Cooper v. Int'l Paper Co.

912 F.Supp.2d 1307

Billy Glenn COOPER, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

No. CA 2:12–00583–C.

United States District Court,

S.D. Alabama,

Northern Division.

Dec. 14, 2012.

Douglas Brett Turnbull, Hogan Law Office, Kenneth E. Riley, Birmingham, AL, Philip Henry Pitts, Rickman Edgar Williams, III, Thomas Clay Atchison, Pitts, Pitts & Williams, Selma, AL, for Plaintiffs.

Daniel W. Nelson, Stacie Boothe Fletcher, Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher, L.L.P., Washington, DC, Tabor R. Novak, Jr., Montgomery, AL, William Douglas Montgomery, Jr., Mobile, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. CASSADY, United States Magistrate Judge.

A motion to dismiss (Docs. 11, 12) and a motion to remand (Doc. 18) have been filed in this matter, removed from the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama on September 12, 2012 ( see Doc. 1) and on the undersigned's docket pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) ( see Docs. 17, 20, 22).¹ Both motions have been fully briefed ( see Docs. 19, 23, 27, 28), but, as explained in the October 18, 2012 Order (Doc. 22), while the motion to dismiss was filed first, the motion to remand raises the threshold issue of subject-matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, must be addressed first ( see id. at 2) (“Absent federal jurisdiction, this Court lacks the power to decide [the] pending Motion to Dismiss, and must immediately remand this action to state court without reaching the question of whether Plaintiffs have stated cognizable claims against [the] Defendant[ ].”) (citations omitted).

After careful consideration of the parties' briefing and the pleadings, and for the reasons discussed herein, the motion to remand (Doc. 18) is GRANTED, and this matter is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Dallas County.

Background

The plaintiffs filed their action in Dallas County Circuit Court on July 20, 2012. ( See Doc. 1–1 at 3.) A first amended complaint ( id. at 62–84) was filed on August 29, 2012, prior to removal.

Focusing on the allegations of the first amended complaint (or the “complaint”), “[t]his lawsuit is centered around the operation of a paper manufacturing facility located in Selma, Alabama [ ] from which tons of hazardous substances, pollutants, contaminants, and other toxic and harmful materials are, and have for years been, continuously released into the environment.” (Doc. 1–1 at 62.) According to the plaintiffs, all residents of Selma and its surrounding areas ( see id., ¶ 14), Defendant International Paper (“IP”), through its operation of the Selma plant, violated “laws intended to protect Plaintiffs from the effects of the Hazardous Substances,² Particulate Matter, and Noxious Odors, including without limitation” certain federal ³ and Alabama ⁴ statutes and regulations ( id., ¶ 22 (footnotes added)). The plaintiffs further contend that violation of these “laws and regulations constitute violations of duties imposed by law and intended to prevent harm to Plaintiffs and other persons similarly situated” ( id., ¶ 23), and the specific state-law causes of action asserted are: trespass ( see id., ¶¶ 39–45); public nuisance ( see id., ¶¶ 46–57); private nuisance ( see id., ¶¶ 58–66); negligence ( see id., ¶¶ 67–73); wantonness ( see id., ¶¶ 74–80); negligence per se ( see id., ¶¶ 81–88); and fraudulent suppression ( see id., ¶¶ 89–95).⁵

IP timely removed this matter to federal court, asserting that this Court has subject-matterjurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, IP contends that the plaintiffs' claims asserted pursuant to state law arise under federal law. ( See Doc. 1 at 4–14.)

