Corey v. Rockdale Cnty.

689 F.Supp.3d 1251

William E. COREY and U.S. Enterprises, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. ROCKDALE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-3918-MLB

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

Signed August 28, 2023

Roy E. Barnes, The Barnes Law Group, LLC, Marietta, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Thomas M. Mitchell, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

MICHAEL L. BROWN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case involves a decades-long zoning dispute between Plaintiffs and Rockdale County. Since 1999, Plaintiffs have wanted to build a truck stop on property they own in the County. The County does not (and has not since 1999) allowed truck stops, so it has prevented Plaintiffs numerous times from developing the property in line with their wishes. Plaintiffs have now struck a deal to develop a new store on the property but have again been roadblocked by the County, which says the project is—you guessed it—a truck stop. Plaintiffs sued the County and several County officials, saying the County's refusal to allow them to develop their property as a truck stop is preempted by federal law and violates their constitutional rights. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. 19.) The Court grants that motion.

I. Background¹

Since 1996, Plaintiffs have owned a parcel of land near Interstate 20 in Rockdale County, Georgia. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 12-13.) The property sits on a heavily traveled, major commercial corridor that contains service stations and convenience stores catering to both automobiles and trucks, including heavy trucks. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 44.) Plaintiffs' property is located within one mile of the Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense Highways (the Interstate System), which is part of the National Network of Roads (the National Network). (Dkt. 1 ¶ 15.)

In November 1996, the Rockdale County Board of Commissioners (BOC) zoned Plaintiffs' property C-2, which allows general commercial activities including a convenience store with the sale of petroleum products like gas and diesel fuel. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 18.) In May 1999, Plaintiffs asked the County whether a truck stop on the property was an authorized use under the zoning ordinance. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 19.) The County said no. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 20.) It relied on the ordinance in effect at the time that only permitted specific uses, not including truck stops. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 21, 22.)

Plaintiffs proposed an amendment to the zoning ordinance for consideration by the BOC that would allow truck stops within C-2 zoning. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 23.) In the meantime, they filed an application for a permit allowing them to service automobiles and heavy trucks on the property. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 27.) The application sought the County's approval for development of a "travel plaza" that would allow the sale of fuel to both automobiles and trucks. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 28.) They maintained the project was not a truck stop and met the requirements of the zoning ordinance. (Id.) The County returned Plaintiffs' application because it did not set forth "the proposed uses of the site." (Dkt. 1 ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs filed a mandamus action in state court to compel the County to consider their application. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 30-31.) The court denied relief. (Id.) Plaintiffs had to abort their travel plaza project, including by voiding an agreement with a travel center company, and suffered financial losses. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 32-33.)

The BOC ultimately amended the zoning ordinance in July 1999 to allow truck stops, but only in M-2 zoning districts, which are generally located in sparsely developed areas and are limited to "general industrial" uses. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 26.) The new ordinance had the practical effect of preventing any property in Rockdale County from being developed as a truck stop. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 25.) Undeterred, over the next several years, Plaintiffs continued improving and enlarging the property—including by locating it closer to the highway—"[i]n hopes of developing the [p]roperty to its highest and best use, that of a convenience store which sold fuel to automobiles and heavy trucks." (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 34-35.)

In 2006, the BOC adopted a new comprehensive zoning and development ordinance called the Uniform Development Ordinance (UDO). (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 36-38.) The UDO includes a section saying: "Truck stops are prohibited. Furthermore, no adjoining or adjacent uses shall be physically connected or used so as to effectively create a truck stop." (Dkt. 1 ¶ 39.) The UDO defines a truck stop as:

[A]ny building, premises, or land in which or upon which a business, service, or industry involving the maintenance, servicing, storage, or repair of heavy trucks and similar commercial vehicles is conducted or rendered, including the dispensing of motor fuel or other petroleum products primarily for such heavy trucks and similar commercial vehicles and the sale of accessories or equipment for heavy trucks and similar commercial vehicles, as well as overnight accommodations, showers, overnight customer parking, or restaurant facilities for the use of crews of heavy trucks and similar commercial vehicles.

