Crawford v. Daniels

1

KELLY CRAWFORD, Plaintiff, v. CAMRYN T. DANIELS, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-00585

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Charleston Division

April 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS E. JOHNSTON, CHIEF JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendants Camryn T. Daniels, the Boone County Sherriff's Office, and the Boone County Commission's partial motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 16.) For the reasons more fully explained below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Just before midnight on August 30, 2022, Defendant Camryn T. Daniels (“Defendant Daniels”), a deputy of the Boone County Sheriff's Office (“Defendant BCSO”), received a call about a disturbance at a home in Wharton, West Virginia. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4, ¶¶ 13-14.) The dispatcher told him that Plaintiff Kelly Crawford (“Plaintiff”) was the one causing the disturbance. (Id. at 3-4, ¶ 14.) Defendant Daniels promptly headed to the provided address. (Id.)

Once there, he spotted Plaintiff, a five-foot-four-inch, 119-pound woman.^[1](Id. at 4, ¶¶ 15-16.) She was foaming at the mouth and saying “I'm Kelly, and I'm dead.” (Id. at 4, ¶ 15.) Defendant Daniels tried to handcuff Plaintiff but, rather than complying, she tried to punch Defendant Daniels in the face. (Id. at 4, ¶ 17.) So he tasered her. (Id.) That, of course, dropped her. (Id.) Defendant Daniels seized the moment and slipped the cuffs on Plaintiff. (See id. at 4, ¶ 18.) He then ordered her to get in the patrol car. (See id.) She refused. (Id.) So he punched her in the face. (Id.) Defendant Daniels ultimately got Plaintiff in the backseat of his patrol car (the complaint does not say how), and he left the scene. (See id. at 4, ¶¶ 19-20.)

Defendant Daniels drove the car while Plaintiff sat handcuffed in the backseat. (Id. at 4, ¶ 20.) Before long, though, Plaintiff leaned forward and tried to bite Defendant Daniels. (Id.) He shoved her back in the seat, stopped the car, got out, and opened her door. (Id. at 4, ¶¶ 2021.) Plaintiff, seeing the door was open, tried to swing her legs out. (Id. at 4, ¶ 21.) Defendant Daniels, hoping to keep her contained, punched her in the face, again. (Id.) He then hopped back in the car and resumed driving. (Id. at 4-5, ¶ 22.) Undeterred, Plaintiff tried to bite Defendant Daniels again. (Id.) So Defendant Daniels hit her in the face, this time with an elbow. (Id.) That, perhaps unsurprisingly, gave Plaintiff a nosebleed. (Id.) She began hitting her head off the car's windows. (Id.) Defendant Daniels, evidently tired of using physical force, pepper sprayed her. (Id.)

Defendant Daniels then met up with Defendant Joe Marino (“Defendant Marino”), a City of Madison Police Officer, in a local business parking lot. (Id. at 5, ¶ 25.) At this rendezvous, Defendant Daniels handed Plaintiff over to Defendant Marino, who drove her a few miles away to Boone Memorial Hospital in Madison, West Virginia. (Id.) Plaintiff was later transferred to Charleston Area Medical Center in Charleston, West Virginia. (Id. at 5, ¶ 27.) Once there, the toll of Defendant Daniels' beating became apparent: Plaintiff suffered a laundry list of facial injuries, which required surgery to fix.^[2] (Id.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on August 30, 2023, invoking this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (ECF No. 1.) She sued Defendant Daniels, Defendant BCSO, and the Boone County Commission (“Defendant BCC”), collectively referred to as “the Boone County Defendants.” (Id. at 2, ¶¶ 2-4.) She also sued Defendant Marino, the City of Madison, the City of Madison Police Department, James Hudson (Madison's mayor) in his official and private capacities, and Chet Burgess (Madison's Chief of Police) also in his official and private and private capacities, collectively referred to as “the Madison Defendants.” (Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 5-9.) Her complaint brought the following eight claims:

• Count I - Excessive Force in Violation of the Laws and Constitutions of West Virginia and the United States [Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments], brought against Defendant Daniels

