Corona v. City of Chicago

1

IMELDA CORONA, Plaintiff v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Department of Animal Care and Control, and JOSE DEL RIO, in his individual capacity, Defendants

No. 21 CV 6777

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

August 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Jeremy C. Daniel, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Imelda Corona filed this action for monetary damages and injunctive relief against her employer, the City of Chicago Department of Animal Care and Control, and her supervisor Jose Del Rio, in his individual capacity, alleging that they violated both federal and state law by discriminating and retaliating against her after reporting that she was sexually assaulted by one of her co-workers. She asserts federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law claims under the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act and the Illinois Whistleblower Protection Act. Defendants have filed a partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons below Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND^[1]

At all relevant times, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant City of Chicago in the Department of Animal Care and Control (“Department”). R. 12 ¶¶ 4, 30. Defendant Del Rio was Plaintiff's supervisor. Id. ¶ 6. During her employment, Plaintiff worked closely and on the same shift with an individual named Mr. Caballero. Id. ¶ 8.

Plaintiff's claims arise from an incident that occurred on February 4 2018. Id. ¶ 7. On this date, Plaintiff states that she was sexually assaulted by Caballero outside of work hours. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Plaintiff does not allege that she immediately reported the sexual assault to her employer or the police. See id. ¶¶ 9-10. However, about a year after the incident, on or around February 15, 2019, Plaintiff learned from a colleague that Del Rio had been informed of the sexual assault. Id. ¶ 10. Del Rio did not undertake any investigation or implement any disciplinary procedures against Caballero. Id. ¶ 11. Rather, he continued to place Plaintiff and Caballero on the same shift, thereby requiring them to have one-on-one interaction. Id.

Plaintiff was not Caballero's only alleged victim. Id. ¶¶ 14, 72. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Caballero sexually assaulted another female employee who worked in the Department. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff states that once Del Rio learned that she was aware that he knew about the sexual assault, he became upset and would ignore her at all costs. Id. ¶ 13. He also began to disparage Plaintiff to her co-workers. Id.

On February 18, 2019, Plaintiff and the other female employee reported their respective sexual assaults to the City's Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Division within the Department of Human Resources. Id. ¶ 14. Three days later, the two went to the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) to file a police report against Caballero. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff states that she was motivated to file a police report not only to deter Caballero from any further criminal activity, but also out of a concern for the safety of the public given that he had sexually assaulted multiple people. Id. ¶¶ 72-73.

Plaintiff's sexual assault became a widely discussed topic at work. Id. ¶ 19. Del Rio openly discussed the assault with Plaintiff's co-workers, and he and another colleague, Francis Watson, began to retaliate against her. Id. ¶¶ 16, 20. On February 26, 2019, Plaintiff spoke with human resources (“HR”) about Del Rio and Watson's retaliation. Id. ¶ 16. Despite her report, the two continued to disparage her, call her derogatory names, and tell co-workers that she was “ruining their lives.” Id. ¶ 20.

As the information about the sexual assault and resulting investigation became more widespread, other co-workers joined in on the harassment. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21-23. They would tell Plaintiff that the sexual assault was “grown folk business” and insinuate that it was her fault for putting herself in a situation to be assaulted. Id. ¶ 21. The office became hostile toward Plaintiff, blaming her for causing tension in the workplace and for losing certain privileges, like bowling night. Id. ¶ 22. Some coworkers also started placing derogatory pictures and memes in the dispatch room that referenced people “snitching.” Id. ¶ 23. Despite her report to HR, Plaintiff was forced to face her harassers every day. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. Del Rio also continued to place Plaintiff on the same shift as Caballero. Id. ¶ 24.

On April 8, 2019, two months after Plaintiff initially reported the sexual assault, she gave a statement regarding Caballero's conduct to the City's Office of Inspector General (“OIG”). Id. ¶¶ 17, 84, 92. Caballero was eventually terminated in October 2020. Id. ¶ 26.

On March 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Illinois Human Rights Act. Id. ¶ 28; R. 1-1. Despite Caballero's termination and the filing of the Charge, the harassment and retaliation at work persisted. R. 12 ¶ 29. For example, in June 2021, Plaintiff overheard Del Rio once again discussing the sexual assault with other employees and telling them that Plaintiff had ruined his life. R. 12 ¶¶ 30-31. Due to the continued harassment, Plaintiff decided to leave her employment with the Department the following month. Id. ¶ 30.

On September 24, 2021, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue. Id. ¶ 32; R. 1-2. Plaintiff then brought this suit against the Defendants. R. 1. She amended her original complaint pursuant to this Court's March 9, 2022, scheduling order. R. 11. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges that Defendants discriminated against and harassed Plaintiff because of her sex in violation of Title VII (Count I) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count III). R. 12 at 5-6, 7-8. She further alleges that Defendants retaliated against her in violation of Title VII (Count II), deprived her of her First Amendment rights (Count IV), and retaliated against her in violation of the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act (“Illinois Ethics Act”) (Count V) and the Illinois Whistleblowers Protection Act (“IWA”) (Count VI) for reporting Caballero's sexual assault and the harassment that followed. Id. at 6-7, 8-11. Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief on all counts. Id. at 11-12.

Defendants have filed a partial motion to dismiss the FAC under Rule 12(b)(6). R. 23. The Court now addresses the merits of their motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is meant to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the case. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2012). In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cochran v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” however, “do not suffice” to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, the plaintiff's complaint must allege facts which, when taken as true, “‘plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level.'” Cochran, 828 F.3d at 599 (quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)).

ANALYSIS

Defendants seek partial dismissal of the FAC on the following grounds (1) certain events covered by Plaintiff's Title VII claims are time-barred; (2) Plaintiff's speech is not constitutionally protected because it did not address a matter of public concern; (3) an individual cannot be held liable under the IWA; and (4) the Illinois Ethics Act does not apply because the City of Chicago is not a state agency and Del Rio is not a state employee. R. 22 at 3-10. The Court addresses each of their arguments in turn.

I. Timeliness of Title VII Claims

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's Title VII claims (Count I and II) include acts that were allegedly committed outside of the applicable limitations period and therefore should be dismissed as time-barred. Id. at 3-4.

A statute of limitations defense is generally not properly raised in a motion to dismiss because it is an affirmative defense, and the plaintiff “need not anticipate and attempt to plead around defenses” in the complaint. Chi. Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian House, Inc., 770 F.3d 610, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2014). Nonetheless, dismissal is appropriate where “the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense, such as when a complaint plainly reveals that an action is untimely under the governing statute of limitations.” Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2008).

The parties agree that Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s charge-filing provision governs Plaintiff's Title VII claims. A plaintiff in Illinois who wishes to bring a Title VII claim must first file an administrative charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the allegedly unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Boston v. U.S. Steel Corp., 816 F.3d 455, 463 (7th Cir. 2016); Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 86, 746 F.3d 835, 839 (7th Cir. 2014). Failure to file a charge within that time renders the claim untimely. Boston, 816 F.3d at 463.

Defendants argue that...