Coste v. Town of Islip

1

FERDINAND L. COSTE, JR., individually and on behalf of, November Romeo, LLC and all aircraft owners who are to be deprived of reasonable use and access to the Long Island MacArthur Airport, an entity and premises which the Town of Islip claims to be fee owner having offices, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF ISLIP, ANGIE CARPENTER, ISLIP TOWN BOARD MEMBERS JOHN C. COCHRANE, JR., MARY KATE MULLEN, JOHN LORENZO, JAMES P. O'CONNOR, JORGE GUADRON, each individually and in their own capacities, SHELLEY LAROSE ARKIN, and JOHN AND JANE DOE # 1-10, Defendants.

No. 23-cv-1339 (NJC)(SIL)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

June 26, 2024

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

STEVEN I. LOCKE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:

Presently before the Court in this Section 1983-interference with contracts action, on referral from the Honorable Joan M Azrack^[1] for report and recommendation, is Defendants Town of Islip's, Shelley LaRose-Arken's (listed on the docket as “Shelley LaRose Arkin”) Angie Carpenter's, Islip Town Board Members John C Cochrane, Jr.'s, Mary Kate Mullen's, Jorge Guadron's, John Lorenzo's, James P. O'Connor's and John and Jane Doe # 1-10s', (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs Ferdinand L. Coste, Jr.'s (“Coste”) and November Romeo, LLC's (“NR”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Second Amended Complaint (“SAC” or “2d Am. Compl.”), Docket Entry (“DE”) [23], for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Notice of Motion to Dismiss (“Defendants' Motion” or “Defs. Mot.”), DE [54]; Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion to Dismiss (“Defs. Mem.”), DE [54-1].

By way of their Complaint dated February 21, 2023, DE [1], later modified by the Amended Complaint dated April 3, 2023, DE [18], and the Second Amended Complaint (“2d Am. Compl.”) dated May 22, 2023, DE [30-1], Plaintiffs commenced this action on behalf of themselves and “all aircraft owners who are to be deprived of reasonable use and access to the Long Island MacArthur Airport,” and now allege: (i) the existence of a prescriptive easement; (ii) violation of the Contracts Clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; (iii) general violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”); (iv) First Amendment retaliation pursuant to Section 1983; (v) unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to Section 1983; (vi) denial of due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to Section 1983; (vii) an unconstitutional burden on the right to travel in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to Section 1983; and (viii) conspiracy. See 2d Am. Compl., DE [1].

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on February 9, 2024. See Defs. Mot. Plaintiffs oppose (“Plaintiffs' Opposition” or “Pls. Opp.”) and request that the Court either convert Defendants' Motion to a motion for summary judgment or grant Plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. See Pls. Opp., DE [55]. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court respectfully recommends granting Defendants' Motion in its entirety, dismissing the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, and denying Plaintiffs' cross-motions for leave to amend and conversion of Defendants' Motion to a motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts

The facts set forth herein are taken from the Second Amended Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this Report and Recommendation.^[2]

a. The Parties and the Relevant Properties

Coste is a resident of the Town of Islip (the “Town”) in Suffolk County. Id., ¶ 2. He is the “Managing Member” of November Romeo, LLC (“NR”), a New York-based limited liability company that, in 2003, purchased a 4.77-acre commercial aircraft hangar facility (the “NR Property” or the “Property”), adjoining Long Island MacArthur Airport (the “Airport”). Id., ¶¶ 18, 21. Plaintiffs purport to bring their claims on behalf of themselves and “all aircraft owners who are to be deprived of reasonable use and access to the Long Island MacArthur Airport,” see 2d Am. Compl. at i (case caption), including tenants of the NR Property and the Long Island Group Headquarters of the Civil Air Patrol (“Civil Air Patrol”). See id., ¶¶ 116, 119, 304, 308, 323-24. Plaintiffs allege that the Town of Islip Department of Aviation is directly responsible for the operation of the Airport and is a state actor. Id., ¶¶ 159-60. Defendant Shelley LaRose-Arken leads the Town of Islip Department of Aviation as its Commissioner of Aviation and Transportation. Id., ¶ 161. Defendant Angie Carpenter is the Town Supervisor. Id., ¶ 146. The remaining individual defendants, (together with Shelley LaRose-Arken and Angie Carpenter, “the Individual Defendants”) are members of the Town Board of the Town of Islip (or the “Town Board”). Id., ¶¶ 147-57.

