Cox v. N.Y. State

1

HENRY COX, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants.

No. 1:23-CV-0060 (MAD/CFH)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

April 4, 2023

APPEARANCES:

Henry Cox

Plaintiff pro se

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION & ORDER

CHRISTIAN F. HUMMEL, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Plaintiff pro se Henry Cox purported to commence this action on January 17, 2023, with the filing of a complaint. See Dkt No. 1. As plaintiff failed to pay this Court's filing fee or submit a complete application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), the Court issued an order directing administrative closure with opportunity to comply with the filing fee requirement. See Dkt. No. 5. On February 1, 2023, plaintiff submitted a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See Dkt. Nos. 6, 7. That day, the Clerk was directed to reopen this action and restore it to the Court's active docket. See Dkt. No. 8. Presently before the Court is review of plaintiff's IFP application. See Dkt. Nos. 6, 7.

I. IFP Application

After review of plaintiffs renewed IFP application, the Court concludes that he financially qualifies to proceed without prepayment of this Court's filing fee.^[1] Plaintiff is advised that IFP status does not include other fees or costs that may be associated with this litigation, including, but not limited to, copying fees, transcription fees, and witness fees. As plaintiff has been granted IFP status, the Court proceeds to review of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

II. Legal Standards

Section 1915(e) of Title 28 of the United States Code directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Likewise, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review any "complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity" and must "identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (explaining that section 1915A applies to all actions brought by prisoners against government officials); Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that both sections 1915 and 1915A are available to evaluate pro se prisoner complaints).

It is a court's responsibility to determine that a plaintiff may properly maintain his complaint before permitting him to proceed with his action. Where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must consider the claims “liberally” and “interpret them ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'” Cold Stone Creamery, Inc. v. Gorman, 361 Fed.Appx. 282, 286 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (quoting Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 2006)). It is well-established that “[p]ro se submissions are reviewed with special solicitude, and ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'” Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 706 Fed.Appx. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, a court is “obliged to construe his pleadings liberally.”) (quoting McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004)). However, this approach “does not exempt a [pro se litigant] from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994). The Court may not “invent factual allegations that [the plaintiff] has not pled.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010).

“The [Second Circuit's ‘special solicitude' for pro se pleadings, Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994), has its limits, because pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Kastner v. Tri State Eye, No. 19-CV-10668 (CM), 2019 WL 6841952, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2019).^[2] Pleading guidelines are set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rule 8 provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain, inter alia, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “The purpose . . . is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 54 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rule 8 also requires the pleading to include:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought . . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although “[n]o technical form is required,” the Federal Rules make clear that each allegation contained in the pleading “must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. at 8(d).

Further, Rule 10 of the Federal Rules provides:

[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence - and each defense other than a denial - must be stated in a separate count or defense.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). This serves the purpose of "providing] an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]" Flores, 189 F.R.D. at 54 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 622, 678 (2009). A court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” does not suffice.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Allegations that “are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them” are subject to dismissal. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed.Appx. 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order). Indeed, a complaint that fails to comply with these pleading requirements “presents far too a heavy burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of their claims.” Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). As the Second Circuit has held, “[w]hen a complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be short and plain, the court has the power, on its own initiative . . . to dismiss the complaint.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). However, “[dismissal . . . is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Id. (citations omitted).

III. Complaint

Plaintiff seeks to sue the State of New York, “in full capacity,” and the United States of America “Federal Agencies.” Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff states, generally, that his case is based upon the “mass incarceration” of minorities in the United States. See id. He says the “(PRS) sentencing, the sentencing, and the treatment thereof between white and Black people are Boas and racist denying due process rights of Blacks and subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment revolving around the 8^thamendment.” Id. Plaintiff states that “African-Americans (Black people) are incarcerated 5x more than [sic] their white counterpart [sic].” Id. at 3. Plaintiff avers that there are “a number of problem's [sic] centered around the above problems that lead to Constitutional violations and should be reviewed and dealt with (addressed).” Id. Plaintiff states that the “[r]easons for the overflow of...