Cragg v. Adm'r, Unemployment Comp. Act

160 Conn.App. 430

125 A.3d 650

Lauren C. CRAGG

v.ADMINISTRATOR, Unemployment Compensation Act et al.

No. 36868.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 26, 2015.

Decided Oct. 13, 2015.

Joseph A. La Bella, with whom was Linda Bulkovitch, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Maria C. Rodriquez, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (named defendant).

LAVINE, SHELDON and PRESCOTT, Js.

LAVINE, J.

In this case, the plaintiff, Lauren C. Cragg, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act (administrator) and the Employment Security Appeals Division—Board of Review (board).¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) granted the administrator's motion for judgment and (2) denied the plaintiff the opportunity for oral argument before ruling on the administrator's motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as adopted by the board, and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the plaintiff's appeal. On June 22, 2012, the plaintiff resigned from her employment with the city of New London (city) because she was under the impression, based on the New London City Council's proposed budget, that funding for her position was to be eliminated. The plaintiff applied for unemployment compensation benefits, which application was granted by the administrator, effective July 29, 2012. The administrator found that even though the plaintiff had voluntarily left her job, there was good cause for her to have left, attributable to the city. The city filed a late appeal on October 15, 2012.

On November 13, 2012, an appeals referee (referee) heard the city's appeal. The referee made the following findings of fact. The plaintiff had been employed by the city as a full-time risk manager from October 23, 2010, to July 2, 2012. The plaintiff, based on her review of the minutes of a city council meeting held on May 29, 2012, concluded that the city council had considered a proposal eliminating the funding for her position. The city never indicated to her that her position was in jeopardy, nor did the plaintiff inquire about the status of her employment with her supervisor, Jeff Smith. Bernadette Welch, the city's personnel director, assured the plaintiff that her position was not at risk. On June 19, 2012, the city council finalized its budget, which included funding for the plaintiff's position. On June 22, 2012, the plaintiff submitted her resignation, by e-mail, effective July 2, 2012. The plaintiff resigned in anticipation of being discharged based on her mistaken belief that her position was being eliminated. She did not know, however, if her position was eliminated or when the city would discharge her.

On November 14, 2012, the referee issued her decision. The referee first found good cause for the city's untimely appeal.² The referee stated that pursuant to General Statutes § 31–236(a)(2)(A), an employee is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if she willingly left suitable work, without good cause attributable to the employer. The referee concluded that the plaintiff's fear of future discharge did not afford her good cause for leaving her employment and, therefore, she was ineligible for benefits pursuant to § 31–236(a)(2)(A). In doing so, the referee found that the plaintiff failed to seek clarification from Welch or Smith, regarding her employment status. The referee concluded that the plaintiff's failure to seek clarification, along with the fact that discharge was not imminent, disqualified the plaintiff from receiving benefits. In coming to her conclusion, the referee stated that "[i]f it is unclear whether the claimant will be discharged, it is her burden to seek clarification of her status from the employer" and "[q]uitting because of the mere possibility of future discharge generally will be considered a voluntary separation without good cause attributable to the employer." The referee reversed the administrator's ruling and sustained the city's appeal.

The plaintiff filed a timely motion to open the referee's decision, which the referee denied.³ On December 21, 2012, the plaintiff filed an appeal from the referee's decision to the board. In her appeal, the plaintiff requested a hearing before the full board. The board issued its decision on April 5, 2012. On the basis of the claims the plaintiff raised before the board, the board came to the following conclusions. First, the board denied the plaintiff's request for an evidentiary hearing, concluding that she "failed to show, pursuant to [§] 31–237g–40 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, that the ends of justice require that the board receive additional evidence or testimony in order to adjudicate the appeal."⁴ The board further concluded that there was no basis for admitting the plaintiff's alleged new evidence and, therefore, that the referee did not err in denying the plaintiff's motion to open. The board, after reviewing the record of the plaintiff's appeal, adopted the referee's findings of fact, affirmed the referee's decision, and dismissed the plaintiff's appeal.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 31–249b, the plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the decision of the board.⁵ She did not file a motion to correct the board's findings pursuant to Practice Book § 22–4.⁶ On November 14, 2013, the administrator filed a motion for judgment seeking the dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal with an attached memorandum of law in support of the motion. The plaintiff then filed three forms requesting oral argument on the motion for judgment, but she did not appropriately claim her appeal for the short calendar. Without holding a hearing, the court granted the administrator's motion for judgment. On April 24, 2014, the plaintiff moved for reargument, reconsideration, and articulation, which the court denied. This appeal followed. During the pendency of this appeal, the plaintiff filed a second motion for articulation pursuant to Practice Book § 66–5, asking the trial court to state the factual and legal basis for its ruling. The court granted the motion and issued its written memorandum of decision on July 22, 2014.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. In appeals of this nature, the trial court does not try the matter de novo. Acro Technology, Inc. v. Administrator, 25 Conn.App. 130, 134, 593 A.2d 154 (1991). "The trial court's standard of review with regard to administrative appeals is limited. Such appeals are heard by the court upon certified copy of the record filed by the board. The court does not retry the facts or hear evidence. It considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the board, and then for the limited purpose of determining whether the finding should be corrected, or whether there was any evidence to support in law the conclusions reached.... The court's ultimate duty is to decide only whether, in light of the evidence, the board of review has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Phillips v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 157 Conn.App. 342, 350, 115 A.3d 1162 (2015).

"When considering an appeal from the board, we have stated that [a] plaintiff's failure to file a timely motion [to correct] the board's findings in accordance with [Practice Book] § 22–4 prevents further review of those facts found by the board.... In the absence of a motion to correct the findings of the board, the court is not entitled to retry the facts or hear evidence. It considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the board, and then for the limited purpose of determining whether ... there was any evidence to support in law the conclusions reached." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 155 Conn.App. 259, 262–63, 109 A.3d 540 (2015).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly granted the administrator's motion for judgment on the merits. Specifically, she argues that the court improperly affirmed the board's decision, which the plaintiff claims was arbitrary, unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion. The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly affirmed the board's determination that the referee did not error in denying her motion to open. We disagree.

Section 31–236(a) provides in relevant part: "An individual shall be ineligible for benefits ... (2)(A) If, in the opinion of the administrator, the individual has left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer ... provided ... no individual shall be ineligible for benefits if the individual leaves suitable work (i) for good cause attributable to the employer, including leaving as a result of changes in conditions created by the individual's employer...."

The board, in its adoption of the referee's findings, found that the plaintiff voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the city, which in turn disqualified her from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Specifically, the board and referee found that the plaintiff resigned in anticipation of a funding cut and that she did not approach her supervisor regarding her employment status. "Insofar as the plaintiff's appeal is directed to the factual findings of the appeals referee, appellate review is limited to determining whether these factual conclusions were reasonably and logically drawn." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivera v. Administrator, 4 Conn.App. 617, 619, 495 A.2d 1125 (1985). The referee credited, and the board accepted, the city's version of the events over that of the plaintiff. The board found that "Welch credibly testified that she spoke to the [plaintiff] on May 30 or May 31, 2012, immediately following the [city]...