NR pays over $55,000 annually in real estate property taxes to the Town. Id., ¶ 23. The NR Property is improved with airplane storage hangars, which were first constructed in 1969 and certified by the Town for their present use, as well as electric security gates. Id., ¶¶ 24, 77. Plaintiffs claim that a proposal to acquire the NR Property has been in the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) budget several times over the last fifty years, but that past offers to sell the Property to the Town have been ignored. Id., ¶¶ 81,82. Plaintiffs allege that the “highest and best” use of the NR property is to support General Aviation as a regional economic resource. Id., ¶ 84.

According to Plaintiffs, the Airport is “a major element of the Long Island infrastructure” and “a regional economic engine upon which the well-being of the residents of Suffolk County depend to a substantial extent.” Id., ¶¶ 209, 210. The Town of Islip Department of Aviation is directly responsible for the operation of the Airport, and both this Department and the Town Board manage and steward the Airport. Id., ¶¶ 160-61. Plaintiffs argue that the Airport “is so vested with the public interest it has become ‘social property'” and the Airport “must manage the property in the public interest[,] which in this case means facilitating access from the hangar area on the NR Property to the main runways of the airport.” Id., ¶ 212.

Plaintiffs allege that the Town is subject to FAA and Transportation Security Administration regulation, including safety, security and operational regulations, as well as obligations as a condition of accepting FAA grant funds. Id., ¶¶ 220-22. Plaintiffs assert that non-party Robert Schneider, the Town Deputy Commissioner of Aviation, has stated that “[f]ailure to comply with the Federal Requirements could subject the Town to enforcement action by the FAA and ultimately could result in civil penalties, injunctions, and the loss of federal grant eligibility.” Id., ¶ 227.

NR purchased the NR Property from Paul C. Halstead (“Halstead”) in 2003. Id., ¶ 36. According to Plaintiffs, in 1968, Halstead negotiated airport access with then-Airport manager Alfred Warner, and in 1969 Halstead entered into a lease agreement (the “Halstead Lease”), for an annual sum of $1,100, payable in monthly installments, with the Town “to construct and use a taxiway for aircraft...with right of ingress and egress to [the Airport] over said premise by aircraft, personnel and maintenance equipment” from that property, which right extended to Halstead's “employees, guests[,] invitees and patrons and tenants.” Id., ¶¶ 31-34. The Second Amended Complaint states that the Halstead Lease was both ten years and twenty years in length, and it is unclear to the Court which duration Plaintiffs intended to allege. Id., ¶¶ 33, 44. In 1969, the Town constructed Taxiway H, connecting the threshold of the Airport's Runway 28 to the western border of the NR Property. Id., ¶¶ 42-43. On June 20, 1990, Commissioner Werner wrote a letter to Halstead agreeing that the Town would continue to grant Halstead ingress and egress to the Airport via a paved taxiway, Taxiway H, pursuant to a month-to-month lease with a fee increasing annually. Id., ¶ 47. The letter established rent for 1991 at $3,600 per year. Id.

Presently, NR owns a Commercial “Through-the-Fence” operation at the Airport, with physical access to the Airport via Taxiway H. Id., ¶¶ 22, 25. Plaintiffs allege that the FAA has never “questioned or challenged” this operation. Id., ¶ 91. According to Plaintiffs, no Defendant has ever “indicated that the through-the-fence Agreement under which NR is operating and under which its predecessor-in-interest operated was improperly structured.” Id., ¶ 236. Indeed, Plaintiffs and owners of light aircraft have used Taxiway H since 1969 to access the Airport. Id., ¶ 25. Moreover, according to Plaintiffs, there is no available hangar space for these users at the Airport itself. Id., ¶ 26.

Taxiway H connects the main aeronautical facilities (runways etc.) of the Airport with the NR Property and six outdoor aircraft parking positions known as “tie-downs” on Airport property adjacent to the NR property. Id., ¶ 48. Taxiway H is open to all Airport users, but is primarily used by NR and by the Civil Air Patrol. Id., ¶¶ 50-51. Plaintiffs allege that there is a high demand for aircraft storage “in the region.” Id., ¶ 53. According to Plaintiffs, failure to permit reasonable unrestricted access to Taxiway H as a route for General Aviation aircraft to access the commercial runways of the Airport creates an imminent danger of serious, permanent, and irreparable damage to all Town and Suffolk County residents who depend upon the accessibility and use of the Airport as a terminal destination and “hub”...