Cornell v. Miss. Dep't of Hum. Serv.

374 So.3d 1217

Andrew CORNELL f/k/a Andrew Faulkner, Appellant

v.MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee

NO. 2021-SA-00784-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

01/03/2023

HANCOCK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, HON. CHRISTOPHER LOUIS SCHMIDT, JUDGE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: EDWARD GIBSON

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: TRACE D. McRANEY, Gulfport

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND SMITH, JJ.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Andrew Cornell filed a negligence suit against the Mississippi Department of Human Services (MDHS) alleging that MDHS breached its duties to him while he was in its care and custody. Andrew specif- ically claimed he was sexually abused for years by his foster father, Ricky Faulkner. Andrew further alleged that Ricky was a known pedophile at the time of Andrew’s placement with the Faulkners (i.e., MDHS failed to "screen" the foster home before the placement).

¶2. MDHS moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Hancock County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of MDHS based on lack of causation and statutory immunity from the alleged liability involving MDHS’s "investigation and licensing of the Faulkner foster home."

¶3. Andrew now appeals. Upon review, we find that Andrew produced sufficient evidence to meet his burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to certain negligence claims. Specifically, we find that Andrew presented sufficient evidence that an MDHS employee’s failure to report allegations of abuse was a cause in fact and legal cause of Andrew’s continued sexual abuse, and MDHS’s breach of its duty to conduct its required visits with Andrew was a proximate cause of Ricky’s repeated sexual abuse of Andrew. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in part and remand for further proceedings on these matters. As to Andrew’s remaining claim involving MDHS’s pre-placement licensing decisions, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment.

FACTS

¶4. In 1998, Andrew was placed in the custody of MDHS and the Hancock County Department of Human Services. In 2000, when Andrew was approximately five years old, he was placed in the home of foster parents David ("Ricky") and Melissa Faulkner. During his time in foster care, Andrew’s MDHS social worker was Celeste Prouxl. Terri Yetter worked as the MDHS licensure specialist who conducted the Faulkners’ home study.

¶5. In July 2004, the Faulkners formally adopted Andrew. In 2009, Ricky was convicted of seven felonies regarding the molestation of Andrew and other children in the Faulkners’ home.

pdc¶6. On December 15, 2015, Andrew filed a complaint in the Hancock County Circuit Court against MDHS, the Hancock County Department of Human Services, Celeste, and Melissa. In his complaint, Andrew asserted a negligence claim against MDHS and the Hancock County Department of Human Services under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), Mississippi Code Annotated sections 11-46-1 to -23 (Rev. 2019), and he asserted a cause of action against Celeste and Melissa for deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

¶7. MDHS removed the ease to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Andrew then amended his complaint to assert that following his adoption by the Faulkners, Terri failed to report allegations of Ricky’s abuse to MDHS and the youth court. Andrew argued that Tern’s failure to make such mandatory reporting was the proximate cause of Ricky’s continued molestation of Andrew following the allegations made against Ricky. Andrew also claimed that Terri and MDHS neglected their duties to conduct regular twice-monthly visits with Andrew¹ and regular monthly visits to the Faulkners’ home.

¶8. The federal court entered opinions and orders dismissing the claims against Celeste and Terri. After ultimately disposing of all federal claims, the federal court sua sponte remanded the case to the Hancock County Circuit Court.

¶9. Following remand, MDHS moved for summary judgment. MDHS argued that based upon the plain language of Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-15-125 (Rev. 2015), MDHS is entitled to immunity from Andrew’s claims regarding the investigation and licensing of the Faulkners’ home, thereby entitling MDHS to summary judgment. MDHS also argued that the record is devoid of evidence to support Andrew’s allegations that MDHS knew or should have known that Ricky was a pedophile before Andrew’s placement with the Faulkners and also that MDHS knew or should have known that Andrew was being molested by Ricky and failed to take the appropriate measures in response. MDHS maintained that it did not have actual or constructive notice that Ricky was a pedophile prior to or throughout the duration of Andrew’s foster-care placement with the Faulkners, nor did MDHS have actual or constructive notice of any abuse by Ricky prior to Andrew’s adoption by the Faulkners. Finally, MDHS argued that MDHS’s alleged failure to conduct regular visits with Andrew does not alone establish a claim for negligence. Specifically, MDHS asserted that Andrew could not establish that any negligence on the part of MDHS was the cause in fact of abuse he suffered by Ricky or that the abuse was foreseeable to MDHS.

