Cotton v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin.

340 F.Supp.3d 1187

Harold T. COTTON, Plaintiff,

v.COMMISSIONER OF the SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.

Case No. CIV-17-46-SPS

United States District Court, E.D. Oklahoma.

Signed September 24, 2018

Marianna E. McKnight, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff.

Brian C. Baak, Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, Denver, CO, Cheryl R. Triplett, US Attorney, Muskogee, OK, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

STEVEN P. SHREDER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The claimant Harold T. Cotton requests judicial review of a denial of benefits by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). He appeals the Commissioner's decision and asserts that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in determining he was not disabled. For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's decision is hereby REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the ALJ for further proceedings.

Social Security Law and Standard of Review

Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment [.]" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act "only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy[.]" Id. § 423 (d)(2)(A). Social security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.¹

Section 405(g) limits the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to two inquiries: whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is " ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ " Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) ; see also Clifton v. Chater , 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996). The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its discretion for the Commissioner's. See Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). But the Court must review the record as a whole, and "[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight."

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB , 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) ; see also Casias , 933 F.2d at 800-01.

Claimant's Background

The claimant was fifty-three years old at the time of the administrative hearing (Tr. 39). He completed the sixth grade, and has worked as a kitchen helper, laborer in a dairy, and janitor (Tr. 26, 349). The claimant alleges that he has been unable to work since March 21, 2012, due to depression, anxiety, heart disease, colon problems, learning disability, and illiteracy (Tr. 348).

Procedural History

On September 14, 2012, the claimant applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 - 434, and on September 27, 2012, he applied for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 - 85. His applications were denied. ALJ John W. Belcher conducted an administrative hearing and determined that the claimant was not disabled in a written opinion dated December 22, 2015 (Tr. 11-28). The Appeals Council denied review, so the ALJ's opinion is the final decision of the Commissioner for purposes of this appeal. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.

Decision of the Administrative Law Judge

The ALJ made his decision at step five of the sequential evaluation. He found that the claimant had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work, i. e. , he could lift/carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, stand/walk six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday, but only occasionally climb, balance, bend, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. Additionally, he determined that the claimant could perform simple and routine tasks, and have superficial contact with co-workers, supervisors, and the public, where "superficial" was defined as "contact similar to that which a grocery clerk might have with those groups" (Tr. 19). The ALJ then concluded that although the claimant could not return to his past relevant work, he was nevertheless not disabled because there was work he could perform in the national economy, e. g. , production inspector, press machine operator, and bench assembler (Tr. 25-28).

Review

The claimant contends that the ALJ erred by: (i) failing to properly assess his mental impairments based on the state reviewing physician opinion in the record, and (ii) improperly considering and rejecting the opinion of a consultative examiner. The Court agrees with the claimant's first contention, and the decision of the Commissioner must therefore be reversed.

The ALJ found that the claimant had the severe impairments of ischemic heart disease, right knee osteophytes, hypertension, obesity, depression, anxiety and PTSD, a learning disability, and borderline intellectual functioning (Tr. 14). The relevant medical records as to the claimant's mental impairments are as follows.

On November 14, 2012, Dr. Denise LaGrand conducted a mental status/diagnostic examination, and estimated that the claimant had borderline intellectual functioning, which was consistent with his education and job history (Tr. 521-524). She assessed him with major depressive disorder, polysubstance abuse /dependence, and tobacco use disorder (Tr. 524).

On December 11, 2012, state reviewing physician Laura Lochner, Ph.D., completed a review of the claimant's evidence to that point, and found that the claimant's mental impairments consisted of affective disorders and substance addiction disorders, and that he was moderately impaired in the three functional categories of activities of daily living, maintaining social functioning,and maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace (Tr. 94). Dr. Lochner also completed a Mental RFC Assessment and found in the area referred to as "Section I" that the claimant was markedly limited in the typical three categories of ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, to carry out detailed instructions, and to interact appropriately with the general public, and that he was moderately limited in the ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods (Tr. 97-98). In the written comments section ("Section III"), Dr. Lochner wrote that the claimant could perform simple tasks with routine supervision, could relate to supervisors and peers on a superficial work basis, and could adapt to a work situation, but could not relate to the general public (Tr. 98).

On October 20, 2014, nearly two years later, Dr. Brian Snider conducted a mental status examination of the claimant (Tr. 541-545). Among other things, the claimant appeared to have a limited fund of knowledge and impaired judgment, and Dr. Snider estimated the claimant's intellectual ability in the extremely low to borderline range (Tr. 543). He assessed the claimant with major depressive disorder, PTSD, generalized anxiety disorder, and alcohol use disorder in sustained remission (Tr. 545). Additionally, Dr. Snider completed a mental RFC assessment, in which he indicated that the claimant had extreme limitations in the ability to interact appropriately with supervisors and co-workers; marked limitations in the ability to interact appropriately with the public, understand and remember complex instructions, carry out complex instructions, and make judgments on complex work-related decisions; and had moderate limitations in the ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting (Tr. 538-539). He cited the claimant's intellectual deficit and poor judgment, as well as irritability, history of conflict on the job, and anxiety around others, in support of his assessment (Tr. 538-539).

At the administrative hearing, the ALJ elicited testimony from a VE to determine if there were jobs a hypothetical person could perform with the following limitations:

... limited to lifting no more than 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, with pushing and pulling consistent with lifting and carrying limitations. He could stand or walk for six hours in an eight hour day, sit for six to eight hours in an eight hour day. He could climb, balance, bend, or stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl on an occasional basis. He could simple tasks, simple and routine tasks. He should have superficial contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public, and by superficial I mean contact similar to that that a grocery clerk might have with others, groups like that – coworkers, supervisors, and the public.

(Tr. 62). The VE identified that the claimant could perform the jobs of production inspector, DICOT § 712.684-050; light press machine operator, DICOT § 690.685-326; and bench assembler, DICOT § 780.684-062 (Tr. 63).

In his written opinion, the ALJ summarized the claimant's hearing testimony and the medical evidence in the record. Based on the evidence in the record regarding the claimant's cognitive and intellectual functioning, the ALJ found that the claimant's ability to perform more than simple tasks was limited (Tr. 22). In the next sentence, however, he stated that the claimant's learning disability and borderline intellectual functioning were not as severe as alleged because he had a good understanding of most questions, had an adequate fund of knowledge, and exhibited the ability to read and...