Corbin v. Prummell

1

SANDRA CORBIN and JOHN CORBIN, Plaintiffs, v. BILL PRUMMELL, JR., in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Charlotte County, Florida's Sheriff's Office, DAVID GENSIMORE, individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy for the Charlotte County Sheriff's Office, AARON WILLIAMS, individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy for the Charlotte County Sheriff's Office, KENRICK ROGUSKA, individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy for the Charlotte County Sheriff's Office, and MICHAEL DAVIDSON, individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy for the Charlotte County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-394-JES-KCD

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division

July 19, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN E. STEELE, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment - Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc #110) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc #112). A Supplement (Doc. #113), Responses in Opposition (Docs. ##115 129), and Replies (Docs. ##119, 130) were filed. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion (Doc. #110) is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs' Motion (Doc. #112) is denied.

I.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010). A fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A court must decide ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Tana v. Dantanna's, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010). However, “if reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment.” St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999)(quoting Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1983)(finding summary judgment “may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the factual inferences that should be drawn from these facts”)). “If a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant summary judgment.” Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 495 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007).

The principles governing summary judgment do not change when the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment. See Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). Cross-motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately, “view[ing] the facts ‘in the light most favorable to the non-moving party on each motion.'” Cowen v. Sec'y of Ga., 22 F.4th 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Chavez v. Mercantil Commercebank, N.A., 701 F.3d 896, 899 (11th Cir. 2012)). Ultimately, “[w]hen parties jointly move for summary judgment, the court has three options: granting summary judgment for the plaintiff under the defendant's best case, granting summary judgment for the defendant under the plaintiff's best case, or denying both motions for summary judgment and proceeding to trial.” FCOA LLC v. Foremost Title & Escrow Servs. LLC, 57 F.4th 939, 959 (11th Cir. 2023).

II.

On or about November 29, 2019, Deputy Michael Davidson (Deputy Davidson) made a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by John Corbin (Mr. Corbin) after observing the vehicle swerving on the road. Deputy Davidson caused the vehicle to pull into a McDonalds parking lot. Sandra Corbin (Mrs. Corbin) was in the passenger seat in the vehicle driven by her husband. After both Mr. and Mrs. Corbin admitted to drinking a few beers, Mr. Corbin consented to a field sobriety test and was escorted by Deputy Davidson to a more level parking lot approximately fifty to one hundred feet away. Mrs. Corbin stayed in the car. Deputy Aaron Williams (Deputy Williams), who had recently arrived at the scene in a separate vehicle, stood between the Corbin vehicle containing Mrs. Corbin and the sobriety testing site where Mr. Corbin and Deputy Davidson were located.

At some point, Mrs. Corbin exited the vehicle. Deputy Williams approached and told her to get back into the vehicle. According to Deputy Williams, he also told her to remain in the vehicle. Mrs. Corbin got back into the vehicle, but she did not remain there. Approximately five minutes later, Mrs. Corbin exited the vehicle for a second time. Deputy Williams told her to stop. What happened next is disputed. Deputy Williams asserts Mrs. Corbin did not stop, told Deputy Williams he would have to arrest her, and pulled away from his attempts to grab her wrists. At that point, Deputy Williams asserts, he swept Mrs. Corbin's leg from underneath her, bringing her to the ground. On the other hand, Mrs. Corbin asserts that she immediately stopped when told to do so by Deputy Williams and before Deputy Williams positioned himself in front of her, and she uttered the single word “my” before Deputy Williams swept her legs from underneath her.

It is undisputed that Mrs. Corbin found herself on the ground and laying in her own urine. Mrs. Corbin was screaming that her leg was broken and complaining of leg pain, but there was no visible physical sign of a broken leg.^[1] Deputy Williams handcuffed Mrs. Corbin and called for backup. Sergeant David Gensimore (Sgt. Gensimore) arrived and with Deputy Williams attempted to have Mrs. Corbin stand up.^[2] After Mrs. Corbin was unable to do so, the officers called paramedics. Upon the arrival of paramedics, Mrs. Corbin was placed on a stretcher and moved to an ambulance. The ambulance transported Mrs. Corbin and Deputy Williams to the hospital, where she was diagnosed with a fractured tibia. Two days later, Mrs. Corbin underwent leg surgery. About a year later she underwent a total knee replacement.

Mrs. Corbin was charged with resisting arrest without violence and disorderly intoxication, but the state did not prosecute the charges. Mr. Corbin was arrested that night for driving under the influence and was issued a warning for failure to drive in a single lane.

III.

Ten counts of the sixteen-count Complaint (Doc. #1) remain after two Opinion & Orders from this Court (Docs. ##24, 67): False Arrest/Imprisonment against Williams (Count I); False Arrest/Imprisonment against Gensimore (Count II); Excessive Force against Williams (Count IV); Deliberate Indifference/Failure to Render Aid against Williams (Count VI); Deliberate Indifference/Failure to Render Aid against Gensimore (Count VII); Respondeat Superior against Sheriff Prummell (Count VIII); State Tort False Arrest/Imprisonment against Williams (Count VIII); Battery against Williams (Count IX); Assault against Williams (Count X); and Loss of Consortium against Williams (Count XVI).^[3]

Mrs. Corbin moves for summary judgment on her excessive force claim (Count IV). (Doc. #112.) Deputy Williams, Sgt. Gensimore, and Sheriff Prummell move for summary judgment on Counts I, II, VI, VII, VIII (Respondeat Superior), VIII (State False Arrest/Imprisonment), and X. (Doc. #110.) The battery (Count IX) and loss of consortium (Count XVI) claims are not discussed in either motion. The Court first discusses some general legal principles, and then the specific counts at issue.

IV.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Principles

Section 1983 provides a private cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, deprives a person of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [plaintiffs] must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2003)(citation omitted).

“A constitutional claim brought pursuant to § 1983 must begin with the identification of a specific constitutional right that has allegedly been infringed.” DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1288 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2019)). Mrs. Corbin identifies the Fourth Amendment as the constitutional right at issue for her false arrest and excessive force claims and the Fourteenth Amendment for her deliberate indifference claims.

B. Qualified Immunity Principles

The Eleventh Circuit succinctly summarized qualified immunity's legal principles:

“Qualified immunity shields public officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged action.” To receive qualified immunity, the “defendant must first show he was performing a discretionary function.” The plaintiff then bears the burden of proving both that the defendant violated his constitutional right and that

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