Cooper v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co.

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YVETTE COOPER, Plaintiff, v. BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 1:23-cv-03116-JRR

United States District Court, D. Maryland

August 16, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Julie R. Rubin, United States District Judge

Pending before the court are Defendant Whelan Security Mid-Atlantic LLC d/b/a GardaWorld Security Services' (“GardaWorld”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 13; the “GardaWorld Motion”) and Defendant Baltimore Gas and Electric Company's (“BGE”) Partial Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 12; the “BGE Motion”). The court has reviewed all papers. No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md 2023).

I. BACKGROUND^[1]

Plaintiff Yvette Cooper is a female former GardaWorld and BGE employee. (ECF No. 8 ¶ 1.) GardaWorld provides security services at BGE's corporate headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff began working in November 2021 and was terminated in August 2022. Id. ¶¶ 18, 41. At all times relevant, Plaintiff's supervisor was Tavon Roberts (“Roberts”). Id. ¶ 21.

During her employment, Plaintiff interacted with Roberts daily. (ECF No. 8 ¶ 23.) A majority of Plaintiff's interactions with Roberts took place in his office. Id. ¶ 24. On one occasion, after working for approximately 30 days Plaintiff called Roberts and told her to come to his office. Id. ¶ 25. When she arrived, “the door shut and locked” automatically. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. As Plaintiff was leaving, Roberts said: “You really look good in your uniform.” Id. ¶ 26. Roberts' tone made Plaintiff feel uncomfortable and Plaintiff informed her co-worker about the incident the next day. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. The co-worker told Plaintiff that Roberts was “having a relationship” with another female employee (“Morrison”). Id. ¶ 27.

On another occasion, in November 2021, Plaintiff went to Roberts' office to report a security officer was not performing as expected. (ECF No. 8 ¶ 31.) After their discussion, with the door locked and closed, Roberts walked towards Plaintiff, “squeezed her butt,” and said, “you know I like you.” Id. Plaintiff was scared and ashamed to complain (to another employee), and was concerned she would lose her job because Roberts was a supervisor and due to her “interim probationary status.” Id. She also believed “no corrective action would be taken if she complained” in view of the fact that it was generally known Roberts was engaged in a sexual relationship with Morrison. Id.

Soon thereafter, Plaintiff asked Roberts if he was romantically involved; they agreed to meet outside of work at Roberts' house where they engaged in sexual intercourse. Id. ¶ 32. Over the course of the next several months, Plaintiff and Roberts had sexual relations in Roberts' office two to three times a week. (ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 33-37.) In February 2022, following sexual intercourse, Roberts told Plaintiff, “if you keep this up, you will not have to worry about receiving overtime.” Id. ¶ 34. “With the lure of receiving additional pay in exchange for providing sexual favors and intimidated by Mr. Roberts' apparent position of authority, Plaintiff Cooper did not inform anyone of this incident.” Id. Following Roberts' comment, Plaintiff's income increased from $1100 to $1400 every two weeks after she started performing sexual favors for Roberts. Id.

Roberts' behavior continued through March 2022-“Roberts would demand that Plaintiff Cooper perform sexual acts on him in his office during her shift.” (ECF No. 8 ¶ 35.) During this time, Plaintiff learned that Roberts continued to have a sexual relationship with Morrison as well as another “officer named ‘Goings' who reported to [Roberts].” Id. In April and May 2022, “Plaintiff continued to have intercourse with Roberts two to three times a week in exchange for the continued increase in overtime pay.” Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff alleges that the sessions of intercourse consisted of physically humiliating acts and aggressive demands by Roberts. Id. “Plaintiff considered Mr. Roberts' behavior and demeanor during these sessions to be abusive, physically and mentally, causing her to feel anxiety and depression during the time remaining on her shift on the dates that the intercourse occurred, and further into the evening before having to return again to work.” Id.

In May 2022, Plaintiff informed Roberts that she was not going to continue to have intercourse with him, following which Roberts discontinued “giving Plaintiff Cooper additional overtime;” Roberts gave other female employees “who continued to have sex with him” overtime opportunities. In addition, Roberts' attitude and behavior changed towards Plaintiff. This caused Plaintiff distress; she changed her workplace conduct to avoid him and felt “anxiety and depression on a nightly basis.” (ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 37-38.)

In late August 2022, Plaintiff was given a drug test for marijuana. Id. ¶ 41. Roberts informed Plaintiff that the drug test was “inconclusive and faulty.” Id. On August 26, 2022, Roberts reached out to Plaintiff to inform her that his supervisors were “using the drug test as a positive,” and that Plaintiff was fired. Id. Plaintiff's last day of work was August 26, 2022. Id.

On August 29, 2022, Major Engle, a GardaWorld employee, contacted Plaintiff and asked if she was resigning. (ECF No. 8 ¶ 42.) Plaintiff responded that Roberts told her she was fired; Engle did not respond. Id. Plaintiff informed Engle about Roberts' behavior. Roberts was fired the next day. Id. During the first week of September 2022, Plaintiff called human resources at GardaWorld and indicated that she wanted to speak to someone about her job. Id. ¶ 43. GardaWorld never returned Plaintiff's call. Plaintiff did not receive an exit interview or written notice of the basis of her termination. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that when she refused to continue a sexual relationship with Roberts, “he engaged in retaliation resulting in [her] termination.” Id. ¶ 7. After Plaintiff's termination, Roberts continued to send Plaintiff text messages. Id. ¶ 44. “To date, Plaintiff Cooper continues to battle her increased signs of depression on the basis that she believes that she lost her job because she refused to continue to have sex with her boss.” Id. ¶ 46.

On September 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action against BGE and GardaWorld in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland. (ECF No. 8.) On November 15, 2023, GardaWorld removed the action to this court. (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint asserts claims for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act, MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 20-606, et seq. (“FEPA”) (Counts I and IV); quid pro quo harassment in violation of Title VII and FEPA (Counts II and V); retaliation in violation of Title VII and FEPA (Counts III and VII); hostile work environment in violation of Title VII (Count VI); and common law wrongful termination (Count VIII). With respect to each count, Plaintiff demands $1,000,000.00 dollars in compensatory damages, $10,000,000.00 in punitive damages, and any other relief this court deems just and proper. (ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 55, 61, 67, 74, 81, 87, 93, 100.)

GardaWorld moves to dismiss on several grounds: (1) Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support unlawful termination based on sex; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to her quid pro quo claims and, in any event, she fails to state a claim; (3) Plaintiff fails to allege a protected activity and causal connection in support of her retaliation claim; (4) Plaintiff fails to allege the elements to state a claim for hostile work environment; and (5) Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim fails for lack of identified public policy. (ECF No. 13-1 at 3-4, 7-19.) BGE seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim (Count VIII) as duplicative of Plaintiff's statutory Title VII-based claims. (ECF No. 12-1 at 3.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion asserted under Rule 12(b)(6) “test[s] the sufficiency of a complaint;” it does not “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, a “Rule 12(b)(6) motion should only be granted if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244.

“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and footnote omitted). “[A] complaint that provides no more than ‘labels and conclusions,' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,' is insufficient.” Bourgeois v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., 3 F.Supp.3d 423, 434 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). There must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are...