Cook Cnty. v. Wolf

461 F.Supp.3d 779

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, an Illinois governmental entity, and Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Inc., Plaintiffs,

v.Chad F. WOLF, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, a federal agency, Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II, in his official capacity as Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, a federal agency, Defendants.

19 C 6334

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed May 19, 2020

A. Colin Wexler, David E. Morrison, Steven A. Levy, Juan Carlos Arguello, Takayuki Ono, Goldberg Kohn Ltd., Jessica Megan Scheller, Lauren Elizabeth Miller, Office of the Cook County States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff Illinois Cook County.

Andrea Marie Kovach, Gavin Michael Kearney, Katherine Elizabeth Walz, Militza Marie Pagan Lopez, Shriver Center On Poverty Law, Caroline Goodwin Chapman, Meghan Patricia Carter, Nanshelmun Ruth Dashan, Legal Counsel for Health Justice, Marlow Elizabeth Svatek, Tacy Fletcher Flint, David Andrew Gordon, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL, Robert S. Velevis, Pro Hac Vice, Yvette Ostolaza, Sidley Austin LLP, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Inc.

Eric J. Soskin, Jason Cyrus Lynch, Kuntal Cholera, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs, Washington, DC, AUSA, United States Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Chad F. Wolf.

Eric J. Soskin, Jason Cyrus Lynch, Joshua Kolsky, Kuntal Cholera, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs, Washington, DC, AUSA, United States Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendants U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, U.S. Citizenshiup and Immigration Services.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge Cook County and Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Inc. ("ICIRR") allege in this suit that the Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") final rule, Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds , 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) ("Final Rule" or "Rule"), violates the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. , and ICIRR alleges that the Rule violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Doc. 1. The court preliminarily enjoined DHS from enforcing the Rule on the ground that it likely violates the APA—specifically, that it likely is incompatible with the meaning of the term "public charge" in the governing statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A). Docs. 85, 87, 106 (reported at 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2019) ). DHS appealed, Cook Cnty. v. Wolf , No. 19-3169 (7th Cir.) (argued Feb. 26, 2020), and the Supreme Court stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal, Wolf v. Cook Cnty. , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 681, 206 L.Ed.2d 142 (2020) (mem.).

Meanwhile, the case proceeds on the merits here. See Wis. Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States , 441 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[A]n appeal taken from an interlocutory decision does not prevent the district court from finishing its work and rendering a final decision."). Before the court are two matters. The first is DHS's motion under Civil Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the suit. Doc. 124. (DHS does not mention Rule 12(b)(1), but that is the proper vehicle for its standing and ripeness arguments. See Swanigan v. City of Chicago , 881 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2018).) The second concerns whether ICIRR is entitled to discovery beyond the administrative record for its equal protection claim. Doc. 95 at 6-7; Docs. 111, 113, 118-119, 121, 137, 140-141, 146.

The court denies DHS's motion to dismiss insofar as it submits that Plaintiffs lack standing or fall outside the pertinent zone of interests, that this suit is not ripe, or that the APA claims fail as a matter of law. The court addressed those issues in its preliminary injunction opinion, 417 F. Supp. 3d at 1016-28, and the Seventh Circuit will have a chance to weigh in when it resolves DHS's appeal. Until then, this court adheres to the views articulated in its opinion. DHS of course may renew under Rule 12(c) any arguments on those issues once the Seventh Circuit rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(B).

That leaves DHS's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss ICIRR's equal protection claim and, if the motion is denied, the question regarding extra-record discovery on that claim.

Background

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the truth of the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions. See Zahn v. N. Am. Power & Gas, LLC , 815 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must also consider "documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice," along with additional facts set forth in ICIRR's brief opposing dismissal, so long as those additional facts "are consistent with the pleadings." Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 714 F.3d 1017, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Heng v. Heavner, Beyers & Mihlar, LLC , 849 F.3d 348, 354 (7th Cir. 2017) ("Materials or elaborations in [the plaintiff's] brief opposing dismissal may be considered, so long as those materials or elaborations are consistent with the pleadings.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. , 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[A] plaintiff is free, in defending against a motion to dismiss, to allege without evidentiary support any facts he pleases that are consistent with the complaint, in order to show that there is a state of facts within the scope of the complaint that if proved (a matter for trial) would entitle him to judgment."). The court must set forth the facts as favorably to ICIRR as those materials allow. See Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc. , 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016). In setting forth the facts at the pleading stage, the court does not vouch for their accuracy. See Goldberg v. United States , 881 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 2018).

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

Before getting to the factual background, a few words are in order about the Final Rule and its governing statute. Section 212(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") states: "Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A). The public charge provision has a long pedigree, dating back to the Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, §§ 1-2, 22 Stat. 214, 214, which directed immigration officers to refuse entry to "any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge." The provision has been part of our Nation's immigration statutes, in various but nearly identical forms, ever since. See Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084; Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 899; Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876; INA of 1952, ch. 477, § 212(a)(15), 66 Stat. 163, 183; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 531(a), 110 Stat. 3009 -546, 3009-674 to -675 (1996).

Prior to the rulemaking that yielded the Final Rule, the federal agency charged with immigration enforcement last articulated its understanding of the term "public charge" in a 1999 field guidance document. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689 (May 26, 1999). The field guidance defined a "public charge" as a person "primarily dependent on the government for subsistence," and instructed immigration officials to ignore non-cash public benefits in assessing whether a person was "likely at any time to become a public charge." Id. at 28,689.

In October 2018, DHS published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (Oct. 10, 2018). Some ten months later, DHS issued the Final Rule, which addressed comments, revised the proposed rule, and provided analysis to support the Rule. See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,292. As DHS described it, the Rule "redefines the term ‘public charge’ to mean an alien who receives one or more designated public benefits for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month period (such that, for instance, receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months)." Id. at 41,295.

By adopting a largely duration-based standard, the Rule deems aliens who receive only modest benefits to be public charges so long as they receive those benefits for the requisite time period. As the Rule explains: "DHS may find an alien inadmissible ... even though the alien who exceeds the duration threshold may receive only hundreds of dollars, or less, in public benefits annually." Id. at 41,360 -61. The Rule "defines the term ‘public benefit’ to include cash benefits for income maintenance, [the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program], most forms of Medicaid, Section 8 Housing Assistance under the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) Program, Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance, and certain other forms of subsidized housing." Id. at 41,295. The Rule sets forth several nonexclusive factors DHS must consider in making a public charge determination, including "the alien's health," any "diagnosed ... medical condition" that "will interfere with the alien's ability to provide and care for himself or herself, to attend school, or to work," and past applications for enumerated public benefits. Id. at 41,502 -04. The Rule also requires DHS to consider "[w]hether the alien is...