Cooper v. Am. Univ.

AAMIR COOPER, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 18-cv-1970 (TSC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 23, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TANYA S. CHUTKAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Aamir Cooper sued American University (“AU”) alleging employment discrimination based on his race and gender. AU has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, ECF No. 37. For the reasons explained below, Defendant's motion will be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 4, 2016, Plaintiff, an African American man, began working as a Police Dispatcher in AU's Police Department. That same day, Plaintiff signed a form acknowledging and agreeing to follow “the policies in the Staff Personnel Policies Manual and other university polices.” Def.'s Stmt. of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 14, 16 (“Def.'s Facts”), ECF No. 37-2. The form included “specific instructions” on how to access the Personnel Manual, id. ¶ 16, which “includes a reference to [AU's] Discrimination and Sexual Harassment Policy, ” id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff's job entailed receiving emergency and non-emergency “requests for service by radio and telephone, ” determining an appropriate response to the caller “according to location and nature of problem and procedures of the department, ” and “enter[ing] record[ing], track[ing] and updat[ing] service calls and police activity in the computer-aided dispatch system.” Id. ¶ 15.

In late May 2017, a student lifeguard at the Reeves Aquatics Center complained to her supervisor, Anike Oladeji, that Plaintiff “had made inappropriate comments to her while at the swimming pool.” Id. ¶ 17. On May 26, 2017, Employee Relations Advisor Roberta Goldstein learned that Oladeji “had received several complaints from lifeguards and student pool patrons about Cooper.” Decl. of Deadre' Johnson ¶ 15, ECF No. 37-3.^[1] Goldstein “spoke to Will Sowers, the Assistant Director, University Police & Transportation Programs” and “asked that someone from the Department of Public Safety speak” to Plaintiff “and tell him not to use the pool until they had a chance to speak to [him] about the allegations.” Id. ¶ 16. Shortly after, Captain Kevin Barrett called Plaintiff to his office, informed him “that there was an open investigation” and gave Plaintiff “a direct order not to go to the pool, ” Decl. of Kevin Barrett ¶ 7, ECF No. 37-5 at 11-12. Although Plaintiff disputes the description of Barrett's statement as an order, Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, ECF No. 38-2 at 2-5, on June 28, 2017, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave with pay for violating “instructions” not to visit the pool pending the outcome of the investigation of the “sexual harassment complaint” against him, ECF No. 38-2 at 86.

Meanwhile, on June 14, 2017, the student lifeguard spoke to Employee Relations Coordinator Jessica Finegan and “elaborated on her earlier May 2017 complaint to Oladeji about Cooper's conduct.” Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 9, 20. Following her conversation with the lifeguard, Finegan spoke with HR Director Johnson and Employee Relations Advisor Santo A. Scrimenti, and an investigation ensued under Johnson's supervision. “[S]oon” after learning “about the student lifeguard's allegations, ” Johnson “emailed the Title IX Coordinator Regina Curran to inform her about the complaint and to schedule a call to discuss further.” Johnson Decl. ¶ 20. Curran remained “informed throughout the course of the investigation.”^[2] Id. ¶ 21.

As part of the investigation, Finegan and Scrimenti interviewed Plaintiff, as well as the complainant, Oladeji, a male pool patron, and another female student lifeguard. Id. ¶ 23. They also received from Oladeji written statements from other female student lifeguards and pool patrons, which revealed that “a total of five female student lifeguards and pool patrons had complaints against” Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 25-26; see id. ¶¶ 28-34 (recounting complainants' statements that raised “more” concerns “about Cooper's inappropriate behavior, ” including one indicating that the behavior “had started as early as 2016”).

On July 21, 2017, the investigation concluded with Scrimenti's and Finegan's “Confidential Report on Investigation.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 35. The original complainant and Plaintiff were informed “simultaneously on July 28, 2017, about the outcome of the investigation, ” id. ¶ 44, which was also the date of Plaintiff's termination as per the recommendation of Human Resources. In the termination letter prepared by Human Resources in consultation with Police Chief Phillip Morse, Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 42-43, Morse explained:

HR's investigation [ ] included interviews with you and the complainant as well as other staff and patrons of the Aquatic Center, and they were able to corroborate that you inappropriately attempted to make sexual advances toward at least four students and one staff member. Four witnesses independently corroborated that you used the alias “Noah” and gave shifting stories about your affiliation with the University, never truthfully disclosing your role as University Police Dispatcher.

The University's core competencies require that all staff act ethically and with integrity, which is defined, in relevant part, as “think[ing] carefully about the likely effect on others of one's words, actions and behavior.” Additionally, the core competencies require staff to support a diverse and inclusive community, which means staff should avoid “doing or saying things that might offend others.”

You have exhibited a pattern of unprofessional and inappropriate behavior that runs counter to your duties as a member of the University Police Department and has substantially eroded and undermined your ability to do your job. Specifically, sexual advances toward those you are charged to protect and assist in times of crises, as well as use of a false identity, cannot be tolerated. Your behavior constitutes a Level III violation of University policy - serious misconduct - which is grounds for immediate termination.]

Therefore, consistent with the University's discipline policy, I have decided to terminate your employment effective today, July 28, 2017.

ECF No. 37-4 at 98-99.

Johnson attests that she, Scrimenti, and Finegan “concluded that Cooper's behavior was a Level III violation of AU policy and, as a result, [he] should be terminated for cause.” Johnson Decl. ¶ 37. Johnson “approved the termination decision because Cooper's conduct was so egregious, given his role as a Police Dispatcher, and because multiple witnesses provided similar statements describing a pattern of inappropriate and aggressive behavior by Cooper.” Id. ¶ 38. Johnson notes:

The recommendations section of the investigation report stated, inter alia: “Mr. Cooper did not admit to unprofessional behavior and inappropriate behavior when confronted with some of the allegations. Each of the remaining allegations, which Mr. Cooper denied, were verified and corroborated by at least two other lifeguards. Because every lifeguard interviewed and those who provided statements consistently described a pattern of inappropriate behavior, Mr. Cooper's assertions and explanations to the contrary are dubious. Mr. Cooper is an employee of the Department of Public Safety, making his unprofessionalism more egregious. Each lifeguard and pool patron interviewed had directly witnessed and experienced multiple instances of Mr. Cooper's inappropriate behavior.”

Decl. ¶ 36 (citing Ex. 3). Johnson further attests that Plaintiff's termination was not based on his race or gender but “on the facts presented in the investigation, ” id. ¶ 40, and that Plaintiff's “returning to the pool or using the pool in June 2017” did not factor into the decision, id. ¶ 39.

Morse attests that he signed the termination letter because he

believed the five student witnesses who accused Cooper of engaging in inappropriate conduct. These student reports were disturbing to me, particularly since Cooper was a member of the University Police Department. I have never had any member of the Police Department accused by this many students of such conduct as Cooper.

Decl. of Phillip Morse ¶ 7, ECF No. 37-5 at 2-5.^[3] He further attests that he has “never treated Cooper differently in any manner due to his race or sex” and that the termination decision “was based on the facts presented in the investigation[.]” Id. ¶ 8.

On June 19, 2019, the court dismissed Plaintiff's common law claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, leaving only the Title VII discrimination claim for resolution. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 17.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no disputed genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

The moving party bears the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the ‘pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . .' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party, in response, must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories,...