Coyle v. Allentown Parking Auth.

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PETER P. COYLE Appellant v. ALLENTOWN PARKING AUTHORITY, RIVERVIEW LOFTS ALLENTOWN AND RIVERVIEW LOFTS ALLENTOWN, LLC

No. 459 EDA 2023

No. J-S25003-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

November 7, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered January 19, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s) 2022-C-1755

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM

NICHOLS, J.

Appellant Peter P. Coyle appeals pro se from the order granting the petition to open the default judgment filed by Appellees Riverview Lofts Allentown and Riverview Lofts Allentown, LLC^[1] (Riverview) and dismissing Appellant's complaint. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting Riverview's petition to open the default judgment and abused its discretion in dismissing Appellant's complaint. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts and procedural history of this matter as follows:

Appellant rented an apartment unit at 114 W. Allen Street Allentown, PA, owned by Riverview Lofts Allentown, LLC, [and] Riverview Lofts Allentown (collectively "Riverview"). The dispute began as a relatively simple landlord-tenant matter concerning [Appellant's] failure to pay rent to Riverview in the late summer of 2021 . . . .

On February 14, 2022, [Appellant] filed a complaint in the Lehigh County Court against Riverview docketed to No. 2022-C-0328 alleging: (1) breach of contract/covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (2) anticipatory breach of contract/covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) negligence arising out of the landlord-tenant dispute. After several pre-trial motions were decided against [Appellant], he voluntarily withdrew the complaint on July 29, 2022, by filing a praecipe to withdraw and discontinue that stated inter alia, "I wish to discontinue the case."

However, and prior to the withdrawal of the first complaint, [Appellant] filed a second complaint against Riverview and Allentown Parking Authority ("APA") on March 21, 2022, at Lehigh County Docket No. 2022-C-0606. The second complaint alleged causes of action for: (1) actual breach of contract/covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (2) negligence arising out of the landlord tenant dispute and the towing/impounding of [Appellant's] vehicle. [Appellant] also filed for a preliminary injunction requesting to enjoin [Appellees] from towing/impounding his vehicle. On April 27, 2022, [Appellant] voluntarily filed a praecipe to withdraw his complaint and petition for injunctive relief, thereby ending the litigation in case No. 2022-C-0606.

In [Appellant's] separate appeal from an MDJ judgment in favor of Riverview docketed to Lehigh County Docket Number 2022-C-0434, Riverview filed a complaint seeking a money judgment and possession against [Appellant]. [Appellant] subsequently filed an answer and counterclaim against Riverview and the APA related to impoundment of his vehicle. Following [Appellant's] failure to appear for a compulsory arbitration hearing and following a hearing before the court pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1303(a)(2) and Leh.R.C.P. 1303(e), Riverview obtained a judgment for money and for possession against [Appellant]. Relevant to the disposition in the instant matter, [Appellant's] counterclaims for: (1) actual breach of contract/covenant of good faith and fair dealing, [] (2) negligence, (3) breach of [quiet] enjoyment, (4) nuisance, and (5) abuse of process were dismissed. Not only did [Appellant] fail to appeal that order, final on July 6, 2022, or seek to open the judgment, but his motion to reconsider was denied by this court on August 22, 2022.

On August 24, 2022, [Appellant] filed the within action docketed to 2022-C-1755 against Riverview and APA, alleging: (1) actual breach of contract/covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (2) unlawful eviction, (3) negligence, (4) breach of quiet enjoyment, (5) nuisance and (6) abuse of process.

Trial Ct. Op., 1/19/23, at 1-2.

[The complaint was] personally served on Riverview October 28, 2022. On November 22, 2022, Riverview filed a motion to dismiss under Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 contending [Appellant's] complaint was frivolous. While Riverview's motion to dismiss remained pending, [Appellant] filed two (2) separate praecipes on November 29, 2022 to enter judgments by default against Riverview. By petition filed on December 7, 2022, Riverview sought to strike and/or open the judgments. Accordingly, by order dated December 9, 2022, the court opened and struck the default judgments entered against Riverview. On January 19, 2023, Riverview's motion to dismiss was granted.

Trial Ct. Op., 3/31/23, at 1-2.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing Appellant's claims.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:

1. Did the court err in granting Appellees' petition to open/strike the default judgment issued against them?

2. Did the court err and abuse its discretion in dismissing Appellant's complaint under rule 233.1?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

In his first claim, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting Riverview's motion to open/strike the default judgment. Id. at 14-15. With respect to the motion to strike, Appellant asserts that Riverview failed to file an answer or preliminary objections and that the trial court erred in concluding that Riverview's motion to dismiss was a "responsive pleading." Id. at 15. Additionally, regarding the petition to open the default judgment, Appellant asserts that Riverview failed to "include a copy of the complaint, preliminary objections, and/or a copy of the complaint," as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.1. Id.

Initially, we note that "[a] petition to open a default judgment and a petition to strike a default judgment seek distinct remedies and are generally not interchangeable." Stauffer v. Hevener, 881 A.2d 868, 870 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

"An appeal regarding a petition to strike a default judgment implicates the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Issues regarding the operation of procedural rules of court present us with questions of law. Therefore, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Dig. Commc'ns Warehouse, Inc. v Allen Invs., LLC, 223 A.3d 278, 284 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

A petition to strike a judgment operates as a demurrer to the record, and must be granted whenever some fatal defect appears on the face of the record. When deciding if there are fatal defects on the face of the record for the purposes of a petition to strike a judgment, a [trial] court may only look at what was in the record when the judgment was entered. Importantly, a petition to strike is not a chance to review the merits of the allegations of a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at defects that affect the validity of the judgment and that entitle the petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief. Importantly, a petition to strike does not involve the discretion of the trial court.

Oswald v. WB Public Square Assocs., LLC, 80 A.3d 790, 793-94 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted and formatting altered). In other words, "[t]he standard for 'defects' asks whether the procedures mandated by law for the taking of default judgments have been followed." Roy v. Rue, 273 A.3d 1174, 1182 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

Conversely, "a petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to the equitable powers of the [trial] court." Dig. Commc'ns Warehouse, Inc., 223 A.3d at 285 (citation and brackets omitted). This Court has explained:

The decision to grant or deny a petition to open a default judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn that decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion or error of law. An abuse of discretion is not a mere error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion, the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill[-]will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

Id. (citation omitted and formatting altered).

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.3(b)(2) states that if a petition to open a default judgment is filed within ten days after the entry of a default judgment on the docket, then "the court shall open the judgment if one or more of the proposed preliminary objections has merit or the proposed answer states a meritorious defense." Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.3(b)(2); see also Boatin v. Miller, 955 A.2d 424, 427-29 (Pa. Super. 2008) (explaining that if a petitioner meets the two requirements set forth in Rule 237.3(b)(2) and files a petition to open within ten days and states a meritorious defense, he "does not need to satisfy the common law requirement that he provide a reasonable excuse for the failure that led to the judgment by default").

In order to assert a meritorious defense, a party must assert a defense that, if proven at trial, would entitle the party to judgment in its favor. Reid v. Boohar, 856 A.2d 156, 162 (Pa. Super. 2004). This Court has held that "broad averments . . . are sufficient to plead a meritorious defense." Attix v. Lehman, 925 A.2d 864, 867 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Here, in granting Riverview's motion to open/strike the default judgment, the trial court stated:

A review of the record reveals that, prior to entry of the default judgment, [Appellees] filed a responsive pleading in the nature of a motion to dismiss under Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1 and therefore entry of a default judgment was not proper. Thus, the default judgment is stricken. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 206.4(a)(2) (judgment shall

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