Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz

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COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS ACTION NETWORK, INC., et al., Plaintiffs v. PAUL DAVID GAUBATZ, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 09-2030 (CKK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

December 2, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This tort case is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions in limine.^[1]The case centers on an alleged scheme between Defendants Paul Gaubatz, David Gaubatz, and affiliated organizations to gather damaging information on Plaintiffs Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. (“CAIR-AN”) and CAIR-Foundation Inc. (“CAIR-F” and, collectively “CAIR”) under false pretenses. Plaintiffs' remaining claims to relief arise under the Federal Wiretap Act, the District of Columbia Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the common law of trespass. Defendants seek to present particularly inflammatory evidence of Plaintiffs' purported links to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations in an effort to portray Plaintiffs as criminal organizations and material supporters of Islamic terrorism. Because these specious allegations have nothing to do with the claims at issue and would overly prejudice the jury, the Court shall exclude all such evidence and testimony. Accordingly, and upon consideration of the pleadings, the relevant legal authority, and the record as a whole^[2], the Court shall GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Plaintiffs' [249] Motions in Limine.

I. BACKGROUND

Given how long this case has been pending, the Court shall restate the factual background of this matter in more detail. Plaintiffs' remaining claims to relief arise under the common law of trespass, the Federal Wiretap Act, the District of Columbia Wiretap Act, and the Stored Communications Act. CAIR v. Gaubatz, 82 F.Supp.3d 344, 349 (D.D.C. 2015); Third Am. Compl. Plaintiffs allege that, beginning in 2007, Defendants crafted and executed a plan by which Defendant Chris Gaubatz secured and completed work as a CAIR intern under false pretenses in order to access and distribute confidential information belonging to CAIR. Third Am. Compl. at ¶ 21. This scheme was purportedly motivated by Defendants' belief that CAIR, a civil rights organization, was a “front group” for nefarious Islamist organizations.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants SANE and Yerushalmi entered into a 2007 agreement with Defendant David Gaubatz whereby David Gaubatz would serve as the Director of SANE's unrelated “Mapping Shari'a in America: Knowing the Enemy Project.” Id. at ¶ 22; Pls.' Ex. A (“SANE-Gaubatz Agreement”); CAIR v. Gaubatz, 31 F.Supp.3d 237, 244-45 (D.D.C. 2014). Under the agreement, Gaubatz worked as SANE's and Yerushalmi's agent, reported directly to Yerushalmi, and held the authority and obligation to manage the “field work” of SANE, including data collection, hiring and training of “field agents,” and supervising analysis of collected data. Third Am. Compl. ¶ 22; Pls.' Ex. A. The agreement dictated that all “written, electronic, and digital material” collected by David Gaubatz through his work for SANE would be “the exclusive property” of SANE. Third Am. Compl. ¶ 25; Pls.' Ex. A.

When Defendant CSP needed someone to manage field research for its “CAIR Documentary Project,” Defendant CSP contacted Defendants SANE and Yerushalmi, who recommended Defendant David Gaubatz for the role. CAIR, 31 F.Supp.3d at 244-45. Plaintiffs allege that the Gaubatz Defendants “entered into at least two agreements” with Defendants CSP and Brim according to which the Gaubatz Defendants provided Defendants CSP and Brim with Plaintiffs' confidential information obtained by Chris Gaubatz. Third Am. Compl. ¶ 42; Pls.' Ex. B (“CSP-Gaubatz Agreement”).

Plaintiffs assert that in 2008 Defendant Chris Gaubatz, in furtherance of Defendants' agreements, served as Defendant David Gaubatz's “chief field investigator” and worked as an intern first at the affiliate CAIR MD/VA Office in Virginia and then at the national CAIR office in Washington, D.C. by deceptively stating that his name was David Marshall and he was an adherent to the Muslim faith, among other false representations. Id. ¶¶ 26-28, 41. These CAIR offices, including the areas where computers are stored, were not open to the public and could only be accessed with authorization from CAIR. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. Plaintiffs have stipulated that Defendant Chris Gaubatz's conduct at the CAIR MD/VA Office does not form the basis for any of their claims. CAIR, 31 F.Supp.3d at 247.

