Convention Headquarters Hotels, LLC v. Marion Cnty. Assessor

173 N.E.3d 307

CONVENTION HEADQUARTERS HOTELS, LLC, Petitioner,

v.MARION COUNTY ASSESSOR, Respondent.

Cause No. 19T-TA-00021

Tax Court of Indiana.

May 21, 2021

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER: BENJAMIN A. BLAIR, DAVID A. SUESS, DANIEL R. ROY, FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP, Indianapolis, IN

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT: JESSICA R. GASTINEAU, SPECIAL COUNSEL - TAX LITIGATION, ANNE C. HARRIGAN, CHIEF LITIGATION COUNSEL, OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL, Indianapolis, IN, RAYMOND J. BIEDERMAN, SEAN P. BURKE, HAMISH S. COHEN, MATTINGLY BURKE COHEN & BIEDERMAN LLP, Indianapolis, IN

ORDER ON PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STRIKE

WENTWORTH, J.

In June of 2019, Convention Headquarters Hotels, LLC ("Convention HQ") filed a direct appeal with this Court challenging the 2010 assessment of its real property. The parties concurrently filed counter motions for partial summary judgment and Convention HQ also filed a motion to strike. This Order resolves Convention HQ's motion to strike ("Motion"). Upon review, the Court grants Convention HQ's Motion in part and denies it in part.

BACKGROUND

Convention HQ owns real property located in downtown Indianapolis. (Pet'r Pet. Jud. Rev. ("Pet'r Pet.") ¶ 6.) The property, comprised of the JW Marriott hotel and several other improvements, is situated on 4.382 acres of land. (Pet'r Pet. ¶¶ 6, 15.) During the 2010 tax year, the property was under construction; the hotel building was only partially-complete. (See Pet'r Pet. ¶¶ 16-18.) As a result, the Assessor used a "percentage complete" factor to assess the partially-complete improvements and assigned the property a total assessed value of $86,987,100. (See Pet'r Pet. ¶¶ 20-21.)

Convention HQ subsequently came to believe that its assessment violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, its civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the "1983 Claim"), the Property Taxation and Equal Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Indiana Constitution, and Indiana's market value-in-use standard. (See Pet'r Pet. ¶¶ 44-96.) Upon exhausting all of its administrative remedies, Convention HQ filed a direct appeal with this Court in June of 2019 pursuant to Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-5(g) because the maximum time for the Indiana Board to issue its final determination had elapsed. (See Pet'r Pet. ¶¶ 4, 7-13.) See also, e.g., IND. CODE § 6-1.1-15-5(g) (2021) (providing that the Tax Court hears direct appeals filed pursuant to Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-5(g) de novo ); Convention Headquarters Hotels, LLC v. Marion Cnty. Assessor (CHH III ), 132 N.E.3d 77, 81, 84 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019) (discussing the Tax Court's de novo standard of review for direct appeals filed under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-5(g) ). Thereafter, the parties filed several procedural motions that the Court subsequently resolved.¹

On June 17, 2020, Convention HQ moved for partial summary judgment on its equal protection, due process, property taxation, and equal privileges and immunities claims. (Pet'r Mot. Partial Summ. J.) In its motion, Convention HQ asserted that it was entitled to summary judgment because the Assessor violated its federal and state constitutional rights by failing to assess most of the other partially-complete commercial buildings within his jurisdiction between the 2006 and 2019 assessment dates. (See, e.g., Pet'r Br. Supp. Pet'r Mot. Partial Summ. J. ("Pet'r Br.") at 1.)

That same day, the Assessor filed his own motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Indiana constitutional claims and the 1983 Claim. (See Resp't Br. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. ("Resp't Br.") at 5-16.) For purposes of the summary judgment motions, the Assessor's designations of evidence consisted of the following:

1. the first affidavit of Jeff Hill with attachments of Convention HQ's administrative appeal forms (Exhibit R-1), documents that were faxed to the Assessor's office (Exhibit R-2), emails concerning the subject property (Exhibit R-3), a memorandum prepared by Convention HQ's former tax representative (Exhibit R-4), and documents that the former tax representative provided to the Assessor's office (Exhibit R-5); 2. Convention HQ's responses to written discovery (Exhibit R-6), the deposition transcript of Convention HQ's 30(B)(6) witness Mark Jindra (Exhibit R-7), and the Assessor's responses to written discovery (Exhibit R-8);

3. the second affidavit of Jeff Hill with attachments of documents regarding Convention HQ's preliminary 2010 assessment (Exhibit R-9), exhibits from the administrative proceedings (Exhibit R-10), aerial photographs of various properties (Exhibit R-11), and documents relating to Parcel 1026770 (Exhibit R-12); and

4. documents relating to several other parcels (Exhibit R-13).

