Cooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

661 F.Supp.3d 618

Eric COOLEY, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-60-KHJ-MTP

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division, Northern Division

Signed March 13, 2023

Lindsey A. Topp, Hair Shunnarah Trial Attorneys, Metairie, LA, for Plaintiff.

Michael F. Myers, Currie, Johnson & Myers, PA, Jackson, MS, for Defendant.

ORDER

Kristi H. Johnson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's ("State Farm") [36] Motion to Strike Expert Testimony and [38] Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, Partial Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion to Strike and grants in part and denies in part the Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

This case arises from an insurance dispute between Plaintiff Eric Cooley and Defendant State Farm. On April 13, 2019, a windstorm blew down a tree in Cooley's yard in Vicksburg, Mississippi. Compl. [1-1] ¶ 6; Mem. Supp. Def.'s Mot. Strike Expert [37] at 2. The tree struck Cooley's roof, but the parties dispute how much damage the tree caused. Compare [1-1] ¶ 6 (alleging the tree caused "significant damage"), with [37] at 2 (stating the tree "brushed the edge of the roof"). On April 15, State Farm's adjuster inspected Cooley's property. [1-1] ¶ 8; [37] at 2. He documented $1,091.58 in damages, which was less than Cooley's deductible. [1-1] ¶ 8; [37] at 2. Accordingly, State Farm did not issue a payment for the damages at that time. [1-1] ¶ 8; [37] at 2.

In July 2020, public adjuster Mario Barrilleaux inspected Cooley's property. [1-1] ¶ 10; [37] at 3. He concluded that Cooley's house and other personal property sustained around $40,000 in damages from the windstorm. [1-1] ¶ 10; [37] at 3. After Cooley submitted another claim to State Farm based on Barrilleaux's estimate, State Farm hired Jason Dill, an independent engineer, to reinspect the property. [1-1] ¶ 13; [37] at 3-4. Dill determined that Cooley's property sustained damages of $2,569.63. [1-1] ¶ 13. Based on that estimate, State Farm paid Cooley $1,353.63—the amount of damages above Cooley's deductible. Id.; [37] at 4.

On February 8, 2022, Cooley sued State Farm, alleging breach of contract and bad faith for failing to pay for all the damages assessed by Barrilleaux. [1-1] ¶¶ 23-36. Unfortunately, Barrilleaux died after Cooley filed his lawsuit. [37] at 4; Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. [43] at 2. Cooley then retained public adjuster Luke Irwin to review his claim and offer expert testimony on the scope, value, and cause of the damages to his property from the windstorm. [37] at 4; [43] at 2. Irwin reviewed photos of Cooley's property, the estimates from State Farm and Barrilleaux, a roof scope report, applicable building codes, and other documents, and estimated that Cooley's property sustained around $95,000 in damages. [36-1] at 51; [37] at 5.

State Farm now moves to strike Irwin's expert testimony. [36]. State Farm further contends that if the Court excludes Irwin's testimony, then summary judgment is appropriate because Cooley cannot prove his home sustained additional damages. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. [39] at 7. Alternatively, even if Irwin's testimony is not excluded, State Farm argues that partial summary judgment is appropriate for Cooley's bad-faith claim, punitive damages, or other extra-contractual damages. Id. at 8-12.

The Court first addresses the [36] Motion to Strike and then the [38] Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, Partial Summary Judgment.

II. Motion to Strike

A. Standard

An expert who is qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" may provide opinion testimony if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. The district judge acts as a gatekeeper to ensure that any evidence admitted under FRE 702 is both relevant and reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). That role is "a flexible one," and there is no "definitive checklist or test" that a judge must follow in every case. Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Rather, "the gatekeeping inquiry must be 'tied to the facts of a particular case.' " Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (citation omitted)).

"While the district court must act as a gatekeeper to exclude all irrelevant and unreliable expert testimony, 'the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.' " Puga v. RCX Sols., Inc., 922 F.3d 285, 294 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendment). "The trial court's role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system." U.S. v. 14.38 Acres of Land, More or Less Situated in Leflore Cnty., State of Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996). Instead, "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786).

