Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc.

TERRI COWGILL, Plaintiff, v. FIRST DATA TECHNOLOGIES, INC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. ADC-19-2565

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

April 1, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant First Data Technologies, Inc. ("Defendant") moves this Court for summary judgment. ECF No. 52. Plaintiff Terri Cowgill ("Plaintiff") alleges in her Complaint violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). ECF No. 1. Additionally, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Exhibits (ECF No. 62) attached to her Response to its Motion (ECF No. 56) as not integral to the pleadings and unauthenticated. After considering the Motions and responses thereto (ECF Nos. 52, 56, 61, 62,64, 65), the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. Loc.R.105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 52. The Court will also DENY Defendant's Motion to Strike certain Plaintiff's exhibits as moot (ECF No. 62).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working for First Data at their Hagerstown, Maryland location on July 5, 2004. ECF No. 1 at 4, ¶ 14; ECF No. 31-1 at 2. On January 5, 2015, Plaintiff was injured in a car accident, from which she developed severe back and neck pain and headaches. ECF No. 1 at 4, ¶ 14. Under the ADA, an individual is disabled when they have a physical impairment "that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Plaintiff alleges she was disabled within this definition as a result of her car accident, but she was still "able to perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodations." ECF No. 1 at 4, ¶ 15-16.

Plaintiff applied for intermittent FMLA leave, for which she was approved on January 26, 2015, for the period of January 15, 2015 through February 20, 2015. Id. at 5, ¶ 18. Plaintiff submitted a request for an amended schedule based on her FMLA approval, of four hours per day three to five days per week. Id. at 5, ¶ 19. Defendant acknowledged and approved Plaintiff's request. ECF No. 52-8 at 1. Plaintiff alleges that it was after this that her supervisor, Dawn Rowe, had a change in attitude towards Plaintiff, demonstrated by Ms. Rowe's reluctance to say, "good morning" to her. ECF No. 56 at 3, ¶ 14. Despite being approved for FMLA, on February 11, 2015, Plaintiff received a Final Written Warning for violating First Data's attendance policy. ECF No. 1 at 5, ¶ 20. This warning was dismissed after Plaintiff notified Human Resources. Id.

On August 4, 2015, Plaintiff received notice that she was being placed on an Improvement Action Plan ("IAP") for "dropping" a call on July 10, 2015. Id. at 5, ¶ 21. Both the Quality Department and Team Managers reviewed Call Center Representatives' calls and monitored their performance. ECF No. 52-5 at 4, ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges First Data has a standard practice of reviewing questionable calls within two days, and it was very unusual to receive notice of a questionable call almost a month after it occurred. Id.

On August 20, 2015, Plaintiff was reapproved for intermittent FMLA. Id. at 6, ¶ 24. On September 9, 2015, Plaintiff was on a call with a customer and could not hear the caller speaking; she disconnected the call after thirty seconds of silence from the caller, per First Data policy. Id. at 6, ¶ 25. While in the process of disconnecting, Plaintiff heard the caller speak, but it was too lateto retrieve the call. Id. Plaintiff alleges First Data never determined whether the silence was due to any mechanical issue with either Plaintiff's or the caller's phone. Id. The caller subsequently gave her a low rating on the post-call survey, negatively implicating Plaintiff's IAP. Id. First Data terminated Plaintiff for violating her IAP on September 14, 2015, even though Plaintiff was a long-term employee with an otherwise good performance record. Id. at 7, ¶ 26.

On August 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against First Data for discrimination based on disability. See ECF No. 31-2. On June 5, 2019, Plaintiff received a dismissal of her Charge from the EEOC as well as a Notice of Rights letter. See ECF No. 1-4.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed a four-count suit in this Court, seeking declarations that Defendant violated the ADA and FMLA, permanent injunctions enjoining Defendant and its employees from further discrimination, and awards of past and future pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, liquidated damages, punitive damages, and prejudgment interest. ECF No. 1.¹ On December 5, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 31. Additionally, on January 2, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike exhibits to Plaintiff's Response. ECF No. 42. On February 4, 2020, this Count granted Defendant's motions. ECF Nos. 44, 45.

On September 17, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a ruling from the Court that Plaintiff cannot prevail on the two remaining counts. ECF No. 52. Additionally, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Exhibits (ECF No. 62) attached to her Response toits Motion (ECF No. 56). On December 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike. ECF No. 64. Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Motion to Strike are fully briefed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review for Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 56, a movant is entitled to summary judgment where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The Supreme Court has clarified that not every factual dispute will defeat a motion for summary judgment but rather, there must be a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) ("[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." (emphases in original)). An issue of fact is material if, under the substantive law of the case, resolution of the factual dispute could affect the outcome. Id. at 248. There is a genuine issue as to material fact "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see also Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012). On the other hand, if after the court has drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, "the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of either establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists or that a material fact essential to the non-movant's claim is absent. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-24. Once the movant has met its burden, the onus is onthe non-movant to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In order to meet this burden, the non-movant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings," but must instead "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court views the facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011)). "A genuine issue of material fact exists if "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Res. Bankshares Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 407 F.3d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). Thus, "to grant summary judgment the [c]ourt must determine that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party on the evidence before it." Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1990)).

B. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

In its Motion, Defendant seeks summary judgment on Count I and Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court will address each Count in turn.

1. Count I: ADA Discrimination

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Sections 102(a), (b)(1), and (b)(4) of the ADA, by firing her based on her disability. ECF No. 1 ¶ 29. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because Plaintiff lacks evidence of an inference of unlawful discrimination. The Court agrees with Defendant.

Title I of the ADA forbids employers from intentionally discriminating against persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b), The plaintiff bears the burden of proving her claim by a preponderance of the evidence when alleging discrimination by termination. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Mfrs. and Traders Tr. Co., 429 F.Supp.3d 89, 118 (D.Md.2019). At summary judgment, there are two avenues of proof by which a plaintiff may prove intentional employment discrimination. Id. (internal citations omitted). The first avenue of proof is through "direct evidence of a stated purpose to discriminate and/or [indirect] evidence of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of material fact." Id. (internal citation omitted). The second avenue of proof is the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas....