Corbitt v. Balt. City Police Dep't

TERRELL CORBITT, Plaintiffs, v. BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. RDB-20-3431

United States District Court, D. Maryland

August 10, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Richard D. Bennett United States District Judge

On December 15, 2017, Plaintiff Terrell Corbitt (“Plaintiff” or “Corbitt”) was struck by a stray bullet as Baltimore City Police officers pursued a vehicle through the streets of Baltimore City, exchanging fire with the eluding vehicle. On November 24, 2020 Plaintiff Corbitt filed a six-count Complaint seeking damages for his injuries against the Baltimore City Police Department (“BPD”), former BPD Commissioner Kevin Davis (“Davis”), and former Baltimore City Police Chief T.J.ith (“Smith”), as well as eighteen other BPD officers (collectively “Officer Defendants”) other BPD employees, and other individuals allegedly involved in the incident. (ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff Corbitt appears to allege claims against the BPD and Defendants Davis and Smith in four of the six counts of the Complaint. In Counts I and III he asserts claims for negligence and/or gross negligence and negligent supervision under Maryland law. In Count V he asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S Constitution. In Count VI he alleges violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights on the same grounds as the Section 1983 claim. However, it is unclear whether the Plaintiff adequately complied with the notice requirement of the Local Government Tort Claims Act in order to bring a suit for unliquidated damages against a local government and its employees. Even assuming he did provide proper notice, the doctrine of State sovereign immunity bars the Plaintiff's state law claims against the BPD and Davis and Smith in their official capacities as Commissioner and Chief of the BPD. Moreover, the Complaint is devoid of any specific factual allegations related to the BPD, Davis, and Smith. Corbitt has failed to state any plausible claim for relief against these three Defendants.

Accordingly, Davis, Smith, and the BPD's pending Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20) is GRANTED. With respect to the Baltimore City Police Department and Defendants Davis and Smith in their official capacities, Counts I, III, and VI are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. However, with respect to the Count V Monell claim against the Baltimore City Police Department as well as Counts I, III, V, and VI as alleged against Defendants Davis and Smith in their individual capacities, the counts are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of an Amended Complaint within a specified time period.

BACKGROUND

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in a complaint and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v. Black &amp Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). Plaintiff Corbitt is an individual and resident of the State of Maryland. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 11.) The Baltimore City Police Department (“BPD”) is an agency of the state of Maryland. (Id. ¶ 12.) Defendant Davis was at all times relevant to the Complaint the Commissioner of the BPD. (Id. ¶ 32.) Defendant Smith was the Chief of Police for Baltimore City. (Id. ¶ 32.) The BPD is responsible for conducting criminal investigations and apprehension in a reasonable manner to protect and life and well-being of Maryland residents. (Id. ¶ 12.) The Plaintiff alleges that the BPD, through policymakers such as Defendants Davis and Smith, creates, implements, and ratifies policies, practices, habits, customs and procedures, and is responsible for the training and supervision of officers regarding apprehension of suspected criminals. (Id.) He contends that such responsibilities extend to the training and supervision of officers with respect to high-speed car chases. (Id.)

On or about December 15, 2017, one of the Officer Defendants^[1] detained Mausean Carter (“Carter”) at a traffic stop on Reisterstown Road. (Id. ¶ 38.) Corbitt contends that Carter was stopped because the window tinting on his automobile exceeded legal limits. (Id.) The Officer Defendant allegedly told another BPD officer and BPD dispatch that he believed Carter's vehicle had been involved in a recent shooting. (Id. ¶ 39.) The BPD dispatch operator authorized the Officer Defendant to detain Carter while the dispatch investigated his claim. (Id. ¶ 40.) The Officer Defendant then instructed Carter to exit the vehicle, but Carter ignored the officer's instructions and fled the scene. (Id. ¶ 41.) The Officer Defendant immediately returned to his own vehicle and began to pursue Carter northbound on Reisterstown Road. (Id.) Carter began firing shots at the Officer Defendant and his vehicle as he began his pursuit. (Id. ¶ 42.)

