Crane v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 1:19-cv-000805-DAD-JLT

BRIAN CRANE, Plaintiff, v. CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 1:19-cv-000805-DAD-JLT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 4, 2020

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART

(Doc. No. 20)

This matter is before the court on defendant Chevron U.S.A., Inc.'s ("Chevron")¹ motion to dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint ("SAC"). (Doc. No. 20.) A hearing on the motion was held on September 4, 2019. Attorney Randall Rumph appeared telephonically on behalf of plaintiff, and attorney Morgan Podruski appeared telephonically on behalf of defendant.The court has considered the parties' briefs and oral arguments and, for the reasons set forth below, will grant defendant's motion to dismiss in part.

BACKGROUND

On March 11, 2019, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in Kern County Superior Court against Chevron and other defendants. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) On May 6, 2019, plaintiff filed a pro se first amended complaint ("FAC"). (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) On June 7, 2019, Chevron removed the action to this federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1.) On June 14, 2019, Chevron moved to dismiss the FAC. (Doc. No. 9.) On June 17, 2019, attorney Rumph entered his appearance as attorney of record for plaintiff. (Doc. No. 11.)

In opposing Chevron's motion to dismiss the FAC, plaintiff's counsel sought leave to file a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in Chevron's motion, arguing that plaintiff had omitted key facts in the original complaint and the FAC as a consequence of being unrepresented. (Doc. No. 14.) The magistrate judge to whom the undersigned referred the motion to dismiss the FAC directed the parties to "file either a stipulation allowing the plaintiff to file an amended complaint or a joint statement that the parties do not agree to proceed by way of stipulation." (Doc. No. 15.) The parties stipulated to plaintiff's filing of a SAC and the court so ordered. (Doc. Nos. 16, 17.) On July 15, 2019, plaintiff filed his SAC. (Doc. No. 18 ("SAC").)

In his SAC, plaintiff alleges as follows. Plaintiff is sixty-one years old and worked for Chevron at its gas plant in McKittrick, California for approximately thirty-five years. (SAC at ¶¶ 5, 6.) At the time of his termination, plaintiff was employed as a Head Operator by Chevron, which required him to monitor gas flows, strip fluids from the gas, and respond to alarms. (Id.) Plaintiff "received numerous awards from his peers and supervisors," "has been recognized for his successful execution of [drills]" and "his leadership training," and "always received excellent written work evaluations and was well-liked by his superiors and peers." (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8.)

On or about November 3, 2017, Chevron sent its employees an expression of interest form ("EOI") to sign if they were interested in terminating their employment with Chevron as part of an upcoming reduction in work force in exchange for severance pay. (Id. at ¶ 11.) The deadline for submitting an EOI was November 22, 2017. (Id.) On or about November 22, 2017, plaintiffsubmitted a signed EOI containing additional language as a counter-offer. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Chevron did not accept the EOI/counter-offer submitted by plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

At or around this same time, plaintiff was harassed on the basis of his age by younger co-workers, who "demand[ed] that plaintiff take the package[,] so it would leave a vacancy for one of them to fill." (Id. at ¶ 15; see also id. at ¶¶ 16, 17, 18.) On November 26 and 27, 2017, plaintiff received nine phone calls, emails, and text messages "from supervisors and the individual who would succeed to [his] position," asking him to submit a second EOI, despite the November 22, 2017 deadline to submit an EOI having already passed. (Id. at ¶ 19.) On or about November 27, 2017, plaintiff signed and submitted a second EOI form. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff "felt harassed and coerced into signing a new EOI form and thought he would be terminated if he did not sign it." (Id.) Plaintiff "felt pressure and stress on the job" due to "younger employees demanding that he submit an EOI so they could have [his] job." (Id. at ¶ 27.)

Plaintiff "was informed by fellow employees that all employees were given seven (7) days to revoke any EOI . . .." (Id. at ¶ 20.) On or about November 30, 2017, members of Chevron's human resources transition team informed employees who signed an EOI that they were entitled to revoke their EOI within seven days after its submission if they chose to do so. (Id. at ¶ 21.) On or about December 1, 2017, plaintiff submitted a written letter of revocation of his second EOI. (Id. at ¶ 22.)