Discussion

I. “Arising Under” Jurisdiction Generally

“Congress has provided for removal of cases from state court to federal court when the plaintiff's complaint alleges a claim arising under federal law.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 472, 118 S.Ct. 921, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998). “Generally the existence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed “by the ‘well-pleaded complaint’ rule, under which a suit arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based on federal law.” ” Coffey v. Freeport–McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., 623 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1269 (W.D.Okla.2009) (citations omitted and emphasis added) (further noting that a case neither arises under federal law by a plaintiff's anticipation of a federal defense nor by a defendant's assertion of one and that a plaintiff, as the “master of the claim,” may prevent removal “by choosing not to plead a federal claim even if one is available”). But “[a] case [also] arises under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ‘if “a well-pleaded complaint establishes ... that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” ’ ” Bender v. Jordan, 623 F.3d 1128, 1131 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006) (quoting, in turn, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27–28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983))). Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' ostensibly state-law causes of action if “it is apparent that the federal questions overwhelmingly predominate.” Id.; see also Gulledge v. Gulledge, Civil Action No. 10–0259–WS–M, 2010 WL 3528567, at *3 (S.D.Ala. Sept. 3, 2010) (“The law is clear that, even in the absence of a federally created cause of action, ‘in limited circumstances, federal-question jurisdiction may be also be available if a substantial, disputed, question of federal law is a necessary element of a state cause of action.’ ”) (quoting Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir.1998)).⁶

II. Substantial Federal Question Doctrine.

“Even when a right of action is created by state law, if the claim requires resolution of significant issues of federal law, the case may arise under federal law for 28 U.S.C. § 1331 purposes.” Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 740, 749 n. 9, 181 L.Ed.2d 881 (2012) (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005)) (emphasis added). And “the question” for a court “is, does a state-law claim necessarilyraise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, 125 S.Ct. 2363;accord Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir.2008) (further noting that “ ‘Grable exemplifies' a ‘slim category of cases' ”) (quoting Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 701, 126 S.Ct. 2121).⁷ Put somewhat differently, “[f]or federal courts to have jurisdiction, the state law claim must turn on an ‘actually disputed and substantial’ issue of federal law.” Bender, 623 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, 125 S.Ct. 2363) (emphasis added). Federal jurisdiction must, further, “be ‘consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing the application of § 1331.’ ” Id. (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 313–14, 125 S.Ct. 2363).

The Court has said that this depends on such factors as the strength of the federal interest in a federal forum to resolve questions of federal law and whether federal jurisdiction would “materially affect” the “normal currents of litigation.” [Grable, 545 U.S.] at 315, 319, 125 S.Ct. 2363. Federal jurisdiction is favored in cases that present “a nearly ‘pure issue of law’ ... ‘that could be settled once and for all and thereafter would govern numerous ... cases.’ ” Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 700, 126 S.Ct. 2121 (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer, & Daniel L. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 65 (2005 Supp.)). Conversely, federal jurisdiction is disfavored for cases that are “fact-bound and situation-specific” or which involve substantial questions of state as well as federal law. Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 701, 126 S.Ct. 2121.

Id. (some citations modified). And “[t]he Court's opinions in this area call on the federal courts to make predictive judgments about, for example, whether jurisdiction over such actions ... will ‘materially affect, or threaten to affect, the normal currents of litigation,’ presumably by leading to a wave of new filings in federal court.” Id. (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 319, 125 S.Ct. 2363).⁸

Proving that this matter fits into the “slim category of cases” that trigger this Court's “arising under” jurisdiction because a substantial federal question arises out of what are otherwise purely state-law claims is, of course, up to IP, which, as the removing defendant, “bears the burden of establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction.” Brown v. Kabco Builders, Inc., Civil Action 07–0099–WS–C, 2007 WL 841690, at *1 (S.D.Ala. Mar. 15, 2007) (citing Leonard v. Enterprise Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir.2002) (“A removing defendant bears the burden of proving proper federal jurisdiction.”)); cf. University of S. Ala. v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir.1999) (“Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly.... Indeed, all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.”); D.M.C. Enters. Inc. v. Best McAllister, LLC, Civil Action No. 10–00153–CB–N, 2010 WL 3039477, at *2 (S.D.Ala. Aug. 4, 2010) (“Because it is conferred by statute, the right of removal is strictly construed to limit federal jurisdiction.”) (citing Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir.1996)).

Analysis

As indicated above, the ideal vehicle for finding federal-question/ “arising under” jurisdiction pursuant to the substantial federal question doctrine is a case in...