Cota v. Aveda Corp.

JULISSA COTA, individually and on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AVEDA CORPORATION, a Minnesota corporation; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendant.

Case No.: 3:20-cv-01137-BEN-BGS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

October 14, 2020

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

[ECF No. 11]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Julissa Cota ("Plaintiff"), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brings this action for violations of (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (the "ADA"), and (2) Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civ. Code, § 51, et seq. (the "UCRA"), against Defendant Aveda Corporation, a Minnesota corporation ("Defendant"). ECF No. 1.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses Nos. 1, 4-8, and 10-17 pled in Defendant's Answer (the "Motion"). ECF No. 11. On September 29, 2020, Defendant filed an opposition. ECF No. 13. Plaintiff did not file a reply brief. The motions were submitted on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and Rule 78(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 15.

After considering the papers submitted, supporting documentation, and applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses Nos. 4, 6, 10, 12, 14, 15, and 17. As discussed below, with respect to Affirmative Defense Nos. 1, 5, 7-8, 11, 13, and 16, the Motion is moot as Defendant has agreed to withdraw these defenses.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person who requires screen reading software to read website content using her computer. ECF No. 1 at 1:26-27. Defendant is a Minnesota corporation, which operates (1) "stores, which constitute places of public accommodation, in California, and the United States as a whole, selling make-up, hair and beauty products, and other items," and (2) "a website, https://www.aveda.com, which provides consumers with product information, a means to order items for pick-up in store, store location information, and other services." ECF No. 11 at 1:21-24 (citing ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 3, 5). "Defendant's website is incompatible with screen-reading software and, therefore, cannot be used by Plaintiff." Id. at 1:25-26 (citing ECF No. 1, ¶ 24). As a result, Plaintiff alleges she has visited Defendant's website numerous times, and during each visit, she has encountered various barriers, which prevented her from using the website. Id. at 1:27-28 (citing ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 26, 28).

B. Procedural History

On June 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, alleging claims for relief for violations of the (1) ADA and (2) UCRA against Defendant. ECF No. 1.

On July 20, 2020, Defendant was served. ECF No. 4. On August 10, 2020, Defendant timely filed its answer to Plaintiff's complaint, asserting eighteen (18) affirmative defenses. ECF No. 5; see also FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(a).

On August 31, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer, seeking to strike Affirmative Defense Nos. 1, 4-8, and 10-17. ECF No. 11. On September 29,2020, Defendant filed an Opposition to the Motion, advising that it withdrew its 1^st, 5^th, 7^th, 8^th, 11^th, 13^th, and 16^th affirmative defenses, leaving only the 4^th, 6^th, 10^th, 12^th, 14^th, 15^th, and 17^th affirmative defenses at issue. ECF No. 13 at 5.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) allows a court to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." "The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or from matters which the Court may take judicial notice." Herd v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2018). A motion to strike portions of an answer is appropriate when a defense is (1) insufficient as a matter of law or (2) insufficiently pled. Harris v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 303 F.R.D. 625, 627 (E.D. Cal. 2014); see also Herd, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 1162 (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (5th Cir. 1982)). "An affirmative defense fails as a matter of law if it 'lacks merit under any set of facts the defendant might allege.'" Harris, 303 F.R.D. at 628. With respect "to determining the sufficiency of pleading[,] an affirmative defense is [sufficiently pled when] . . . it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense." Id.; see also Kohler v. Flava Enterprises, Inc., 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015) (providing that "the 'fair notice' required by the pleading standards only requires describing the defense in 'general terms'").

The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion "is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial." Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Motions to strike are generally disfavored and should not be granted unless the matter to be stricken clearly could have no possible bearing on the subject of the litigation." Diamond S.J. Enter., Inc. v. City of San Jose, 395 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1216 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (internal quotations omitted). When considering a motion to strike, "courts must view the pleadings under attack in the light more favorable to the pleader." Lazar v. Trans Union LLC, 195 F.R.D. 665, 669 (C.D. Cal. 2000). The decision to grant a motionto strike ultimately lies within the discretion of the trial court. Rees v. PNC Bank, N.A., 308 F.R.D. 266, 271-72 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973). Some courts require a plaintiff to make a showing of prejudice before granting a motion to strike. Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2010).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's primary arguments are that Defendant's affirmative defenses are (1) "poorly pled," lacking "some connection, even in general terms, between the defense and this case," and (2) "not valid affirmative defenses." ECF No. 11 at 1:11-18. Defendant responds by arguing that its affirmative defenses (1) "are based on plausible interpretations of Plaintiff's allegations" from Plaintiff's own "artfully vague, boilerplate complaint" and (2) provide Plaintiff fair notice. ECF No. 13 at 1:7-20. Defendant also voluntarily withdrew its 1^st, 5^th, 7^th, 8^th, 11^th, 13^th, and 16^th affirmative defenses, ECF No. 13 at 5:7-21, and argues that "[h]ad Plaintiff picked up the phone rather than running to the Court, the parties could have addressed the issues informally," id. at 1:12-14. Thus, Defendant contends that "Plaintiff's Motion only stands to manufacture unnecessary attorneys' fees," id. at 1:16-17, noting that "the ADA has been manipulated to generate attorneys' fees," id. at 5:1. The Court notes that while the Southern District has no formal meet and confer requirement prior to filing a motion to strike, meet and confer efforts are always encouraged. Here, such efforts could have saved Plaintiff time and effort with respect to Defendant's agreement to withdraw several of its affirmative defenses. That being said, as outlined the below, with respect to Plaintiff's Motion, this Court grants it in part and denies it in part for the below reasons.

A. Defenses Plaintiff Alleges Fail as a Matter of Pleading

"The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense." Harris, 303 F.R.D. at 628. Unlike the code pleading standard used in California superior courts, in which pleading of facts in support of affirmative defenses is required, federal courts utilize the notice pleading standard. See, e.g., Fanucchi & Limi Farms v. United Agri Prod., 414 F.3d 1075, 1082(9th Cir. 2005) (reiterating that "federal courts employ notice pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)" while "California courts employ code pleading, which requires more factual detail than notice pleading"). In federal courts, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 8") governs the level of pleading, and Rule 8(a) requires in a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). Rule 8(b) governs the pleading of defenses generally and requires only that the party "state in short and plain terms its defense to each claim asserted against it." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b). Meanwhile, Rule 8(c) governs the pleading of affirmative defenses and provides that "[i]n response to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). The Supreme Court has opined on the interpretation of Rule 8 in several opinions relevant to the level of pleading required.¹ However, the Ninth Circuit has held that the SupremeCourt's Twombly/Iqbal standard does not apply to affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Kohler v. Flava Enterprises, Inc., 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015) (in a case involving an appeal from the Southern District, the Ninth Court held that it would not disturb the district court's finding that the defendant had adequately pled "equivalent facilitation as an affirmative defense") (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1274 (3d ed.1998)).

The Southern District follows the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kohler, which requires Defendant to plead its affirmative defenses under the fair notice standard. "[T]he 'fair notice' required by the pleading standards only requires describing the defense in "general terms." 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1274 (3d ed.1998). Each affirmative defense "need not be supported by detailed factual allegations" but "must at least give notice of the grounds upon which it rests." Weintraub v. Law Office of Patenaude...