(Dkt. 1 ¶ 40.) The UDO sets forth several criteria that must be met for a gas station with a convenience store within the C-2 zoning category, including that "[t]he use shall not be combined with any other use(s) or facility so as to create a truck stop." (Dkt. 1 ¶ 50.)

In January 2018, Plaintiffs entered into a ground-lease agreement with QuikTrip to construct a "travel plaza" on a 6.7-acre portion of the property, for which Plaintiffs would receive rental payments. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 42.) This portion is surrounded by other parcels of the property, all of which are zoned C-2. (Id.) Plans for the QuikTrip project called for construction of a convenience store with 18 to 20 gasoline dispensers for automobiles, 6 to 8 diesel fuel dispensers for heavy trucks, truck scales, customer parking for 60 to 70 automobiles, and truck parking for 10 trucks. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 53.)

Plaintiffs contended the proposed construction was not a truck stop because, despite having large turning radius areas and higher canopies to accommodate trucks, the plaza was primarily designed to accommodate automobiles and did not have showers or overnight accommodations for truck crews. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 54.) They also told the County that the truck parking spaces would be short-term and were not intended for overnight parking. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 53.) The County, however, determined the project constituted a truck stop and prohibited its construction. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 51.)

In May 2018, Plaintiffs' attorney met with the County's Director of Planning and Development. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 56.) She said the BOC could not approve Plaintiffs' QuikTrip plans because of the proposed truck scales but thought the BOC "would favorably entertain a text amendment to the UDO creating a 'Travel Plaza' category which would accommodate the QuikTrip store." (Dkt. 1 ¶ 57.) Counsel for Plaintiffs and the County worked together to jointly draft such an amendment. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 58-59.) Despite counsels' joint work—and the planning commission's recommendation—the BOC unanimously rejected the proposal. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 60-61.)

While the BOC was considering the amendment, Plaintiffs applied for a permit to the County's Planning and Zoning Director to allow QuikTrip to build the proposed travel plaza. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 63-64.) In September 2019, the Director denied Plaintiffs' application on the basis it sought permission to construct a truck stop. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 65.) Plaintiffs appealed that decision to the County's internal appeals board, which upheld the denial. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 66-67, 75.) That occurred on December 2, 2019. (Id. ¶ 75.) Plaintiffs again sought mandamus in state court. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 76.) The court dismissed most of their claims but held the definition of "truck stop" was impermissibly vague and uncertain under the Georgia Constitution. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 80.) The Georgia Supreme Court reversed. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 83.) On remand, the trial court affirmed the appeals board's decision, concluding it was supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 84.) Plaintiffs also appealed that decision, but the Georgia Supreme Court denied certiorari. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 87; see U.S. Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Rockdale County, et al., No. S22C1137 (Ga. Feb. 21, 2023).)²

In June 2021, the BOC passes a new ordinance that—according to Plaintiff—effectively prohibits all truck stops within the County. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 89.) Plaintiffs do not allege they applied for a permit under that ordinance. Instead, Plaintiffs sued Defendants—the County, the BOC members, and the Planning and Development Director—in federal court. Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. 19.)

II. Standard

"A motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). While the complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," those allegations must be enough "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

III. Discussion

Plaintiffs raise several federal claims against Defendants. In Count I they say they are entitled to injunctive relief preventing the County and the individual defendants from enforcing the truck stop ordinance against them because the County's decision to preclude truck stops conflicts with the Surface Transportation Assistance Act ("STAA"). (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 94-112.) In Count II, they raise four claims under the United States Constitution, saying the decision by the County and (certain) individual defendants to block their construction of a truck stop violates their rights under the taking clauses of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and their rights to procedural due process,...