Copeland v. Soo Line R.R. Co.

WILLIAM COPELAND, Plaintiff, v. SOO LINE RAILROAD CO. d/b/a CANADIAN PACIFIC, SMART-TD/UTU LOCAL 1433, SMART-TD GENERAL COMMITTEE OF ADJUSTMENT GO-261, and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SHEET METAL, AIR, RAIL AND TRANSPORTATION WORKERS, Defendants.

No. 20 C 4451

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

September 7, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

REBECCA R. PALLMEYER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff William Copeland brings this hybrid action against his employer and his union under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C § 151 et seq. ("RLA"). Copeland alleges that Soo Line Railroad Company, d/b/a Canadian Pacific ("CP/Soo") breached its collective bargaining agreement with Plaintiff's union by terminating him without good cause. He further alleges that the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers ("SMART" or "the International"), the SMART Transportation Division ("SMART-TD") General Committee of Adjustment GO-261, and SMART-TD Local 1433 (collectively, the "Union Defendants") breached their duty of fair representation by mishandling a grievance following his termination. Before the court are two motions: (1)a motion by the International and Local 1433 to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim, and (2) a motion by CP/Soo to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. For the reasons provided below, the court grants the Union Defendants' motion [36] and dismisses the International and Local 1433 as Defendants in this case. The court also grants CP/Soo's motion [38] and dismisses Count I of the Second Amended Complaint.

BACKGROUND

At this stage of the proceedings, the court accepts the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") as true. Copeland has worked as a train conductor with CP/Soo in Franklin Park, Illinois since 2004. (SAC [31] ¶¶ 5-6.) He is a member of Local 1433, an affiliate of SMART International. (Id. ¶ 14.) Both Local 1433 and SMART are named as Defendants. Also named is the General Committee of Adjustment GO-261 ("GCA261"), an intermediate organization within the International. (Id. ¶¶ 10-12.) GCA 261 "shares representation and negotiation duties" with approximately 12 locals "[in their] dealings with the employers of [their] members, "^[1] including disputes between Local 1433 members and CP/Soo. (Id. ¶¶ 11 13.) The International "maintains a constitution governing virtually all aspects of these subunits." (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff pays dues to all three organizations-Local 1433, GCA 261, and SMART International. (Id. ¶ 14.)

On May 13, 2017, CP/Soo terminated Copeland for allegedly failing to report another conductor's unauthorized use of an electronic device in violation of the General Code of Operating Rules ("GCOR"). (Id. ¶ 15 (citing GCOR 1.4 (duty to report) and 2.21 (electronic devices)).)^[2]Plaintiff and Engineer Grace Kocur were on a train with Conductor Eric Rodriguez when Rodriguez allegedly used his cell phone (a violation of GCOR 2.21), and both Copeland and Kocur were terminated for their failure to report Rodriguez's violation to CP/Soo. (Id. ¶ 17.)^[3] CP/Soo also terminated Rodriguez but later reinstated him under a leniency agreement. (Id. ¶ 16.) Kocur, who belonged to Local 790 of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, filed a grievance that proceeded to arbitration. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) The Public Law Board ("PLB') determined that Conductor Rodriguez had used his cell phone during a designated meal break, and because there was no violation of GCOR 2.21, Kocur had no duty to report under GCOR 1 4. ^[4] (Id. ¶ 19.) Kocur was reinstated and received a "make-whole remedy," including backpay, retirement credits, and benefits. (Id.)