• Count II - Excessive Force in Violation of the Laws and Constitutions of West Virginia and the United States, brought against Defendant Marino

• Count III - Vacarious [sic] Liability of Defendants Boone County Commission and Boone County Sheriff's Office

• Count IV - Vacarious [sic] Liability of Defendants City of Madison Police Department, City of Madison, Chet Burgess, and James Hudson

• Count V - Assault and Battery, brought against Defendant Daniels • Count VI - Assault and Battery, brought against Defendant Marino

• VII - Negligence, brought against the Boone County Defendants

• VIII - Negligence, brought against the Madison Defendants^[3]

(Id. at 7-18, ¶¶ 40-94.) She seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and any other relief this Court may deem proper. (Id. at 18-19.)

On November 16, 2023, the Boone County Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff, for certain claims, had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.^[4] (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff responded on November 20, 2023, (ECF No. 18), and the Boone County Defendants replied on November 27, 2023, (ECF No. 20), making the matter ripe for adjudication.

C. Plaintiff's Response

Before taking up the Boone County Defendants' motion, though, the Court first finds it necessary to address some issues with Plaintiff's response brief. First, and most alarming, her response brief defends a complaint she did not file. That is, rather than addressing the merits of the eight claims her complaint asserted, her response brief defends the following seven claims:

• Excessive force against Defendant Daniels and Defendant Marino

• Deprivation of medical care and deliberate indifference against Defendant Daniels • Reckless conduct and deliberate indifference brought against Defendant BCC and Defendant BCSO

• Section 1983 Monell liability against Defendant BCC and Defendant BCSO

• Assault and Battery against Defendant Daniels and Defendant Marino

• Negligence against all Defendants

• Punitive damages against Defendant Daniels

(ECF No. 18 at 4.) As a result, Plaintiff's response brief contains many arguments and assertions that are inapplicable, untrue, and, at times, nonsensical. Second, and relatedly, her response brief also mentions several defenses-judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, and qualified immunity- that the Boone County Defendants never mentioned, much less raised.^[5](Id. at 1.) Because Plaintiff's counsel seemingly used the wrong response-brief form, her filing is no more helpful in resolving the Boone County Defendants' motion than a Philips screwdriver is on a flathead screw. Nevertheless, in an effort to mitigate this malpractice, the Court will liberally construe Plaintiff's arguments so as to do justice.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a civil complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, which, if proven, would entitle her to relief under a cognizable legal claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007). A case should be dismissed if, viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In applying this standard, a court must utilize a two-pronged approach. First, it must separate the legal conclusions in the complaint from the factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Second, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, the court must determine whether the plaintiff's complaint permits a reasonable inference that “the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Well-pleaded factual allegations are required; labels, conclusions, and a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Bare legal conclusions ‘are not entitled to the assumption of truth' and are insufficient to state a claim.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)). A plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” thereby “nudg[ing] [the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.

III. DISCUSSION

The Boone County Defendants' motion attacks Plaintiff's complaint on two grounds. First, Defendant BCSO argues that it must be dismissed as a defendant because it lacks the capacity to sue and be sued. (ECF No. 17 at 3-5.) Second, the Boone County Defendants argue that many, but not all, of Plaintiff's purported claims fail as a matter of law. Specifically, they concede that Plaintiff has pled viable claims for battery and excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. (See id. at 8, 18.) But everything else, they say-her claims for assault, negligence, excessive force under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and vicarious liability for those constitutional violations-should be dismissed. (Id. at 6-18.) The Court addresses each Count in turn.^[6]

A. Defendant BCSO

As just noted, Defendant BCSO argues that it must be dismissed from this case because it lacks the capacity to be sued and is thus an improper party. The Court agrees.

In West Virginia, “only the county commission, as the local governing body for a county, is authorized to sue or be sued.” Frye v. Lincoln Cnty. Comm'n, No 2:20-cv-00403, 2021 WL 243864, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 25, 2021); see also W.Va. Code § 7-1-1(...