Corman Marine Contruction, Inc. v. McGeady

319 A.3d 1250

262 Md.App. 585

CORMAN MARINE CONTRUCTION, INC., et al.

v.Matthew F. MCGEADY, et al.

No. 1452, Sept.Term,2023

Appellate Court of Maryland.

August 1, 2024

Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case No. 24-C-19-006335, John S. Nugent, Judge.

Argued by Steven M. Klepper, Kramon & Graham, P.A., Baltimore, MD (Lydia E. Lawless & Joseph Dudek, Kramon & Graham, P.A., Baltimore, MD; James H. Rodgers & Erica N. Cranford, Lewis Bris- bois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellant.

Argued by Paul D. Bekman (Aryeh M. Rabinowitz, Bekman, Marder, Hopper, Malarkey & Perlin, LLC, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellee.

Argued before: Ripken, Albright, Alexander Wright, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Ripken, J.

This case arises from a workplace accident in which Matthew McGeady ("McGeady") was injured while working aboard the Xavier, a floating crane barge owned jointly by his employer, Corman Marine Construction, Inc., and two related companies (collectively "Corman"). Subsequent to the accident, McGeady and his wife (collectively "Appellees"), filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City asserting damages pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. At the conclusion of trial, a jury found Corman liable, and awarded Appellees damages for lost wages, medical expenses, pain, and loss of consortium. Corman noted this timely appeal. For the reasons to follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Corman presents the following issues for our review, which we have condensed and rephrased as follows:¹

I. Whether the court erred by declining to grant Corman’s motion for judgment on Appellees’ claim asserting negligence of a vessel.

II. Whether the court erred by imposing a time limit on the cross-examination of a witness.

DISCUSSION

I. The Circuit Court Erred in Concluding that the Record Contained Evidence Sufficient to Support a Claim for Negligence of a Vessel Under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b).

A. Factual Background

In December of 2016, during the course of his employment with Corman, McGeady suffered a serious injury. At the time of the injury, Corman owned and operated the Xavier, a floating crane barge which was moored to the bed of the York River in Virginia and constituted a stationary work platform. On the date of the incident, the Xavier was serving as the staging area for a construction project to install a sewer pipe in the York River. The day of McGeady’s injury, Martin Corcoran ("Corcoran"), the president of Corman Marine Construction and the person in charge of the sewer pipe project, traveled to the Xavier. Corcoran went with the goal of speeding up the process of sinking the pipe, which had delayed the venture. At that time McGeady and at least one other coworker, the project foreman, were present on the Xavier.

The pipe had a pocket of pressurized air trapped within it, which required venting prior to the sinking of the pipe. On the day of the incident, one end of the pipe was on the shore and the other end was resting on the Xavier. The end of the pipe that was on the Xavier contained a pneumatic plug which, when activated, would expel the pressurized air inside of the pipe. Corcoran, who appeared to be agitated and hurried, ordered the construction foreman to remove the plug. Prior to giving this instruction, Corcoran had not read the plug’s safety manual, did not establish a safety zone, and did not instruct any of the Corman employees where to be located during the procedure. Upon the foreman removing the pressurized plug, the plug exploded out of the pipe, hitting the foreman in the chest, and knocking him backward into McGeady. McGeady was thrown to the ground and struck his head on the deck of the Xavier. He suffered a traumatic brain injury which required emergency surgery. The United States Coast Guard responded to the scene, and subsequently turned the investigation of the incident over to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"). As a result of that investigation, OSHA generated a report indicating that Corman did not provide McGeady with safe working conditions. The OSHA report was admitted into evidence.

Following the workplace accident, McGeady applied for and received no-fault benefits under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act ("LHWCA" or "the Act").² Subsequently, Appellees brought an action against Corman for negligence pursuant to section 905(b) of the LHWCA.³ A jury trial commenced. At the conclusion of evidence, Corman made a motion for judgment as a matter of law, asserting that Appellees had failed to introduce evidence by which a jury could conclude that Corman’s negligence arose out of its vessel operations. The court denied the motion. In so doing, the court noted that the record included the OSHA report, a stipulation that the Xavier was a vessel for the purposes of the Act, and that Corcoran, the president of Corman Marine Construction, was present on the vessel at the time of the accident.

Following the parties’ closing arguments, the court instructed the jury. During the instructions the court informed the jury that under the LHWCA:

A longshoreman and/or harbor worker is permitted to file a third party action against his employer if that employer is also the owner of the vessel and a longshoreman [and/or] harbor worker is injured due to the negligence of the vessel and those in charge of it, such as agents and operators of the owner of the vessel.

This is known as dual capacity employment. A longshoreman and/or harbor worker cannot maintain a third party action against his employer if any negligence resulted solely from defendant[’s] duties as the … employer rather than by defendant’s duties as the vessel owner through the agents and operators of the vessel owner.

The court also instructed the jury that in order to prevail in their action, Appellees would need to prove that "the injury to Mr. McGeady was caused by the negligence of the vessel as described by case law, interpreting Section 905(b), thereby permitting a third party action." The court did not provide a definition of "negligence of the vessel" nor did it articulate how "duties as a vessel owner" are distinct from duties as an employer.

The verdict sheet reflected the jury’s finding that "the negligence … was attributable to the vessel and those in charge of lt[,]" and the jury awarded Appellees damages totaling $8,687,233.19. Corman made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or new trial, which was denied by the court. Additional facts will be included as they become relevant to the issues.

B. The Parties’ Contentions

Corman asserts that the court erred in failing to grant its motions for judgment and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as Appellees failed to make a valid claim for "negligence of a vessel" under the LHWCA. Corman argues that although the Act allows an injured worker to maintain a negligence action against a dual capacity employer specifically in its capacity as vessel owner, Appellees failed to adduce evidence sufficient to allow a jury to determine that the injury occurred due to negligence in Corman’s vessel capacity, as opposed to in its capacity as an employer. While Corman does not dispute that negligence occurred, it argues that McGeady’s injury was solely the result of construction activities undertaken in Corman’s capacity as an employer, and unrelated to the seaworthiness of the vessel.

Appellees disagree and urge this Court to affirm the denial of the motion for judgment and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. They argue that the trial record contained evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to determine that McGeady’s injury occurred due to Corman’s negligence as a vessel. Specifically, Appellees assert that the injury occurred while on a Corman-owned vessel, under the direction of a Corman employee, and during a project intended to further Corman’s corporate interest. Thus, Appellees posit that, in the light most favorable to them, Corman’s negligence can be attributed to Corman in its role as vessel owner.

C. Standard of Review

[1, 2] We review de novo the court’s denial of Corman’s motion for judgment. See Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville, 418 Md. 496, 503, 16 A.3d 159 (2011). In so doing, we evaluate "the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Tr. v. Busch, 464 Md. 474, 486, 211 A.3d 1166 (2019) (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted). We reverse a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict only where "the facts and circumstances permit but a single inference as relates to the appellate issue presented." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright, 433 Md. 303, 333, 71 A.3d 30 (2013) (quoting Jones v. State, 425 Md. 1, 31, 38 A.3d 333 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[3–6] In the absence of controlling caselaw, in order to determine the application of a federal statute this Court likewise applies de novo review to ascertain the legislative intent in enacting the statute. See Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 373, 250 A.3d 197 (2021); see also Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 320 n.10, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979); Henry v. Gateway, Inc., 187 Md. App. 647, 664, 979 A.2d 287 (2009). Our primary purpose in interpreting statutory language is to "discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision under scrutiny." Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274, 987 A.2d 18 (2010) (citations omitted). In so doing, our analysis begins by "look[ing] to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute"; however, "[o]ur inquiry is not confined to the specific statutory provision at issue on appeal. Instead [t]he plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs[.]" Westley v. State, 251...