Cooley v. Soc. Sec. Admin.

BRYAN M. COOLEY v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Civil Action No. 21-840

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

February 4, 2022

SECTION "T"(5)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Bryan M. Cooley filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 405(g) for review of the final decision of the Commissioner denying his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“SSA”). The matter has been fully briefed on cross-motions for summary judgment and the issues are ripe for review. For the following reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be DENIED, the Commissioner's cross-motion be GRANTED, and Plaintiff's case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I.BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his application for DIB on September 10, 2019, alleging a disability onset date of May 11, 2016. (Adm. Rec. at 166-67). Plaintiff alleged disability due to a back injury arthritis in his back, a bulging disc in his back, nerve pain from the bulging disc, gastric issues, high blood pressure morbid obesity, chronic pain, and depression. (Id. at 67). Plaintiff, born on November 2, 1963, was 52 years old on the date on which he alleged disability and 55 years old when he filed his application. (Id. at 66). Plaintiff has a high-school education, (id. at 196), and he has past work experience as a warehouse supervisor and worker. (Id. at 197).

Defendant initially denied Plaintiff's application on October 22, 2019. (Id. at 97-100). Plaintiff sought an administrative hearing, which Defendant held on August 24, 2020. (Id. at 37-68). Plaintiff and a vocational expert (“VE”), Crystal D. Younger, testified at the hearing.

On September 11, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision, in which he concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 11-27). In that decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; degenerative disc disease; obesity; gastric issues, including chronic gastroesophageal reflux disease; and status post-gall bladder surgery. (Id. at 14). The ALJ ultimately held, however, that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or a combination of impairments that meets or medically equals a listed impairment under the regulations. (Id. at 16). The ALJ found that Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work activity as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except occasionally climbing, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Id. at 17). Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff can perform his past relevant work as a warehouse manager. (Id. at 26). The ALJ thus denied Plaintiff DIB. (Id.).

Plaintiff asked the Appeals Council to review the ALJ's conclusion that he is not disabled. On March 1, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to review the ALJ's decision. (Id. at 1-7). Plaintiff then timely filed this civil action.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The function of a district court on judicial review is limited to determining whether there is “substantial evidence” in the record, as a whole, to support the final decision of the Commissioner as trier of fact, and whether the Commissioner applied the appropriate legal standards to evaluate the evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999); Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995); Carriere v. Sullivan, 944 F.2d 243, 245 (5th Cir. 1991). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court must affirm them. Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173.

“Substantial evidence” is that which is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401(1971); Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002). It is more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance. Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993). A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings exist to support the Commissioner's decision. See Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2002).

A district court may not try the issues de novo, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000); Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995); Spellman, 1 F.3d at 360. Notably, the Commissioner is entitled to make any finding supported by substantial evidence, regardless of whether other conclusions are also permissible. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112-13 (1992). Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the courts. Carey, 230 F.3d at 135. Any findings of fact by the Commissioner that are supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 555. Despite this Court's limited function on review, the Court must scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached and whether substantial evidence exists to support it. Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990).

III. ENTITLEMENT TO BENEFITS UNDER THE ACT

To be considered disabled and eligible for disability benefits under the Act, Plaintiff must show an inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is considered disabled only if a physical or mental impairment is so severe that the claimant is unable to do not only previous work, but cannot, considering claimant's age, education and work experience, participate in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the area in which the claimant lives, whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether the claimant would be hired if she or he applied for work. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B). The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that provide procedures for evaluating a claim and determining disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501 - 404.1599 & Appendices, §§ 416.901t-416.988 (1995). The regulations include a five-step evaluation process for determining whether an impairment prevents a person from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Id. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994).

In Shave v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 2001), the Fifth Circuit restated the five-step procedure to make a disability determination under the Social Security Act:

The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” To determine whether a claimant is disabled, and thus entitled to disability benefits, a five-step analysis is employed. First, the claimant must not be presently working at any substantial gainful activity. Second, the claimant must have an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe. An impairment or combination of impairments is “severe” if it “significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Third, the claimant's impairment must meet or equal an impairment listed in the appendix to the regulations. Fourth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from returning to his past relevant work. Fifth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any relevant work, considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education and past work experience. At steps one through four, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant to show he is disabled. If the claimant acquits this responsibility, at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is other gainful employment the claimant is capable of performing in spite of his existing impairments. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant must then prove he in fact cannot perform the alternate work.

Id. at 594 (quoting Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1999)). If the ALJ determines that a Plaintiff is not disabled under Step V of the five-part test, the ALJ must establish that the claimant has a “residual functional capacity, ” given the claimant's age, education, and past work experience, to perform other work available in the national economy. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 n.11 (5th Cir. 1995). Step V also requires the Commissioner to use the medical-vocational guidelines to make a disability determination. Id.

The four elements of proof weighed to determine whether evidence of disability is substantial are: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) claimant's age, education, and work history. Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995). “The Commissioner, rather than the courts, must resolve conflicts in the evidence.” Id.

IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL

There are three issues on appeal:

(1) Whether the ALJ properly denied Plaintiff's application at Step 4 on an “as generally” basis.

(2) Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC finding and the dispositive hypothetical question.

(3) Whether the ALJ had the constitutional authority to render a decision on Plaintiff's DIB application.

V. ANALYSIS

1. Whether the ALJ properly denied Plaintif...