Cramer v. Vill. of Oakley

316 Mich.App. 60

890 N.W.2d 895

CRAMER

v.VILLAGE OF OAKLEY.

Docket No. 330736.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 9, 2016, at Lansing.

Decided June 23, 2016, at 9:00 a.m.

Outside Legal Counsel PLC, Hemlock (by Philip L. Ellison ) for Brandi Cramer.

Richard A. Hamilton for village of Oakley.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and OWENS and BOONSTRA, JJ.

BOONSTRA, J.

In this action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq., defendant village of Oakley appeals by right the order of the trial court granting plaintiff Brandi Cramer's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact) on all six counts of plaintiff's complaint. Defendant also challenges the trial court's order awarding plaintiff attorney fees, costs, and disbursements. Plaintiff cross-appeals, requesting an award of appellate attorney fees, costs, and disbursements. We reverse the grant of summary disposition in favor of plaintiff, remand for the issuance of an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, and vacate the award of attorney fees, costs, and disbursements. Finally, we decline to award plaintiff appellate attorney fees, costs, and disbursements.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 15, 2015, plaintiff sent defendant six separate FOIA requests, each seeking information pertaining to defendant's reserve police department unit. On May 20, 2015, defendant sent plaintiff six letters stating that the FOIA requests were "granted" and that it would "conduct a search of the Village records and provide you a copy of any documents we are able to locate." All of the responses were signed, "Cheryl Bolf[,] Village FOIA Coordinator." That same day, plaintiff's counsel sent an e-mail to Bolf acknowledging receipt of the letters, but stating that simply providing a written statement granting the requests was not sufficient to comply with the FOIA; defendant also needed to produce the requested documents. The e-mail further stated that the documents should be provided by May 22, 2015, and if they were not, further legal action would follow. On May 28, 2015, just three business days after the May 22, 2015 deadline, plaintiff filed suit. She alleged that because defendant had granted her FOIA requests, actual production of the documents was due on May 22, 2015, and that defendant's failure to provide the documents by that date was a wrongful denial of her requests. The complaint included six counts, each separately alleging the wrongful denial of plaintiff's six FOIA requests. Plaintiff requested an order directing defendant to immediately produce the requested documents, an order awarding reasonable attorney fees, costs, and disbursements, and an award of $3,000 in punitive damages.

Plaintiff moved for summary disposition on October 15, 2015, notwithstanding her admission in the motion that in early June 2015 defendant informed her that certain requested documents did not exist and that she had received from defendant the requested documents that did exist. In responding to the motion, defendant submitted an affidavit, signed by Bolf, stating that "after researching and assembling the documents requested, she transmitted copies of the documents to the party making the request on June 2, 2015."¹ The trial court concluded that defendant's May 20, 2015 responses did not comply with MCL 15.235(2) because the requested documents were not themselves produced within the statutory time frame for a response, suggested that the responses therefore effectively constituted denials of the requests, and granted plaintiff's motion for summary disposition. The court also concluded that plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney fees, costs, and disbursements. Plaintiff was awarded $6,048.50. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We "review[ ] the grant or denial of summary disposition de novo to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). An award of attorney fees under the FOIA is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Prins v. Mich. State Police, 299 Mich.App. 634, 641, 831 N.W.2d 867 (2013). "A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes." King v. Mich. State Police Dep't, 303 Mich.App. 162, 175, 841 N.W.2d 914 (2013). A trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error; that is, this Court must defer to the trial court unless we are "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. at 174–175, 841 N.W.2d 914. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Bush v. Shabahang, 484 Mich. 156, 164, 772 N.W.2d 272 (2009).

III. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Defendant argues that it did not violate the FOIA by sending letters granting plaintiff's requests and producing the requested documents a short time later and that the trial court therefore erred by granting summary disposition to plaintiff. We agree.

MCL 15.235(2) states:

Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the person making the request, a public body shall respond to a request for a public record within 5 business days after the public body receives the request by doing 1 of the following:

(a) Granting the request.

