Cox v. Kernan

ERNEST LEE COX, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT KERNAN, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01637 JAM DB

United States District Court, E.D. California

August 25, 2021

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DEBORAH BARNES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The action proceeds on plaintiff's second amended complaint, as screened by the court. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff claims his due process rights were violated as defendant was not an impartial hearing officer during a 2014 rules violation hearing.

Before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 21.) For the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that defendant's motion to dismiss be granted and plaintiff's second amended complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 on August 22, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 30, 2019. (ECF No. 8.) A second amended complaint (“SAC”) was filed on May 1, 2020. (ECF No. 11.) The court screened the SAC, determined it stated a cognizable claim against defendant Correctional Lieutenant M. Allen, and ordered service appropriate on defendant Allen. (ECF No. 13.) On November 30, 2020, defendant filed the motion to dismiss presently before the court. (ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 24) and defendant filed a reply to plaintiff's opposition (ECF No. 28).

II. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is a state prison inmate currently housed at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”). (ECF No. 11 at 1.) At all relevant times, plaintiff was an inmate at MCSP. (Id. at 2.)

In his SAC, plaintiff alleges the following: Correctional Officer Grimes and plaintiff frequently spoke and plaintiff believed Grimes “was interested in him.” (ECF No. 11 at 2-3.) While plaintiff was speaking with Grimes, defendant approached them and stated, “it's too late, I saw to [sic] much already.” (Id.) When plaintiff next spoke with Grimes, she informed plaintiff that she had been warned against having conversations with inmates at the command station. (Id. at 3.) Grimes also told plaintiff that “writing is good therapy” which plaintiff believed meant “Grimes wanted [plaintiff] to reduce their conversations to writing.” (Id.)

Plaintiff wrote Grimes a letter, who then read it, while reassuring plaintiff not to worry about getting in trouble. (Id.) Subsequently, Grimes gave the letter to her supervisors: defendant Allen and Captain Olivas. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff and Grimes were questioned by defendant due to concern from Olivas and Warden Lizarraga that plaintiff was trying to establish a relationship with Grimes. (Id.) Plaintiff was then fired from his job, moved to a new building at MCSP, and ordered not to speak or look at Grimes. (Id.)

Plaintiff later received a rules violation report (“RVR”) for “unlawful influence” and a hearing was held regarding the RVR on April 19, 2014. (Id. at 6.) Defendant was assigned as the hearing officer by Captain Olivas and Warden Lizarraga despite defendant having previously questioned Grimes and the plaintiff. (Id.) During the hearing, defendant denied plaintiff's requests to question Grimes and other inmates about whether Grimes had requested the letter and been flirtatious with other inmates. (Id. at 6-7.) Defendant told plaintiff the only question that mattered was whether plaintiff had given Grimes the letter. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff admitted he had but explained that Grimes had given him permission to give her the letter. (Id. at 8.) Defendant told plaintiff he would dismiss the RVR but Olivas and Lizarraga were watching the hearing and had ordered defendant to find plaintiff guilty. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff was found guilty, assessed a thirty-day behavioral credit penalty, and confined to quarters for ten days. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated as defendant was not an impartial trier of fact during the RVR hearing conducted on April 19, 2014. (Id. at 9.)

STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for motions to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). A pro se complaint must contain more than “naked assertion[s], ” “labels and conclusions, ” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curium). The court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). However, the court's liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not pled. Ivey v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court “may ‘generally consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.'” Outdoor Media Grp., Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007)).

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss this action on four separate grounds: (1) the claims are barred by claim preclusion; (2) the claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (3) the SAC fails to allege a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation; and (4) the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (See ECF No. 21-1 at 12-23.) Each of the grounds in the motion to dismiss, as well as plaintiff's opposition to them and defendant's replies, will be analyzed in turn.

I. Claim Preclusion

A. Arguments in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Reply

Defendant asserts that plaintiff's claims in the present action are subject to claim preclusion as a result of plaintiff's previous habeas petitions filed with the Superior Court of Amador County, the California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 21-1 at 14.) Defendant argues that privity exists between defendant and the habeas petition respondents and that plaintiff raised the “same alleged due process violations of Defendant Allen” in the habeas petition. (ECF No. 28 at 3.) Defendant also claims that the case was decided on the merits as there was a “reasoned denial” by the superior court. (Id. at 3.)

B. Plaintiff's Opposition

Plaintiff opposes on the basis that defendant was not in privity with the respondents named in the state habeas petitions. (ECF No. 24 at 8.) Plaintiff claims that defendant is not in privity with the respondents of his habeas petitions because “[defendant Allen's] liability is different from any of the state habeas respondents.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff also argues that, even if the defendant is found to be in privity with the habeas respondents, claim preclusion should not apply as the state habeas petition was not decided on the merits. (Id. at 9.) Specifically, plaintiff asserts that claim preclusion does not apply because the state courts were unable to award damages and there was no “adversarial testing of the writ.” (Id. at 9-10.)

C. Legal Standard

The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, "bars repetitious suits involving the same cause of action once a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits." United Staes v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 315, 131 S.Ct. 1723, 179 L.Ed.2d 723 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a federal court must accord a state judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the state in which the judgment was entered. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) (state court final judgments are entitled to claim preclusion in federal § 1983 actions); accord, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (state court final judgments are entitled to issue preclusion in federal § 1983 actions); Clark v. Yosemite Comm. College Dist., 785 F.2d 781, 788 n.9 (9th Cir. 1986) (collecting cases).

In determining whether a state court decision is preclusive federal courts are required to refer to the preclusion rules of the relevant state. Miofsky v. Superior Court of California, 703 F.2d 332, 336 (9th Cir. 1983)...