Cook v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs.

Royce W. Cook Counsel of Record

ORDER

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This cause is before the Court on Petitioner Royce W. Cook's timely pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Respondent filed a response (Doc. 5) and Cook filed a reply (Doc. 8). Upon consideration, the Court ORDERS that Cook's petition is DENIED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Cook was charged with two counts of capital sexual battery and four counts of sexual battery. (Doc. 5-2 Ex. 3). He entered a negotiated plea whereby he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of attempted capital sexual battery and four counts of sexual battery in exchange for an overall 25-year sentence. (Doc. 5-2 Ex. 9, Ex. 10, Ex. 11 pp. 347-48). Cook did not appeal the convictions and sentences.

Cook filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Doc. 5-2 Ex. 12). The state court struck his motion with

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leave to amend. (Doc. 5-2 Ex. 13). Cook filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion through counsel. (Doc. 5-2 Ex. 14). After obtaining a response from the State, the state court summarily denied the amended motion. (Doc. 5-2 Exs. 15, 16, 17). The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the denial of relief. (Doc. 5-2 Ex. 21).

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

I. The AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) governs this proceeding. Carroll v. Sec'y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) provides that federal habeas relief cannot be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme]

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Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id.

The AEDPA was meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one.” Id. at 694; see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (“As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”).

The state appellate court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief without discussion. This decision warrants deference under § 2254(d)(1) because “the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due.” Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002). When a state appellate court issues a silent affirmance, “the federal court should ‘look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale” and “presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

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Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland requires a showing of deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Id. at 687. Deficient performance is established if, “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. However, “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.

Cook must show that counsel's alleged error prejudiced the defense because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, Cook must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Because he entered a plea, Cook “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

Obtaining relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is difficult on federal habeas review because “[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013) (stating that this doubly deferential standard of review

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“gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.”). “The question [on federal habeas review of an ineffective assistance claim] ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination' under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.'” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)).

EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES; PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

A federal habeas petitioner must exhaust his claims in state court before presenting them in his federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (“[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.”). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner fairly presents his claim in each appropriate state court and alerts that court to the federal nature of the claim. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971).

The doctrine of procedural default provides that “[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs in an extraordinary case where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

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conviction of someone who is actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003).

To establish cause for a procedural default, a petitioner “must demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in state court.” Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999). In recognizing a narrow exception to the rule that an attorney's error in a postconviction proceeding does not constitute cause for a procedural default, the Supreme Court has held:

Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012).

To establish cause under Martinez, a petitioner must demonstrate that the defaulted ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim “is a substantial one, which is to say that [he] must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Id. at 14. A claim that does not have any merit or that is wholly without factual support is not substantial. See Id. at 15-16.

DISCUSSION

I. Introduction: Cook's Plea

Cook entered a negotiated guilty plea. The following occurred at the change of plea hearing:

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COUNSEL: [ ] Mr. Cook is now present, Your Honor, before the Court standing on my right

THE COURT: And what's the deal, [State]?

[STATE]: Judge, the State would be allowing the defendant to plea to adjudication, 25 years Department of Corrections.

THE COURT: Okay. Adjudication, 25 years DOC. . . .

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Cook, raise your right hand.

(Defendant sworn.)

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. What's your full name?

THE DEFENDANT: Royce Wayne Cook.

THE COURT: How old are you?

THE