(b) Issuing a written notice to the requesting person denying the request.

(c) Granting the request in part and issuing a written notice to the requesting person denying the request in part.

(d) Issuing a notice extending for not more than 10 business days the period during which the public body shall respond to the request. A public body shall not issue more than 1 notice of extension for a particular request.

Failure on the part of a public body to respond to a FOIA request in the manner provided in Subdivisions (a) through (d) "constitutes a final determination to deny the request." King, 303 Mich.App. at 188–189, 841 N.W.2d 914, citing MCL 15.235(3).

We conclude that defendant complied with MCL 15.235(2), and that MCL 15.235(2) does not mandate that a FOIA recipient, after granting a FOIA request, deliver the requested documents within the period statutorily specified for responding to the FOIA request.

The trial court interpreted MCL 15.235(2), as does plaintiff, to mean that a public body can only "grant" a request by delivering the requested documents within the period specified by the statute for a response. We disagree. The first step in interpreting a statute is to "focus on the language of the statute itself." Petersen v. Magna Corp., 484 Mich. 300, 307, 773 N.W.2d 564 (2009). "The words of a statute provide the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent, and as far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in a statute." Id. A court construing a statute should "avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." American Federation of State, Co. & Muni. Employees v. Detroit, 468 Mich. 388, 399, 662 N.W.2d 695 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the various "parts of a statute must be harmonized to discern and carry out the intent of the Legislature." Niles Twp. v. Berrien Co. Bd. of Comm'rs, 261 Mich.App. 308, 315–316, 683 N.W.2d 148 (2004).

The term "grant" is not defined in the FOIA. This Court may use a dictionary to aid in the interpretation of undefined terms. See Cain v. Waste Mgt., Inc. (After Remand), 472 Mich. 236, 247, 697 N.W.2d 130 (2005). The word "grant," in the context of a request, is defined by Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001), p. 572, as "to agree to: to grant a request. " This definition is not synonymous with completion of the task to which the one to whom the request was made agreed. Id. Compare, e.g., id. at p. 530 (defining the word "fulfill" as "to carry out, or bring to realization, as a prophecy or promise").

Further, in amendments that took effect after plaintiff's FOIA requests were made, the Legislature did, in a different subsection of the FOIA, indicate that the words "granted" and "fulfilled" with regard to a FOIA request are not synonymous.² MCL 15.234(11) refers in relevant part to a public body's having "granted and fulfilled a written request from an individual under this act...." (Emphasis added.) The Legislature's use of two separate terms suggests that the terms have different meanings. U.S. Fidelity Ins. & Guaranty Co. v. Mich. Catastrophic Claims Ass'n (On Rehearing), 484 Mich. 1, 14, 795 N.W.2d 101 (2009) ; see also Macomb Co. Prosecutor v. Murphy, 464 Mich. 149, 159, 627 N.W.2d 247 (2001) (indicating that "[w]ords ... are given meaning by context or setting"). Its use of the conjunctive phrase "granted and fulfilled" indicates that the Legislature was aware, at the time of the amendments to MCL 15.235, that a public body may grant a request without fulfilling it. To hold that "grant" is synonymous with "fulfill" in MCL 15.235(2)(a) would render the phrase "and fulfilled" in MCL 15.234(11) nugatory.

American Federation, 468 Mich. at 399, 662 N.W.2d 695. In addition, MCL 15.234(8) now expressly provides that a public body's " response" under MCL 15.235"shall also contain a best efforts estimate by the public body regarding the time frame it will take the public body to comply with the law in providing the public records to the requestor." This subsection provides further evidence that the Legislature intended that granting a request under MCL 15.235 be distinct from the fulfillment of that request.³ Further, in light of the remainder of our analysis, as well as the fact that the nature of the amendment to MCL 15.234 was to substantially revise the procedures relating to charging fees and deposits for FOIA requests, we do not construe the Legislature's amendment of MCL 15.234 to reflect a change in the meaning of the words "grant" or "response." Rather, the Legislature's language in these revised subsections supports our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend the...