Copeland's circumstances were "identical" to Kocur's, but Copeland's union did not achieve the same outcome for him. (Id. ¶ 20.) Local 1433 filed a grievance in August 2017 contesting Plaintiff's termination as a violation of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA").^[5](Id. ¶ 21.) The Union properly pursued the grievance through the first two stages of the grievance process, and CP/Soo denied the grievance at both stages. (Id. ¶ 23.) Local 1433 and GCA 261 "jointly shared responsibility for the prosecution and progression of Plaintiff's grievance." (Id. ¶ 26.) On April 12, 2018, CP/Soo "unilaterally" reinstated Plaintiff-evidently not as a result of the union's advocacy; CP/Soo characterizes the reinstatement as "an exercise of managerial leniency." (CP/Soo Mem. [39] at 2.) But CP/Soo refused to provide a make-whole remedy, so Copeland's grievance proceeded to arbitration. (SAC ¶¶ 24-25.) The General Chairperson of GCA 261, then Matt Marschinke, whose duty it was to "list" Copeland's grievance for arbitration, failed to do so before the August 21, 2018 deadline, (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Instead, Marschinke did not list the grievance for arbitration until April 26, 2019 (id. ¶ 29), and the hearing took place before the PLB on December 20, 2019. (Id. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff's presence at this hearing was neither requested nor required. (Id. ¶ 38.) On April 17, 2020, the PLB issued its opinion denying Copeland's grievance, allegedly because of the missed filing deadline.^[6] (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.)

According to Copeland, he first learned about the missed filing deadline on April 27, 2020 in an email from Gerald Wallace, the new GCA 261 General Chairperson. (Id. ¶ 46.) Copeland alleges that during his tenure as General Chairperson, Marschinke "missed deadlines orbotched the grievances of at least f our other Soo Line employees and SMART union members." (Id. ¶ 30.) In fact, Plaintiff alleges, at the time of Copeland's grievance, Marschinke "had largely abandoned his duties" as General Chairperson. (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff filed charges against Marschinke, as authorized by the SMART Constitution, but the International notified Copeland on July 28, 2020 that it would not pursue his charges further. (Id. ¶ 47.)

Plaintiff alleges that "reasonably relied" on Local 1433 and GCA 261 to process his grievance in a timely fashion. (Id. ¶ 22.) He asserts, on information and belief, that GCA 261, the International, and CP/Soo "were all aware" that Marschinke had mishandled four other union members' grievances. (Id. ¶ 42.) At some point, General Chairperson Wallace "communicated with" a SMART-TD International Vice President "about Plaintiff's situation." (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff does not say whether there was any response to this communication, but he alleges that GCA 261 and the International "failed to take timely action to correct or address this problem" (presumably a reference to Marschinke's failures). (Id. ¶ 44.)

Plaintiff asserts that he maintained email communication with Marschinke and Wallace from the beginning of the grievance process until the PLB's decision, requesting status updates and asking if the Union needed anything from him. (Id. ¶ 45.) Marschinke and Wallace responded in ways that led Copeland to believe "that the grievance was on track and moving forward, and that there was nothing further that Plaintiff needed to do." (Id.) Instead, because of the Union's "arbitrary handling of Plaintiff's grievance," Copeland was denied a make-whole remedy from the PLB. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff notes that the PLB's opinion stated that the Union and CP/Soo had reached a settlement in Plaintiff's case (id. U 39), but he was unaware of and did not participate in a settlement.^[7] (Id. 40.) Plaintiff still has not received back pay, retirement credits, and other benefits that he would have received for the eleven months from his termination to the date of his reinstatement, (Id. U 41.)

Plaintiff filed this suit on July 29, 2020, bringing four counts against CP/Soo and the Union Defendants under the RLA. Count I alleges that CP/Soo breached the CBA by terminating him without good cause and then "[taking] advantage of, and [being] complicit in, the subsequent failure of the [Union Defendants] to uphold their duty to represent Plaintiff." (Id. ¶ 51.) Count II alleges that Local 1433 breached its duty of fair representation ("DFR") by handling Plaintiffs grievance in an arbitrary fashion and failing to keep him informed about the status of his grievance and arbitration. (Id. ¶¶ 57-58.) Count III similarly alleges that GCA 261 breached its DFR to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 64-65.) Finally, Count IV alleges that the International breached its DFR to Plaintiff by handling his grievance in an arbitrary fashion and failing "to take timely action to correct or address" Marschinke's past lapses in pursuing grievances on behalf of other union members. (Id. ¶ 71-72.)

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain "enough factual matter (taken as true)" to suggest that a plaintiff is entitled to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 556 (2007). By contrast, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Courts generally "do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) challenges the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2015). When a...