¶10. In support of its motion for summary judgment, MDHS attached the following exhibits: Andrew’s amended complaint; the federal court memorandum opinions and orders granting the motions filed by certain defendants; excerpts from Ricky’s criminal trial transcript; Andrew’s deposition; the affidavits of Celeste and Terri; and the affidavit of Theresa Seeger, another foster parent. In her affidavit, Theresa asserted that she contacted Terri in 2005, a year after the Faulkners adopted Andrew, and alleged that two female children placed in her home had potentially been abused by Ricky while they were in the Faulkners’ home. Theresa did not mention Andrew in her affidavit.

¶11. The circuit court heard arguments on the summary judgment motion on April 15, 2021. After the hearing, Andrew and MDHS submitted additional briefing.

¶12. On June 24, 2021, the circuit court entered its order granting summary judgment in favor of MDHS. The circuit court found that MDHS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Andrew could not establish any genuine issue of material fact as to his claims against MDHS. The circuit court also entered an order confirming that the judgment was a final judgment under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

¶13. Andrew appealed from the circuit court's order granting summary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] ¶14. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that a circuit court should grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Darling Ingredients Inc. v. Moore, 337 So. 3d 214, 216 (¶7) (Miss. 2022) (quoting M.R.C.P. 56(c)). The circuit court must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id. [2–4] ¶15. On appeal, we employ a de novo review of the circuit court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment. Calhoun v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 314 So. 3d 181, 184 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). In so doing, we view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id. (quoting Est. of Hudson v. Yazoo City, 246 So. 3d 872, 876 (¶29) (Miss. 2018)). "Only if there is no genuine issue of material fact is the moving party entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Id. "Questions of law, which include proper application of the MTCA, also are reviewed de novo." Id.

DISCUSSION

¶16. Andrew argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to his negligence claims against MDHS, including the claim relating to licensing the Faulkners’ home.

[5] ¶17. To survive summary judgment on his negligence claims, Andrew "bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to establish the existence of the conventional tort elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages." Spann v. Shuqualak Lumber Co., 990 So. 2d 186, 189 (¶7) (Miss. 2008). In his amended complaint, Andrew claimed MDHS was negligent in (1) licensing the Faulkners’ home for foster placement and (2) breaching duties of care, thereby causing ongoing damages.

¶18. Specifically, Andrew alleged that MDHS possessed the following duties: "a duty to fully and diligently investigate and screen" the Faulkners’ home prior to Andrew’s placement; "a duty to conduct regular supervision and investigation" of the Faulkners’ home "to determine and ensure the safety" of the home; and "a duty to fully and diligently supervise and inspect" the Faulkners’ home after Andrew’s placement.

¶19. Andrew claimed that MDHS breached its duties in the following instances: by failing to fully and diligently investigate and screen the Faulkners’ home prior to Andrew’s placement; by failing to conduct regular supervision and investigation of the Faulkners’ home to determine and ensure Andrew’s safety; by failing to fully and diligently supervise and inspect the Faulkners’ home after Andrew’s placement; by advocating for the adoption of Andrew by the Faulkners to the detriment of adoption by Andrew’s relatives by disregarding the preferred policy of relative adoption; and by failing to report any suspicion of child abuse as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-21-353 (Rev. 2015).

¶20. Finally, Andrew asserted that "[a]s a direct and proximate cause of [MDHS’s] breaches," he suffered mental, physical, and economic damages that are ongoing.

I. Licensing Immunity Under Section 43-15-125

[6] ¶21. In the order granting summary judgment, the circuit court found that pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-15-125, MDHS is...