Crandall v. Sauer

1

Duane Crandall, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ted Sauer, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 2023AP990

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District IV

May 2, 2024

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane County: Cir. Ct. No. 2022SC4967 RHONDA L. LANFORD, Judge. Reversed in part and cause remanded with instructions.

TAYLOR, J. ^[1]

¶1 Duane Crandall brought a small claims action against Ted Sauer ("Ted") alleging that Ted violated WIS Admin. Code § ATCP 134.06 (Dec. 2023) by withholding Crandall's security deposit without providing a timely itemization of damages.^[2] The circuit court determined that Ted violated § ATCP 134.06 and awarded Crandall double damages, costs, and $300 in "statutory attorney fees." On appeal, Crandall argues that the circuit court erroneously limited him to statutory attorney fees because he is entitled to a "reasonable attorney fee" under WIS. STAT. § 100.20(5). I agree. Accordingly, I reverse that portion of the order of the circuit court and remand with instructions to determine Crandall's reasonable attorney fees pursuant to § 100.20(5).

BACKGROUND

¶2 There is no dispute as to the following material facts.

¶3 Beginning in 2013, Crandall rented an apartment from Ted provided a $745 security deposit, and had a year-to-year periodic tenancy. On May 2, 2022, Ted learned that Crandall had recently moved out of the apartment. On May 21, 2022, Ted sent Crandall a letter stating that Crandall's security deposit was being withheld and that Crandall would be receiving an itemization of damages to the apartment at some point in the future. On June 16, 2022, Ted sent Crandall a partial itemization of damages totaling $751, which exceeded Crandall's $745 security deposit, and stated that Crandall should expect a "final damage statement" by July 15, 2022. A final itemization of damages was mailed to Crandall on September 11, 2022, indicating that total damages exceeded Crandall's security deposit by $878.28.

¶4 Crandall filed a small claims action alleging that Ted violated WIS. ADMIN. CODE § ATCP 134.06 by withholding his security deposit without providing an itemized statement of damages within 21 days of the day Crandall surrendered the apartment.^[3] Crandall sought double damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 100.20(5).

¶5 In Ted's Amended Answer to the complaint, he alleged that Crandall moved out on May 2, 2022 without paying rent for the month of May and without providing written notice terminating his tenancy. Ted argued that, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 704.19(3), Crandall's tenancy terminated 28 days later on May 30, 2022.^[4] According to Ted, because May 30 was the start of the 21-day period for providing itemized damages under WIS. ADMIN. CODE § ATCP 134.06, the June 16 letter partially itemizing damages was timely. Ted also filed a counterclaim for $878.28, the amount of damages he alleges exceeded Crandall's $745 security deposit.

¶6 The case was heard by a court commissioner who dismissed Crandall's claims and ruled in favor of Ted on his counterclaim. Crandall demanded a trial before the Dane County Circuit Court. See WIS. STAT. § 799.207(3).

¶7 At the trial, the circuit court heard testimony from Lisa Sauer, Ted's wife and the co-owner and administrator of the property at issue. Lisa testified that she learned on May 7, 2022 that Crandall had vacated the apartment after Ted had received a text from Crandall indicating that he moved out on May 2, 2022. Lisa also testified that she and Ted entered the apartment on May 9, 2022 and discovered damages. Lisa testified that on May 21, 2022, she texted a notice to Crandall that his security deposit was being withheld because of damages to the apartment; that on June 16, 2022, she forwarded a letter to Crandall with a partial itemization of damages; and that on September 11, 2022, she forwarded a letter to Crandall itemizing the remaining damages. Lisa also acknowledged that the Sauers had not provided an itemization of damages to Crandall within twenty-one days of May 9, 2022.

¶8 Based on Lisa's testimony, the circuit court determined that Ted had violated WIS. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.06. The court explained that WIS. STAT. § 704.19(2)(a)2. provides that a tenant may terminate a periodic tenancy without written notice if the tenant has effected a surrender of the premises.^[5] The court reasoned that Ted knew that Crandall had surrendered the apartment no later than May 9, and that, pursuant to § ATCP 134.06, Ted had 21 days from May 9 to either return Crandall's security deposit or withhold some or all of the security deposit based upon providing an itemization of damages to Crandall. Because the June 16 letter containing a partial itemization of damages was sent after the 21-day deadline, the court entered judgment in favor of Crandall for "double damages of the security deposit and cost[s] and fees."

