Cooper's Hawk Indianapolis, LLC v. Ray

150 N.E.3d 698

COOPER'S HAWK INDIANAPOLIS, LLC d/b/a Cooper's Hawk Winery & Restaurant, Appellant-Defendant,

v.Katherine RAY, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CT-127

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED June 29, 2020

Attorney for Appellant: R. Gregory Sylvester, Reminger Co., LPA, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorney for Appellee: Kyle L. Christie, Cline Farrell Christie Lee & Bell, P.C., Indianapolis, Indiana

Brown, Judge.

[1] Cooper's Hawk Indianapolis, LLC d/b/a Cooper's Hawk Winery & Restaurant, ("Cooper's Hawk") appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. We reverse.

Facts & Procedural History

[2] At some point, Katherine Ray and Ian Ray entered Cooper's Hawk while it was raining and walked to the tasting counter to begin their winetasting. After they had been poured their first taste, Katherine told Ian she needed to use the restroom, and she walked through the restaurant to the restroom. While she was on her way and walking down the hallway, she did not notice any water, any accumulation of water, or anything on the floor. She used the restroom, and slipped and fell on her way out of the restroom door.

[3] A Cooper's Hawk staff member informed Ian that Katherine was hurt, and he walked to the restroom. After three EMTs arrived, Ian began looking to see if something might have caused her fall and observed that "[t]he EMS personnel, the doctor ... did comment ... his right knee was damp when he arose from a sitting, a kneeling position from next to her." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 90-91. Ian "noticed that her left – when she arose from a sitting position, her left flank was slightly damp from – her jeans were damp." Id. at 91. Ian observed "a few very small puddles, but it was mostly sort of that dampness that the sidewalk outside had," "[k]ind of as if somebody had sprayed like a spray bottle of water," and "[t]here was a mist on the floor."¹ Id. at 92.

[4] On October 19, 2018, Katherine filed a complaint alleging she "slipped and fell on an accumulation of water on the ceramic tile floor" and was injured.² Id. at 30. Katherine alleged Cooper's Hawk and/or its employees carelessly and negligently: (1) allowed a hazardous condition to exist on its premises after it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the hazardous condition; (2) failed to maintain its premises in a safe condition; (3) failed to inspect and discover the dangerous condition; (4) failed to remedy the hazardous condition after they knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the existence of the hazardous condition; (5) failed to warn business invitees and the public of the dangerous condition; and (6) failed to provide a reasonable safe walking area for use by invitees, particularly Katherine.

[5] On September 13, 2019, Cooper's Hawk filed a motion for summary judgment and a brief alleging it was entitled to summary judgment because it did not have actual or constructive notice of the defective condition that purportedly caused Katherine to injure herself, it did not owe her a duty, and it was not the proximate cause of Katherine's injury. Cooper's Hawk designated portions of the depositions of Katherine and Ian and an affidavit of Meagan Masters, the front house manager of Cooper's Hawk on the date of Katherine's fall. On November 13, 2019, Katherine filed a reply. On November 18, 2019, the trial court denied Cooper's Hawk motion for summary judgment. Cooper's Hawk filed a motion to reconsider, and the court denied the motion.

Discussion

[6] The issue is whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment filed by Cooper's Hawk. We review an order for summary judgment de novo , applying the same standard as the trial court. Hughley v. State , 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). The moving party bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Manley v. Sherer , 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013). Summary judgment is improper if the moving party fails to carry its burden, but if it succeeds, then the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. We construe all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party. Id.

[7] Cooper's Hawk contends that it did not have actual or constructive knowledge of any hazard present outside of the women's restroom. It asserts Katherine "fails to show how [it] could have discovered the wet spots on the floor outside the women's restroom in the exercise of the ordinary care when, admittingly, the only witness that testified that there were wet spots on the floor stated that they were hardly visible from a standing position." Appellant's Brief at 15-16. It also asserts that she fails to present facts showing that its negligence was the proximate cause of her fall. Katherine argues that "Cooper's Hawk is incorrect in its claim that it lacked ‘constructive knowledge’ because Ms. Masters nor any other Cooper's Hawk [employee] was shown to be in the area prior to [her] fall." Appellee's Brief at 15. She also argues that the negligence of Cooper's Hawk was the proximate cause of her fall.

[8] To recover on a negligence theory, the plaintiff must establish: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant's breach. Rhodes v. Wright , 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004). Absent a duty there can be no negligence or liability based upon the breach. Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc. , 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts to decide. Id. at 386-387. A defendant is entitled to summary judgment by demonstrating that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim. Countrymark Coop., Inc. v. Hammes , 892 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied . Generally, summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence. Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. , 32 N.E.3d 227, 231 (Ind. 2015). However, where the facts are undisputed and lead to but a single inference or conclusion, the court as a matter of law may determine whether a breach of duty has occurred. King v. Ne. Sec., Inc. , 790 N.E.2d 474, 484 (Ind. 2003), reh'g denied .

[9] "Falling and injuring one's self proves nothing. Such happenings are commonplace wherever humans go." Ogden Estate v. Decatur Cty. Hosp. , 509 N.E.2d 901, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), reh'g denied , trans. denied . "This court has long held that ‘negligence cannot be inferred from the mere fact of an accident, absent special circumstances.’ " Brown v. Buchmeier , 994 N.E.2d 291, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Taylor v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc. , 949 N.E.2d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Hale v. Cmty. Hosp. of Indianapolis, Inc. , 567 N.E.2d 842, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) )). Moreover, negligence cannot be established through inferential speculation alone. Id. The mere allegation of a fall is insufficient to establish negligence, and negligence cannot be inferred from the mere fact of a fall. Id.

[10] A property owner must maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition for business invitees. Pelak v. Ind. Indus. Servs., Inc. , 831 N.E.2d 765, 769 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Douglass v. Irvin , 549 N.E.2d 368, 369 (Ind. 1990) ), reh'g denied , trans. denied . Indiana has adopted the formulation of landowners' liability to business invitees expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. (citing Douglass , 549 N.E.2d at 370 ); see also Smith v. Baxter , 796 N.E.2d 242, 244 (Ind. 2003). The Restatement provides:

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he:

(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343. Under this section, an invitee is "entitled to expect that the possessor will take reasonable care to ascertain the actual condition of the premises and, having discovered it, either to make it reasonably safe by repair or to give warning of the actual condition and the risk involved therein." Merrill v. Knauf Fiber Glass GmbH , 771 N.E.2d 1258, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343, cmt. d), trans. denied . While a landowner's duty to a business invitee includes a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from foreseeable dangers on the premises, there is no duty to insure a business invitee's safety while on the premises. Schulz v. Kroger Co. , 963 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). "As an invitor is not the insurer of the invitee's safety, and before liability may be imposed on the invitor, it must have actual or constructive knowledge of the danger." Id. "[W]e have defined constructive knowledge as a ‘condition [which] has existed for such a length of time and under such circumstances that it would have been discovered in time to have prevented injury if the storekeeper, his agents or employees had used ordinary care.’ " Id. (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Blaylock , 591 N.E.2d 624, 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (citing F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Jones , 126 Ind. App. 118, 130 N.E.2d 672, 673 (1955) ), trans. denied ).

[11] The designated evidence...