On or about December 16, 2017, plaintiff requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., to support his wife, who was suffering from cancer and was scheduled to undergo an urgent mastectomy. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff believes that he was entitled to family medical leave, but Chevron denied his request. (Id.) Plaintiff received only one day off without pay to aid his wife despite needing more time. (Id.)

Although an exact time period is not identified in the SAC, plaintiff alleges that Chevron scheduled him for "dangerous work" by assigning him to work alone at the gas plant, in violation of the Head Operator Manual and established safe practices. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges that these changes in his work schedule constitute discrimination because younger operators "always

/////had assistants." (Id.) Plaintiff complained about his schedule to his supervisors and human resources in November and December 2017 and January 2018 to no avail. (Id. at ¶ 26.)

On or about January 9, 2018, "a dangerous emissions event occurred at the gas plant" involving emission of propane, butane, glycol, benzene, and a corrosion inhibitor. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Plaintiff documented the event in a report and "submitted the report to his supervisors and to the required environmental agencies on January 24, 2018." (Id.) Plaintiff also called a hotline Chevron set up for employees to report violations of the law or company policy and informed them of the incident. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his supervisors "did not want the [] Incident to be reported" and that it was "being covered up." (Id. at ¶ 29.) His co-workers showed him a video of the incident but did not allow him access to the video when he sought to use it to report on the incident. (Id.) When other operators met on January 10, 2018 to discuss the incident, plaintiff was excluded from that meeting. (Id. at ¶ 30.)

On January 18, 2018, plaintiff's doctor diagnosed him as suffering from an anxiety and/or stress disorder and told him that he needed to take medical leave on that basis. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Chevron approved plaintiff's short-term disability. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that, "[b]y recognizing Plaintiff's entitlement to [short term disability] leave, [Chevron] clearly gave Plaintiff the impression [that] his EOI revocation had been accepted" because Chevron had a policy that, if an employee is taking time off pursuant to an approved leave of absence and receiving short term disability benefits prior to severance, those benefits would end when the employment relationship terminates. (Id.) Plaintiff was required to notify Chevron's health and medical staff of his medical leave since it would last more than five consecutive days. (Id. at ¶ 33.) On January 23, 2018, plaintiff contacted Chevron's disability management partner, Reed Group, to report his absence and begin a certification process. (Id.) On or about February 22, 2018, much to plaintiff's surprise, Reed Group informed him that Chevron had terminated his employment on January 30, 2018. (Id.)

After his termination, plaintiff applied for a job with Chevron as an operator in February 2019. (Id. at ¶ 100.) Plaintiff alleges that he was "imminently qualified" for that position, but Chevron denied him the job, indicating that another individual was more qualified. (Id.)

In his SAC plaintiff asserts twelve causes of action: an FMLA claim and a California Family Rights Act ("CFRA") claim, California Government Code § 12945.2, alleging that plaintiff's request for family medical leave was a "negative factor in the decision to terminate [his] employment"; a claim brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., alleging that plaintiff's age was a determining factor in the decision to terminate him; four claims brought pursuant to the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), California Government Code § 12940, alleging that plaintiff's age and/or disability and/or filing of claims and lawsuits were factors in the decisions to terminate him and/or to not re-hire him; a FEHA claim alleging failure to prevent discrimination; a breach of contract claim; two claims alleging that plaintiff was terminated for expressing safety concerns and reporting the Emissions Incident, in violation of public policy and California Labor Code §§ 232.5, 1102.5 and 6310; and a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.² (Id. at 7-19.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory, liquidated, and punitive damages, as well as an award for attorney's fees and costs. (Id. at 19.)

On July 29, 2019, Chevron moved to dismiss the SAC, arguing that it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. No. 20.) On August 21, 2019, plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss, and on August 27, 2019, Chevron filed its reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 23, 24.)

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). "Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d...