¶9 Crandall subsequently submitted to the circuit court a proposed order for $1,490 in damages, $377.71 in costs, and $4,240.09 in "reasonable attorney fees" pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 100.20(5). The court declined this proposed order, stating: "Statutory attorneys fees are limited to $300 in this type of action. Please refile." Crandall filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the court to award "reasonable attorney fees" pursuant to § 100.20(5). The court denied Crandall's motion, writing on the declined order to "[p]lease submit bill of costs for $300 attorneys fees." Crandall submitted an amended order for damages, costs, and $300 in attorney fees, and the court signed the order. Crandall appeals the part of the order awarding attorney fees.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review.

¶10 This case requires interpretation of statutes and administrative regulations. The interpretation and application of statutes and administrative regulations are questions of law that I review de novo. DOR v. Menasha Corp., 2008 WI 88, ¶44, 311 Wis.2d 579, 754 N.W.2d 95.

¶11 I interpret administrative regulations and statutes using the same principles of interpretation. Id., ¶45. Hence, I start with the language of the statute or regulation. Williams v. Integrated Cmty. Servs., Inc., 2007 WI.App. 159, ¶12, 303 Wis.2d 697, 736 N.W.2d 226. If the meaning of the statute or regulation is plain and unambiguous, I end the inquiry. Id.

II. Crandall is Entitled to Reasonable Attorney Fees.

¶12 On appeal, Crandall argues that the circuit court erroneously capped his attorney fees award at $300. For the following reasons, I agree.

¶13 As an initial matter, Ted's pro se response brief on appeal does not meaningfully respond to any of Crandall's arguments regarding the circuit court's award of attorney fees. Although this court may grant pro se litigants some leniency, this court has explained that pro se litigants are generally bound to the same appellate rules as attorneys. Waushara County v. Graf, 166 Wis.2d 442, 452, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992). Self-representation is not a license to avoid or ignore the relevant procedural and substantive law. Id.

¶14 Here, Ted's short brief only mentions Crandall's arguments in a heading that states: "The Trial Court was Correct in limiting attorney fees to the statutory provisions in a Trial de Novo court." Ted does not elaborate on this conclusory argument, nor does he include any citations to legal authority in support of this argument. I will not consider Ted's undeveloped argument. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis.2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (this court may decline to address arguments that are undeveloped and are not supported by references to legal authority); see also WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(e), (3) (a respondent's brief must contain an argument that includes "the contention of the [respondent], the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on"). To the extent that Ted's brief contains any argument, he appears to argue that the circuit court should have granted his counterclaim. Not only is this argument undeveloped and lacking in citations to legal authority, see Pettit, 171 Wis.2d at 646-47, but Ted also failed to cross-appeal the circuit court's order, see WIS. STAT. RULE 809.10(2)(b) (requiring a respondent who seeks a modification of the judgment or order to file a cross-appeal). This court generally declines to address issues raised by a respondent that were required to be raised in a cross-appeal, and I do so here. Borntreger v. Smith, 2012 WI.App. 35, ¶20, 340 Wis.2d 474, 811 N.W.2d 447.

¶15 Notwithstanding the deficiencies in Ted's brief, I conclude that Crandall is entitled to reasonable attorney fees as a matter of law. I begin by considering WIS. STAT. § 100.20, which generally prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition in business and unfair trade practices in business[.]" Sec. 100.20(1). As a way to enforce this prohibition on unfair practices in business and trade, § 100.20(5) allows individuals to sue for violations of administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to § 100.20(5):

Any person suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation by any other person of ... any order issued under this section may sue for damages therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction and shall recover twice the amount of such pecuniary loss, together with costs, including a reasonable attorney fee.

¶16 One of the legislature's goals in enacting WIS. STAT § 100.20(5) was to strengthen the bargaining power of tenants when interacting with landlords. Pierce v. Norwich, 202 Wis.2d 587, 594, 550 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1996). Section 100.20(5) achieves this goal in several ways. First, § 100.20(5) authorizes injured tenants to recover double damages...