(See Resp't Mot. Partial Summ. J. & Des'g Evid. Supp. Mot. and Resp't Des'g Evid. Supp. Resp. (hereinafter and collectively, "Designations").)

On July 17, 2020, Convention HQ filed its Motion, claiming that most of the Assessor's designated evidence did not comply with all the requirements of Indiana Trial Rule 56. (See Pet'r Resp. Resp't Mot. Partial Summ. J. ("Pet'r Resp. Br.") at 4 n.2, 21-23.) (See also Pet'r Reply Br. Supp. Pet'r Mot. Partial Summ. J. ("Pet'r Reply Br.") at 2-12.) The Court held a hearing on the Motion remotely on September 10, 2020. Additional facts will be supplied when necessary.

LAW

Indiana's summary judgment process is a desirable tool that allows the Tax Court, when functioning as a trial court, to dispose of cases where only legal issues exist. See Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Indiana Trial Rule 56 permits a party to designate affidavits and other forms of evidence on which it relies upon to support its motion for summary judgment. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C), (E). If a party's designated evidence contains statements or matters that are inadequate under Trial Rule 56, the complaining party has a duty to direct the Court to the defective evidence by filing an objection or a motion to strike. See Avco Fin. Servs. of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Metro Holding Co., 563 N.E.2d 1323, 1327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).

ANALYSIS

Convention HQ claims that "most of the Assessor's [designated] evidence should be disregarded or stricken entirely" because it fails to comply with Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) and (E). (See Pet'r Reply Br. 3-12; Pet'r Resp. Br. at 4 n.2.) Specifically, Convention HQ claims that the Assessor's designations of Exhibits R-5 and R-7 through R-13 as evidence do not satisfy the requirements of Trial Rule 56(C). (See Pet'r Reply Br. at 7-12.) In addition, Convention HQ claims that the Assessor's designations of the two affidavits of Jeff Hill are at odds with the requirements of Trial Rule 56(E). (See Pet'r Reply Br. at 4-7.)

I. Trial Rule 56(C)

When filing or responding to a motion for partial summary judgment, a party must "designate to the court all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion" or response. T.R. 56(C). Because Trial Rule 56(C) compels a party to identify the "parts" of any document upon which it relies, a party may not designate various pleadings, discovery materials, affidavits, or other documents in their entirety. See Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1081 (Ind. 2008). A party's designation, however, does not need to take a particular form; "[i]t is sufficient so long as it informs the court regarding the specific material upon which the party relies in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion."

Nyby v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 725 N.E.2d 905, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

Furthermore, "when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court will only consider properly designated evidence that would be admissible at trial." Miller Pipeline Corp. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 995 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2013) (citation omitted). Thus, by way of example, the Court would not consider unsworn statements and unverified exhibits because that evidence would not qualify as proper Rule 56 evidence. Smith v. Delta Tau Delta, Inc., 9 N.E.3d 154, 159 (Ind. 2014) ; Markley Enters., Inc. v. Grover, 716 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (providing that courts should disregard inadmissible hearsay evidence when ruling on motions for summary judgment).

In its brief, Convention HQ asks the Court to strike or disregard Exhibits R-5 and R-7 through R-13. (See Pet'r Reply Br. at 10.) Convention HQ explains that the Assessor's designations of these exhibits are "problematic" because the Assessor has not provided the specificity required by Trial Rule 56(C) given that, in most instances, he did not identify the specific portions of the exhibits that supported his arguments. (See Pet'r Reply Br. at 7-10.)

The purpose of the specificity requirement in Trial Rule 56(C) is to decrease the amount of evidentiary material a court must sift through when ruling on a summary judgment motion. O'Connor by O'Connor v. Stewart, 668 N.E.2d 720, 721-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ; see also Kissell v. Vanes, 629 N.E.2d 878, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that it is not a court's responsibility to search the record and piece together a party's summary judgment argument for it). The Assessor's designations of Exhibits R-5 and R-7 through R-13 contravene that purpose for two reasons.

First, Exhibits R-5, R-7 through R-11, and R-13, which consist of an attachment to Hill's first affidavit, a deposition transcript, the Assessor's written discovery responses, all of the attachments to Hill's second affidavit, and documents regarding other parcels, total 2,751 pages. (See Resp't Exs. R-5, R-7 to R-11, R-13.) Even though the Assessor listed these exhibits in his Designations, his briefs do not refer to most of them at all. (See Resp't Br. at 1-16 (failing to refer to Exhibits R-5, R-7, R-9 to R-11, R-13); Resp't Resp. Pet'r Br. ("Resp't Resp. Br.") at...