Crandle v. State, Employee Retirement Commission

Catherine CRANDLE et al. v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT COMMISSION

No. HHBCV196049649S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Britain, New Britain

June 19, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

Sheila A. Huddleston

Seventeen plaintiffs commenced this administrative appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 to challenge a declaratory ruling by the defendant State Employees Retirement Commission (commission). The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs, Catherine Crandle, Stephanie Hawthorne Pedro Rodriguez, Ronald Robinson, Michael Gardner, Leslie Cavanaugh, Leah Margentino, Tammy Fettig, Ebone Kearse, Dana Goldberg, Gerard Bernier, Darcie Dockum, Stanley Jarosz Derek Williams, Linda Walsh, Maria Sous, and Karla Carey are "a group of former State of Connecticut employees who were granted disability pension benefits." They allege that their pension payments began on their "effective retirement date" but should have commenced on the day after the date of their last day of paid employment. They allege that they are appealing "a final decision following a petition for declaratory ruling." The complaint alleges that the final agency decision was dated November 15, 2018. Notably, the plaintiffs do not allege that they each petitioned for the declaratory ruling.

On March 21, 2019, the commission moved to dismiss the appeal as to eleven plaintiffs Leah Margentino, Tammy Fettig, Ebone Kearse, Dana Goldberg, Gerard Bernier, Darcie Dockum, Stanley Jarosz, Derek Williams, Linda Walsh, Maria Sous, and Karla Carey (collectively, "contested plaintiffs") because the contested plaintiffs were not parties to the declaratory ruling proceeding and have not exhausted their administrative remedies. In support of its motion, the commission provided a copy of the final decision and declaratory ruling dated November 15, 2018. That decision captioned "In the Matter of Catherine Crandle, et al., Petitioners," identified the petitioners as Catherine Crandle, Ronald Robinson, Jeremy Wiganowske, Stephanie Hawthorne, Paula Mitchell, Leslie Cavanaugh, Pedro Rodriguez, and Michael Gardner.^[1]

The decision and declaratory ruling at issue in this appeal contains findings of fact as to each of the petitioners. It identifies each petitioner’s most recent state employment, the specific retirement plan applicable to each petitioner, the circumstances surrounding each petitioner’s application for disability retirement benefits, the adjudication of the application by the medical examining board, the date of the finding of disability, and the date on which the benefits commenced. Each petitioner’s application for disability retirement benefits and the decision on the application was attached as an exhibit to the declaratory ruling. The declaratory ruling contains no information and no documents relating to the contested plaintiffs, since they did not participate in the petition.

The contested plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that they did not petition for a declaratory ruling. They argue, instead, that they come within the futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine. They argue that they are statutorily entitled to disability pension benefits that commence on the day after their last day of paid employment. They further argue that because the declaratory ruling affirmed the commission’s long-standing practice of commencing disability pension benefits on the first day of the month following the application for benefits, it would be futile for them to exhaust their administrative remedies.

In response, the commission argues that every case must be decided on its own facts. It argues that exceptions have been made to its practice of commencing disability pension benefits on the first day of the month following the date of a retirement application. In support of that argument, it refers to Exhibit V to the declaratory ruling, which memorializes some of the commission’s past decisions relating to the effective date of disability retirement benefits. That exhibit demonstrates that the commission has made exceptions to its general rule in cases with extenuating circumstances, such as agency error.

A motion to dismiss is properly used to test the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Practice Book § 10-30. "Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it." Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441, 870 A.2d 448 (2005). When a question of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be adjudicated before the court can proceed any further. See Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. v. Blake, 186 Conn. 295, 297, 441 A.2d 183 (1982).

It is well established there is no absolute right of appeal to the courts from the decision of an administrative agency. Middlebury v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 283 Conn. 156, 163, 927 A.2d 793 (2007). The Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-183, "grants the Superior Court jurisdiction over appeals of agency decisions only in certain limited and well-delineated circumstances." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Section 4-183(a) provides in relevant part that "[a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as provided in this section." The exhaustion doctrine implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Stepney, LLC v. Fairfield, 263 Conn. 558, 563, 821 A.2d 725 (2003). "It is a settled principle of administrative law that if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law The doctrine provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted ... Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to [the legislature’s] delegation of authority to coordinate branches of Government, that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that [the legislature] has charged them to administer ... Therefore, exhaustion of remedies serves dual...