Cordero v. Kelley

MISAEL CORDERO, Plaintiff, v. GREGORY KELLEY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 17-1596 (PGS) (DEA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

March 1, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS BRUCE DAVIS AND GREGORY KELLEY

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Misael Cordero ("Plaintiff" or "Cordero"), is a state prisoner proceeding with a civil rights complaint alleging purported violations of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"). Presently pending before this Court is Defendants Bruce Davis and Gregory Kelley's (hereinafter the "Moving Defendants") motion for summary judgment (See ECF 56). For the following reasons, Moving Defendants' motion is granted.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law" and a dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude the Court from granting a motion for summary judgment. See id.

A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its motion and must demonstrate that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "A party asserting that a fact [is not] genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents ..., affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). After the moving party adequately supports its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). To withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict the moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. "[I]f the non-movant's evidence is merely 'colorable' or is 'not significantly probative,' the court may grant summary judgment." Messa v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50)). "If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.

"In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party's evidence 'is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The Court's role in deciding a motion for summary judgment is simply "to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Ultimately, there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" if a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was incarcerated at the New Jersey State Prison ("NJSP") from 2014 to 2019. (See ECF 56-6 at 3). While Plaintiff is now incarcerated at the East Jersey State Prison, his allegations relate to circumstances arising while he was incarcerated at NJSP. (See ECF 56-5 at 3). Defendant Kelley is a mailroom officer at NJSP while Defendant Davis is the administrator of the NJSP. (See ECF 56-9 at 3; ECF 56-5 at 8). Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in this Court in March, 2017. (See ECF 1). In August, 2018, this Court screened Plaintiff's complaint. (See ECF 16). This Court noted as follows in that screening opinion:

1. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Kelley confiscated religious tracts Plaintiff purchased to give to his family and friends. Officer Kelley allegedly stated the tracts were "not authorized for retention or receipt" and that "'[a]ll religious material for distribution must go through chaplains office.'" Compl. ¶ 8 (alteration in original).

2. Plaintiff had previously purchased similar tracts without problems. Id. ¶ 7. He alleges there is no policy that requires religious pamphlets to go through the chaplain's office. Id. ¶ 9. He further states the pamphlets were for friends and family, not distribution within the prison. Id. ¶ 11.

3. Plaintiff appealed the confiscation to Administrator D'llio¹ on March 19, 2015. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges Administrator D'llio did not respond to his appeal, so he filed an inquiry form requesting a decision. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. The response to the inquiry form stated that religious pamphlets had to go through the chaplain's office. Id. ¶ 15.

4. Plaintiff alleges Administrator D'llio purposely failed to respond to his grievances to prevent him from exhausting his administrative remedies. He claims he lost a meritorious claim in the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.

5. Plaintiff alleges defendants violated his First Amendment rights to practice his religion. "[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). To make out a claim for denial of an individual's free exercise rights under the First Amendment, an individual mustallege the regulation impinges on a sincerely held religious belief. DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51-52 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).

6. Construing the complaint liberally and giving Plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences, he has sufficiently alleged a First Amendment claim against defendants. This claim shall proceed.

7. Plaintiff also claims a violation of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq. "RLUIPA protects 'any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief[.]'" Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). RLUIPA provides "'greater protection' for religious liberty than is provided by the First Amendment. . . . [C]ourts must be careful not to import reasoning from cases such as Turner involving First Amendment rights." Payne v. Doe, 636 F. App'x 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. at 863) (internal citation omitted). Construing the complaint liberally and giving Plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences, he has sufficiently alleged a RLUIPA against defendants. This claim shall also proceed.

(ECF 16 at 1-3).

After screening, discovery in this case included the deposition of Plaintiff. Plaintiff indicated in his deposition that his religious beliefs require he bring the Word of God and salvation to his friends and family. (See ECF 65 at 7). While incarcerated at NJSP, Plaintiff ordered religious pamphlets to be sent to him at NJSP so that he could send them to his family. (See ECF 56-5 at 6). During Plaintiff's deposition, he further admitted though he could send the pamphlets directly to his family rather than first to him at NJSP, but at a higher cost. (See id. at 9-10).

According to Moving Defendants, inmates at NJSP cannot receive bulk religious mailings through the mailroom, but they can have them sent to the chaplain of NJSP for review and distribution. (See ECF 56-10 at 5). The issue presented in this case is the seizure of Plaintif's bulk religious pamphlets by Kelley.

After the close of discovery, Moving Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff then filed his initial response to the motion for summary judgment. (See ECF 65). After Moving Defendants were ordered to serve Plaintiff with a full copy of his deposition transcript(see ECF 71) and complied (see ECF 72), Plaintiff filed a subsequent response in opposition to Moving Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (See ECF 73). Moving Defendants then submitted a reply brief (see ECF 77) and Plaintiff subsequently filed a sur-reply. (See ECF 79).

IV. DISCUSSION

As previously discussed, Plaintiff is proceeding against the Moving Defendants both under RLUIPA and the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.

A. RLUIPA

RLUIPA "provide[s] very broad protection for religious liberty. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014)). RLUIPA mandates that "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, ... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability," unless the government can satisfy strict scrutiny. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). This requires a showing that the burden imposed on a person's religious exercise "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). Even prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Holt, courts recognized in the prison context that RLUIPA provides greater protections than the First Amendment. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 296 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174,...