredited PA program, despite her withdraw from Cohort 6. Id., ¶ 54. Plaintiffs dispute this fact only to the extent that Kroneck and Contreras were not ultimately placed in another PA program by Defendant, and Olson and Rodman "did significant legwork on their own to secure placements." ECF No. 42 at 12, ¶ 55.

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on March 14, 2022 that raises the following causes of action: violation of Washington's Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"), RCW 19.86 et seq., breach of contract, breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, negligence, and negligent hiring/supervision. ECF No. 1 at 15-28, ¶¶ 55-121. Plaintiff Contreras also alleges causes of action for violations of the Washington Law Against Discrimination ("WLAD"), RCW 49.60 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims asserted against it. ECF No. 19.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

The Court may grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party who demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must only consider admissible evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2002). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to identify specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence...