Cornelius v. State

534 P.3d 715

Walter Harold CORNELIUS II, Appellant

v.The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee

Case No. F-2021-1157

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Filed: July 27, 2023

APPEARANCES AT TRIAL

JAY RAMEY, 1408 SOUTH DENVER AVE., TULSA, OK 74119, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

JOHN BENNETT, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WAGONER COUNTY, 307 E. CHEROKEE, WAGONER, OK 74467, COUNSEL FOR STATE

APPEARANCES ON APPEAL

SIMON CASSEL, APPELLATE DEFENSE COUNSEL, P.O. BOX 926, NORMAN, OK 73070, COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

JOHN M. O'CONNOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA, MARY R. INCREMONA, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, 313 N.E. 21ST STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105, COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

SUMMARY OPINION

MUSSEMAN, JUDGE:

¶1 Appellant, Walter Harold Cornelius II, appeals his Judgment and Sentence from the District Court of Wagoner County, Case No. CF-2020-89, for Possession of a Firearm after Prior Felony Conviction in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2019, § 1283.

¶2 The Honorable Douglas Kirkley, District Judge, presided over Appellant's jury trial. The jury found Appellant guilty and assessed punishment of five years imprisonment and the trial court imposed the same. Cornelius appeals his judgment and sentence and raises the following issues:

I. whether the trial court violated Appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial by failing to review his case for undue delay as required by Oklahoma law; and

II. whether the jury's finding that Appellant knowingly possessed firearms was clearly erroneous because the State did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly had any firearm capable of discharging a projectile at his residence.

¶3 We affirm the Judgment and Sentence of the district court.

I.

¶4 Appellant argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We disagree.¹

¶5 In the present case, the trial court did not hold a hearing to review whether Appellant's right to a speedy trial had been violated. Thus, this Court's review of the claim is de novo . State v. Raby , 2022 OK CR 30, ¶ 6, 522 P.3d 822, 825. This issue is resolved by "applying the four Barker² balancing factors: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of [his] right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant." Id. ; Okla. Const. art. II, § 20 (right to speedy trial). "These are not absolute factors, but are balanced with other relevant circumstances in making a determination." Lott v. State , 2004 OK CR 27, ¶ 7, 98 P.3d 318, 327.

A. Length of Delay

¶6 This first question regarding the length of delay is a double inquiry. Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). First, we must decide if the delay is sufficient to trigger a speedy trial analysis under the Barker factors. Id. at 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Generally, we will consider any delay beyond one year to trigger review under Barker . Ellis v. State , 2003 OK CR 18, ¶ 30, 76 P.3d 1131, 1136.

¶7 Appellant was first arrested due to the events that transpired during a drug court compliance check on January 9, 2020. However, Appellant was released on this case on January 16, 2020, but held pending holds in two other active cases. Ordinarily, Appellant's release without charges would not implicate Appellant's speedy trial rights until the later filing of the information. "[I]t is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment." United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971) (emphasis added). However, the docket reflects that Appellant continued to be recognized back at future dates during this time by the trial court. Considering when the right to speedy trial attaches is " ‘the date the charge is filed, except that if the defendant has been continuously held in custody or on bail or recognizance until that date to answer for the same crime or a crime based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode ....’ " Id . at 321 n.12, 92 S.Ct. 455 (emphasis added) (quoting ABA Standards Relating to Speedy Trial).

¶8 Although Appellant remained in custody on other charges following his arrest on January 9, 2020, and was not being held in custody on this charge, the trial court continued to recognize Appellant back on dates certain to answer for criminal charges in relation to this case in addition to Appellant's other cases. Therefore, the speedy trial protections of the Sixth Amendment attached at arrest on January 9, 2020. Id . at 318-19, 92 S.Ct. 455. This delay of 21 months triggers further review under Barker . Ellis , 2003 OK CR 18, ¶ 30, 76 P.3d at 1136-37.

¶9 Second, we "must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim." Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 533-34, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). The State and Appellant have recognized that this is not a complex case, thus the 21-month delay stretched beyond the bare minimum time necessary, but not substantially so. Barker , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ("[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge."). As a result, this factor weighs slightly in favor of Appellant.

B. Reason for Delay

¶10 "The next step in our analysis is to evaluate the reason for the delay. Essentially, we must ascertain the cause of the delay and assess its reasonableness considering the circumstances of the case." Raby , 2022 OK CR 30, ¶ 12, 522 P.3d at 826 (citing Lott , 2004 OK CR 27, ¶ 10, 98 P.3d at 328 ; Ellis , 2003 OK CR 18, ¶¶ 47-48, 76 P.3d at 1139 ). In evaluating this factor, a court should consider:

Deliberate delay weighs heavily against the government. Neutral reasons, like negligence or crowded courts, weigh slightly in a defendant's favor, for "ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." And a "valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay."

Ellis , 2003 OK CR 18, ¶ 47, 76 P.3d at 1139 (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). This factor is "[t]he flag all litigants seek to capture ...." United States v. Loud Hawk , 474 U.S. 302, 315, 106 S.Ct. 648, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986). The burden lies with "the [S]tate to provide an inculpable explanation for delays in speedy trial claims." Jackson v. Ray , 390 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

¶11 The first period of time from arrest to Appellant's initial preliminary hearing conference date, 76 days, was a neutral delay. There is no evidence that the State acted deliberately to delay the proceeding, nor the Appellant. The preliminary hearing conference was then delayed 63 days due to the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19-related delays are a sufficient reason for purposes of constitutional analysis. See, e.g., State v. Brown , 310 Neb. 224, 964 N.W.2d 682, 693 (2021) (pandemic related delays were a valid reason for purposes of the constitutional speedy trial analysis); Johnson v. State , No. 837, Sept. Term, 2021, 2022 WL 2304055, at *5-6 (Md. Ct. Spec.App. June 27, 2022) (review of jurisdictions considering the impact of the pandemic and determining that the global emergency required a balancing of the right to a speedy trial against public health and safety). This Court recognizes that challenges stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic existed for courthouses and detention facilities during this time. In light of the foregoing, this delay is justified as having a valid reason.

¶12 On May 27, 2020, Appellant's preliminary hearing was passed resulting in another 7-day neutral delay. The preliminary hearing was again passed, resulting in a 42-day delay. While the docket only displays the reason of this delay being the absence of Appellant's counsel, an Inmate Request to Staff written by Appellant indicates that his counsel had been in an accident that prevented her from being present that day. As with the COVID-19 delay, these 42 days are justified as having a valid reason and do not weigh against either party. Appellant's preliminary hearing was passed another time on the court's motion, causing an additional 7-day neutral delay. The next pass of Appellant's preliminary hearing was by agreement, resulting in a 14-day delay which Appellant acquiesced to.

¶13 On August 5, 2020, Appellant waived preliminary hearing and the case was set for formal arraignment. Between the waiver and formal arraignment, 19 days passed, resulting in a neutral delay. However, the formal arraignment was then passed by agreement, thus resulting in another 28-day delay Appellant acquiesced to. Following formal arraignment, the case was then set for disposition on October 13, 2020, causing another neutral delay of 22 days. At disposition, the case was set for jury sounding docket.

¶14 Before this case made it to the assigned jury sounding docket, Appellant filed a pro se motion to substitute counsel. As a result, there was a hearing on the motion which the court denied, finding it meritless. However, the record indicates that there was still a decision made to change counsel, causing a delay until July 12, 2021, when Appellant was present with new counsel for disposition. This 273-day delay weighs against the defendant because it resulted from his meritless pro se motions. Following the entry of appearance of new counsel, the case moved at a typical rate towards trial resulting in the remaining 91 days being neutral.

¶15 Considering the delays in total: 222 days were neutral delays that weigh slightly against the State; 105 days were justified delays resulting either from COVID-19 or other unpredictable accidents weighing against neither party; 42 days were...