During his work as a CAIR intern, Plaintiffs contend that, without Plaintiffs' authorization, Defendant Chris Gaubatz accessed and removed confidential CAIR documents, recorded private conversations involving CAIR employees and concerning CAIR activities, and distributed this confidential information to Defendants David Gaubatz, CSP, Brim, SANE, and Yerushalmi. Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 48-54. Plaintiffs claim Defendant Chris Gaubatz accessed CAIR computers and networks with login credentials he was not authorized to use and distributed electronics documents, including emails and spreadsheets, to Defendant David Gaubatz without Plaintiffs' consent. Id. at ¶ 49-50, 71. Plaintiffs allege the Gaubatz Defendants then distributed the documents and recordings to Defendants CSP and Brim without Plaintiffs' authorization. Id. ¶¶ 53, 71; see Pls.' Ex. C (“SANE-Gaubatz Settlement Agreement”). Plaintiffs assert that Defendants CSP and Brim knew how the Gaubatz Defendants obtained the recordings and that Defendants CSP and Brim subsequently distributed them to additional parties. Id. ¶¶ 56-57.

Over successive rounds of dispositive briefing, three sets of claims remain: those arising under the Federal and D.C. Wiretap Acts, the Stored Communications Act, and the common law of trespass.

First, Plaintiff CAIR-F claims Defendant Chris Gaubatz intercepted CAIF-F's communications in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act and the D.C. Wiretap Acts. Third Am. Compl. ¶ 80. The Federal Wiretap Act prohibits the intentional interception of “any wire, oral, or electronic communication,” including attempted interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (authorizing civil action for recovery based on interception). “Interception” means “the aural or other acquisition of contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).

Plaintiffs also claims that Defendants Chris Gaubatz, David Gaubatz, CSP, and Brim used and disclosed the contents of the intercepted communications in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act and the D.C. Wiretap Act. Third Am. Compl ¶ 87. Like the Federal Wiretap Act, the D.C. Wiretap Act prohibits willful disclosure and willful use of “the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom” when an individual knows or has reason to know “that the communication was obtained through the interception of an oral or wire communication.” D.C. Code § 23-542(a)(2)-(3); D.C. Code § 23-554(a)(1) (authorizing civil action for recovery based on disclosure and use). The D.C. Wiretap Act, however, does not require knowledge that the communication at issue was illegally intercepted. CAIR, 31 F.Supp.3d at 264 & n.10.

Plaintiff CAIR-F further claims Defendants David Gaubatz, Yerushalmi, CSP, and Brim are liable for Defendant Chris Gaubatz's violations of the Federal Wiretap Act and D.C. Wiretap Act by respondeat superior. CAIR v. Gaubatz, 31 F.Supp.3d at 253, 268-70. Specifically, Plaintiff CAIR-F asserts (1) that Defendant Chris Gaubatz was Defendant David Gaubatz's agent and (2) that Defendant Chris Gaubatz was therefore Defendants Yerushalmi's, CSP's, and Brim's sub-agent because Defendant David Gaubatz was their agent. Id. at 268-69.

Second, CAIR-F argues that Defendants violated the Stored Communications Act. Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 89-93. Specifically, Plaintiff CAIR-F claims that (1) Defendant Chris Gaubatz accessed electronic communications stored in CAIR-F's computers and servers without authorization in violation of the Stored Communications Act and (2) Defendants David Gaubatz, Yerushalmi, CSP, and Brim are liable for Defendant Chris Gaubatz's conduct by respondeat superior. Id. at ¶ 90; CAIR, 31 F.Supp.3d at 273. The theory through which Plaintiff CAIR-F claims Defendants David Gaubatz, Yerushalmi, CSP, and Brim are liable for Defendant Chris Gaubatz's conduct under the Stored Communications Act is identical to that raised under the Federal and D.C. Wiretap Acts.

Third and finally, Plaintiffs claim Chris Gaubatz is liable for trespass by gaining consent to enter the national CAIR office under false pretenses and by exceeding the scope of the consent he gained. Third Am. Compl. at ¶ 127-134. Trespass is defined as “an unauthorized entry onto property that results in interference with the property owner's possessory interest therein.” Sarete, Inc. v. 1344 U.Street Ltd. P'ship, 871 A.2d 480, 490 (D.C. 2005).

CAIR also seeks punitive damages. To recover on their first and third sets of claims, Plaintiffs must show (1) that the defendant “acted with evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or with intent to injure, or in willful disregard for the rights of the plaintiff,” and (2) that his conduct “was outrageous, grossly fraudulent, or reckless toward the safety of the plaintiff.”^[3]CAIR need only show willfulness to recover punitive damages on its SCA claim. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c).

Procedurally the Court denied without prejudice Plaintiffs' motions in limine pending supplemental briefing on Plaintiffs' motions in limine, but did not order supplemental briefing on CSP Defendants' motion. CAIR, 306 F.Supp.3d 165 (D.D.C...