Corley v. United States

11 F.4th 79

Royce CORLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.^*

Docket No. 19-4092-cv

August Term, 2020

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: December 7, 2020

Decided: August 25, 2021

Royce Corley, Pro Se.

Eric B. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney (Sandra S. Glover, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for John H. Durham, United States Attorney for the District Connecticut, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: Pooler, Parker, and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

Gerard E. Lynch, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Royce Corley appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Alvin W. Thompson, J .) dismissing his amended complaint against Defendant-Appellee the United States for insufficient service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) because he failed to affix to his amended complaint a good-faith certificate pursuant to § 52-190a(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes. Section 52-190a(a) requires that a complaint pleading negligence claims against a health care provider be accompanied by a "certificate of the attorney or party filing the action ... [stating] that [a] reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief that grounds exist for an action." Id. "To show the existence of such good faith," the certificate must also include a "written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider ... that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence" along with a "detailed basis for the formation of such opinion." Id.

This appeal requires us to determine whether § 52-190a is a procedural rule that is inapplicable in federal court or a substantive rule that applies pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 et seq., under which "the source of substantive liability ... is the law of the State." Hernandez v. United States , 939 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).

The Government argues that because the FTCA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity under which the United States is liable only "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances," 28 U.S.C. § 2674, exempting Corley from § 52-190a ’s requirements would unlawfully deprive the United States of a substantive defense available to private litigants in medical malpractice actions. We disagree. We conclude that § 52-190a is a procedural rule that does not apply in FTCA actions.

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this order. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it transferred this case from the District Court for the Southern District of New York to the District Court for District of Connecticut.

BACKGROUND

In May 2018, while incarcerated at FCI Danbury in Connecticut, Corley filed a pro se complaint in the Southern District of New York against a dentist and dental hygienist employed by the prison, alleging medical malpractice, gross negligence, negligent failure to train, and emotional distress based on the allegedly inadequate quality of the dental care he received. Specifically, he alleged that on November 14, 2016, a dental hygienist damaged a filling in his wisdom tooth and broke a cap on one of his front teeth during a cleaning. According to Corley, he observed pieces of his teeth and filling upon rinsing his mouth, and a few weeks later, the cap on his front tooth fell off, exposing his chipped front tooth and causing "subsequent embarrassment and emotional distress." Gov't App'x at 7. He further alleged that over the following months, a dentist refused to replace the missing cap, refused to repair the filling in his wisdom tooth, and after several days of increasingly severe pain, finally attempted to extract the wisdom tooth on March 13, 2017, in a painful procedure that caused the tooth to break into several pieces that were not entirely removed during the procedure. Finally, Corley alleged that the remaining tooth pieces caused him to suffer severe pain, bleeding, and infection along with bad breath and difficulty eating and sleeping.

Days after Corley filed the suit, the Southern District of New York (Colleen McMahon, J. ), acting sua sponte, transferred the action to the District of Connecticut in the interest of justice under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) because the underlying incident occurred in Connecticut, where Corley was then incarcerated, the defendants were employed, and most of the relevant evidence or witnesses were located.

The District of Connecticut in an initial review order dismissed the complaint without prejudice because of Corley's failure to clearly name the United States as a defendant as required in FTCA suits. Corley thereafter filed an amended complaint naming the United States as the sole defendant and alleging the same facts and claims as in his original complaint. On March 19, 2019, the United States moved to dismiss the amended complaint for insufficient service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), based on Corley's failure to comply with § 52-190a.

Corley opposed the United States’ motion to dismiss, arguing that the rules of service set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, and not state law, govern service in this case and, in any event, that requiring him to comply with § 52-190a as a federal prisoner would unconstitutionally burden his right to meaningful access to the courts. He also cross-moved for the court to appoint a health care provider to supply the good-faith certificate for him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3), or, alternatively, for an extension until January 2021 (90 days after his prison release date) to comply with the requirement.

On November 12, 2019, the district court granted the Government's motion, concluding that "Corley was required to file a good-faith certificate pursuant to Section 52-190a(a)" and that since he had "not done so ... service was insufficient." Gov't App'x at 40. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

We typically review a dismissal for improper service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) for abuse of discretion. Dickerson v. Napolitano , 604 F.3d 732, 740 (2d Cir. 2010). However, this case turns on a question of statutory interpretation, which is "a question of law we review de novo." Jaen v. Sessions , 899 F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir. 2018). We review transfer decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for abuse of discretion. Bank of New York v. First Millennium, Inc. , 607 F.3d 905, 921 (2d Cir. 2010).

The Government argues that " Section 52-190a is substantive law, not a procedural mechanism." Appellee's Br. 17 n.1. In the alternative, the Government argues that even if we construe § 52-190a as a procedural rule, it does not conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We conclude that § 52-190a is a procedural rule and consequently inapplicable in this FTCA action. We also address Corley's argument that the Southern District abused its discretion by transferring the case to the District of Connecticut and conclude that it did not.¹

I. Section 52-190a

The FTCA grants district courts jurisdiction over tort suits against the United States for "the negligent acts of federal employees acting in the scope of their employment." Coyle v. United States , 954 F.3d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 2020). The statute provides, in relevant part:

[T]he district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

The parties do not dispute that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in an FTCA action. The original text of the FTCA, adopted as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, provided that "[i]n actions under this part, ... the practice and procedure, shall be in accordance with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]." Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 60-812, § 411, 60 Stat. 812, 844. That text was removed two years later "as unnecessary" because, as Congress noted "the [Federal] Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court ... apply to all civil actions," United States v. Yellow Cab Co. , 340 U.S. 543, 553 n.9, 71 S.Ct. 399, 95 L.Ed. 523 (1951), citing S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1948), as made plain by the original text of the rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (1938) ("These rules govern the procedure in the district courts of the United States in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity. ...")

The parties also do not dispute that state law is the "source of substantive liability under the FTCA." Hernandez v. United States , 939 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). The FTCA's jurisdictional grant provides district courts with jurisdiction over tort suits against the United States "if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The Supreme Court has "consistently held that [the FTCA's] reference to the ‘law of the place’ means law of the State—the source of substantive liability under the FTCA." F.D.I.C. v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 478, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). Therefore, state law will apply only if it is substantive, rather than procedural, and district courts applying state law in FTCA suits must determine as a threshold matter whether that law is substantive.

Accordingly, we must decide whether § 52-190a is substantive or procedural law. By way of distinction, procedural law is "the judicial...