Cook v. Kata

ROBERT T. COOK, PLAINTIFF, v. WILLIAM KATA, DEFENDANT.

CASE NO. 4:14 CV 1283

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

November 10, 2015

JUDGE SARA LIOI

MEMORANDUM OPINIOIN

The matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant William Kata ("defendant" or "Kata") for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 36 ["Mot."].) Plaintiff Robert Cook ("plaintiff" or "Cook") has opposed defendant's motion (Doc. No. 43 ["Opp'n"]), and defendant has replied (Doc. No. 45 ["Reply"]). Defendant's motion is ripe for decision, and for the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from events occurring on June 13, 2013. Plaintiff's residence is located on Hoss Avenue in Hubbard, Ohio. On that day, defendant William Kata, who is a deputy with the Trumbull County Sheriff's Department, went to plaintiff's residence to obtain the vehicle identification numbers ("VINs") from four "junk" vehicles on plaintiff's property.

Cook was previously noticed and issued summons for violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4513.65 with respect to "junk" vehicles on his property. Kata was asked by Deputy Wix, also with the Trumbull County Sheriff's Department, to retrieve the VINs from four of the vehicles pursuant to an agreement between Cook and the prosecutor reached at a pretrial conference conducted in connection with the summons. (Doc. No. 38 (Deposition of William Kata ["Kata Dep."]) at 295.¹) Cook denies reaching an agreement with the prosecutor that the sheriff would come to his property to obtain the VINs from four "junk" vehicles. (Doc. No. 39 (Deposition of Robert Cook ["Cook Dep."] at 346).).

When Kata arrived at Cook's property, he began obtaining the VINs from the vehicles. Kata did not have a warrant or any other documentation. Cook came out of his house and confronted Kata regarding the reason for his presence and objected to Kata's presence without a warrant. Cook's testimony is mixed as to whether he told Kata to get out of the car in which Kata was looking for the VIN, or to leave the property. (Cook Dep. at 344-46.) Cook told Kata that he was calling the Ohio State Highway Patrol to send a cruiser because Cook had an armed intruder—Kata—on his property, and Kata observed Cook using his cell phone.

The parties have conflicting accounts of what took place next. According to Kata, Cook stated that he had a gun in his storage shed and was going to shoot Kata, and began walking toward the shed. Kata states that when he ordered Cook to stop walking toward the shed Cook turned toward Kata and threw coffee on him, then resumed walking toward the shed. At that point, Kata deployed his taser and struck Cook in the back. (Kata Dep. at 296-97.).

Cook flatly denies that he told Kata he had a gun in his shed or was going to shoot Kata if he did not leave the property. (Cook Dep. at 349-50.) According to Cook, he walked away from Kata to meet the highway patrol when they arrived. Plaintiff claims that when he turned his back on Kata, Kata deployed his taser and struck Cook in the back, causing Cook to fall to the ground and drop his coffee and his cell phone. (Cook Dep. at 352-53.).

What is not in dispute with respect to the events of June 13, 2013, is that Cook was charged with aggravated menacing of Kata pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.21(A). After a jury trial at which Cook was represented by counsel and testified on his own behalf, Cook was found guilty by the jury of aggravated menacing. (Doc. No. 36-2 (Judgment Entry and Jury Verdict); Cook Dep. at 342; Doc. No. 40 (Trial Transcript ["Tr."] at 595).).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. If a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, then summary judgment is not appropriate. Id.

The moving party must provide evidence to the court which demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Once the moving party meets this initial burden, the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The nonmoving party may oppose a summary judgment motion "by any of the kinds of evidentiary material listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves[.]" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The Court must view all facts and evidence, and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom, in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1962).

General averments or conclusory allegations of an affidavit do not create specific fact disputes for summary judgment purposes. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888-89, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990). "Summary judgment requires that a plaintiff present more than a scintilla of evidence to demonstrate each element of a prima facie case." Garza v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. 536 F. App'x 517, 519 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Van Gorder v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 509 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2007)). "'The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].'" Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

In summary, the district court's review on summary judgment is a threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial due to genuine factual issues that must be resolved by a finder of fact because those issues may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Put another way, this Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52; see also Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 578 (6th Cir. 2003).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff alleges that Kata violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when Kata allegedly entered onto Cook's property to obtain VINs without the lawful right to do so and used excessive force against Cook. Cook seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to recover under § 1983, plaintiff must establish that Kata acted under color of state law and violated Cook's rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S. Ct. 1598 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). The parties do not dispute that, on the day in question, Kata was acting under color of state law. The only question is whether Kata violated Cook's rights under the Fourth Amendment.²

C. Qualified Immunity

Kata argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on merits of plaintiff's claims and on the basis of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is not a mere defense to liability, but shields a government official from suit if the official's conduct in performing a discretionary function does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (citation omitted). A government official is entitled to qualified immunity even if that official makes a mistake of fact, law, or mixed question of law and fact—qualified immunity provides "ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815 and Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S. Ct. 534, 116 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1991) (further citation omitted)).

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity, and must do so by showing that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established in light of the specific context of the case. Marsilio v. Vigluicci, 924 F. Supp. 2d 837, 855 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001)) (other citations omitted). "For a right to be clearly established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id.(quoting Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir.2003)). The Court has the discretion to consider the two prongs of Saucier's qualified immunity analysis in whatever order is appropriate in light of the circumstances of a particular case. Scozzari v. Miedzianowski, 597 F. App'x 845, 847-48 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).

D. Excessive Force Claim

The "right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established Fourth Amendment right." Neague v. Cynkar, 258 F.3d 504, 507 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1342 (6th Cir. 1993)). Therefore, to decide whether Kata is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity with respect to Cook's excessive force claim, the Court must first determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Kata's use of force was excessive in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that is, whether Kata's tasing of Cook was objectively reasonable in...