B. Analysis

State Farm attacks Irwin's expert testimony on several grounds. But it fails to align its arguments with the contours of Rule 702, and instead lumps its arguments in one discussion section. See [37] at 5-13. Even so, the Court will address each element of Rule 702 pursuant to its "gatekeeping" role.

i. Irwin's Qualifications

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires that an expert be properly qualified. But it "does not mandate that an expert be highly qualified in order to testify about a given issue." Carlson v. Bioremedi Therapeutic Sys., Inc., 822 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009)). Rather, "[d]ifferences in expertise bear chiefly on the weight to be assigned to the testimony by the trier of fact, not its admissibility." Id.

Courts regularly find that insurance and public adjusters are qualified to testify on damage-causation issues in insurance cases. See, e.g., Haimur v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 605 F. Supp. 3d 887, 890 (S.D. Miss. 2022); Patton v. Metro. Lloyds Ins. Co. of Tex., No. 5:21-CV-074, 2022 WL 2898946, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2022); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 17-597, 2021 WL 292440, at *9-10 (M.D. La. Jan. 28, 2021); Mahli, LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 1:14-CV-175, 2015 WL 4915701, at *6-7 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 2015). "It is a well-known fact that claims adjusters must estimate the damage caused by natural disasters and other casualties, because causation is a key factor in insurance-coverage determinations." Patton, 2022 WL 2898946, at *4. Although "[e]xperience in engineering . . . could be helpful . . . in evaluating weather-damage causation," it is not required and "goes to the degree of expertise" rather than whether an adjuster is qualified under Rule 702. Id.

Irwin is qualified to testify in this case. He holds public-adjuster licenses in both Mississippi and Louisiana and is a licensed insurance adjuster in Oklahoma. Irwin's Expert Report [36-1] at 12. He has conducted over 1,000 underwriting inspections, been an appraiser or umpire for over 1,000 matters, and served as a public adjuster for over 1,000 claims. Id. He also has extensive certifications and training in inspecting damages to roofs and other property. Id. at 12-13. Irwin has the requisite "knowledge, skill, experience, training, [and] education" to testify on the causation of damages to Cooley's roof and to make repair estimates. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. In fact, State Farm concedes that Irwin's experience adjusting claims "may permit him, with the proper factual basis and other necessary factors, to prepare repair estimates . . . ." [37] at 6.

But State Farm argues Irwin is not qualified to testify to certain "engineering opinions" in his expert report. Id. at 5. Specifically, State Farm objects to Irwin's "approximately [four] page discussion of the general effects of wind on structures, the forces involved, and quotations from various engineers of engineering journals." Id. at 5-6. The Court agrees that certain portions of the four-page discussion are problematic. See [36-1] at 4-8. For example, one section discusses in detail how changes in atmospheric conditions can lead to wind damages, and it is doubtful that Irwin is qualified to testify to that specific information. See id. at 4. But as Cooley points out, "the contested portion of Mr. Irwin's report does not include any engineering conclusions or opinions for Plaintiff's structure specifically." [41] at 7. State Farm also concedes this point. See [37] at 6 ("Mr. Irwin admits that this entire discussion is a cut and paste that appears in most of his reports and does not have any specific application to this case.").

Even if Irwin is not qualified to testify to certain portions of his report, it does not bar him from testifying completely. Although experience in engineering could help Irwin's testimony, it is not required for him to testify about the causes of damage to Cooley's property. See Patton, 2022 WL 2898946, at *4. Such experience "goes to the degree of [Irwin's] expertise," not his general qualifications. See id. Even if there is some merit to State Farm's contention that Irwin is not qualified to testify as an engineer, "the precise delineations of what opinions [he] can offer are more appropriately the subject of a motion in limine and/or an objection at trial." Timoschuk v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., No. SA-12-CV-816-XR, 2014 WL 2533789, at *6 (W.D....