The Officer Defendant relayed information regarding the pursuit to the BPD dispatch officers, who promptly informed all BPD officers that Carter had a rifle in the car. (Id. ¶¶ 4243.) A BPD helicopter was deployed to track Carter's trajectory during the pursuit. (Id. ¶ 44.) The helicopter relayed all information regarding the pursuit to all involved officers as it happened in real time. (Id.) Carter continued to fire at pursuing police vehicles. (Id. ¶ 45.) The helicopter informed all Officer Defendants involved in the pursuit to exercise care because of the shots fired and instructed them to pull back if they did not feel safe, as the helicopter could continue to follow Carter. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 48.) The helicopter further advised the Officer Defendants to keep their distance. (Id. ¶ 48.) At least one Officer Defendant returned fire at Carter's vehicle. (Id. ¶ 49.)

After approximately six minutes of pursuit, Carter's vehicle was disabled by police gunfire around the 1800 block of Gwen's Fall Road. (Id. ¶ 50.) During the exchange of fire, Corbitt was struck in the head by a stray bullet while sitting in the back of his cousin's vehicle. (Id. ¶ 51.) Corbitt survived, but he remains paralyzed on the left side of his body. (Id. ¶ 52.)

On November 24, 2020, Plaintiff Corbitt filed the presently pending suit against the BPD, Davis, Smith, and the other Defendants. The six-count Complaint appears to allege four claims against the BPD, Davis, and Smith. In Count I of the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges negligence and gross negligence under Maryland law against “the BPD Defendants, ” which this Court presumes refers to the BPD, Davis and Smith, as well the Officer Defendants and other BPD employees alleged involved in the December 2017 incident. (Id. ¶ 53-65.) In Count I, Plaintiff Corbitt makes allegations that the Officer Defendants had a duty to apprehend criminals in a reasonable manner and according to the professional standards applicable to law enforcement officers. (Id. ¶ 54.) He alleges that the Officer Defendants breached their duty as police officers in three distinct ways: (1) by initiating a high-speed chase to apprehend Carter with knowledge that he was suspected for a series of shootings; (2) by continuing to chase Carter after he began opening fire on public streets during the chase; and (3) by returning fire from a moving vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 55-61.)

In Count III, the Plaintiff asserts a claim for negligent supervision against the “Policymaker Defendants.” (Id. ¶¶ 72-78.) Corbitt uses “Policymaking Defendants” to refer to Davis, Smith, and the BPD. He alleges that at all times relevant to the Complaint, the Officer Defendants were operating vehicles owned by the State of Maryland, the BPD, or another governmental entity. (Id. ¶ 73.) The Officer Defendants were agents and/or employees of the BPD, as managed by Defendants Davis and Smith, and were acting in furtherance of the business and duty of the BPD. (Id. ¶ 74.) Corbitt asserts that Davis, Smith, and the BPD, had a duty to adequately and appropriately train the officers employed by the BPD and to adequately and appropriately discipline them when they failed to adhere to their duties as police officers. (Id. ¶ 75.) He also asserts that as a result of Davis, Smith, and the BPD's failure to train the Officer Defendants, the Officer Defendants continued to chase Carter in his vehicle even after he began to fire weapons on the open streets of the city, fired back at Carter, and thereby created a cross-fire endangering “hundreds” of bystanders in the area. (Id. ¶ 76.) “The Officer Defendants' decision to discharge their weapons from a moving vehicle was the result of the Policymaker Defendants' failure to train them to refrain from doing so during car chases of criminal suspects.” (Id. ¶ 77.)

Count V asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S Constitution against “the BPD Defendants.”^[2] (Id. ¶¶ 83100.) With respect to the BPD, this claim is alleged pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, in which the U.S. Supreme Court determined that local governmental bodies may be liable under Section 1983 based on the unconstitutional conduct of individual defendants if those defendants were executing an official policy or custom of the local government when they violated a plaintiff's rights. 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). In this case, Plaintiff Corbitt alleges that the BPD maintains a custom or practice wherein: (1) officers continue to chase fleeing motor vehicle operators who have shot at officers from their vehicles, and (2) officers frequently shoot or return fire at fleeing suspects. (Id. ¶¶ 88, 94.) He alleges that the BPD fails to train its officers to disengage from high-speed chases when the target initiates a firefight with officers or to refrain from engaging in firefights from...