Crawford v. Ga. Dep't of Transp.

CATRICE CRAWFORD, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (GDOT), Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:16-CV-03810-WSD-JFK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

February 1, 2017

NON-FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Catrice Crawford filed the above-styled employment discrimination action against Defendant Georgia Department of Transportation ("GDOT"), in the Superior Court of Fulton County, on September 12, 2016. [Docs. 1 and 1-2, Exhibit ("Exh.") B ("Complt.")]. Defendant removed the complaint to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction on October 13, 2016. [Doc. 1]. Although the complaint is generally a narrative that does not conform to federal pleading rules set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 10, Plaintiff appears to assert federal claims of retaliation, discriminatory pay, and discrimination based on race and disability. [Complt.]. As part of the retaliation for opposing the alleged discrimination, Plaintiff also contends that Defendant interfered with her rights under federal leave provisions. [Id.]. Plaintiff's federal claims are brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 206, et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2612, et seq. [Id.]. Plaintiff has also asserted a state law claim under the Georgia Fair Employment Practices Act ("FEPA"), O.C.G.A. § 45-19-20, et seq. [Id.]. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). [Doc. 3]. Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition [Doc. 6], and Defendant filed a reply in support of the motion to dismiss [Doc. 7].

I. Facts

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint's factual allegations are assumed true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hardy v. Regions Mortg., Inc., 449 F.3d 1357, 1359 (11^th Cir. 2006); M.T.V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11^th Cir. 2006). "However, conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11^thCir. 2002) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the following factual allegations are drawn from the Complaint.¹

Plaintiff alleges that her employment with the GDOT began on April 15, 2005, as a Program Technician. [Complt. ¶ 2.I.a.]. Over the next few years, Plaintiff received promotions and increases in her salary. [Id. ¶ 2.I.a. -b.]. However, Plaintiff alleges that, after filing an "In-House Grievance" on January 14, 2013, based on "unfair treatment, unlawful discrimination, and . . . managers . . . erroneously applying GDOT policies and procedures[,]" her "work environment shifted for the worse." [Id.¶ 2.I.c.]. Plaintiff alleges that there were three "rounds" of retaliation, the first occurring during the period March 4, 2013, through March 27, 2013, during which her supervisors issued performance and disciplinary write-ups, conducted intimidating meetings and altered her work assignments. [Id. ¶ 2.II.]. This conduct, Plaintiff alleges, violated the FEPA, the Code of Ethics for Government Service, and the Governor's Executive Order of January 10, 2011. [Id.].

Due to this conduct, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on March 27, 2013, based on race and retaliation. [Id. ¶ 2.III.; Doc. 3, Exh. A ("3/27/13 EEOC Charge")].² Thereafter, the "round 1 retaliation and harassment" continued through May 6, 2013, which included "denying training, an unnecessary coaching write-up, [and] denying [Plaintiff] qualified leave of absence." [Complt. ¶ 2.IV.]. This conduct is alleged by Plaintiff to have violated the FMLA and the EPA. [Id.].

Plaintiff next alleges that a "second round of retaliation and harassment" occurred from May 6, 2013, through August 2, 2013, involving her supervisors "denying/approving training, taking a qualified leave of absence, demotion, computer sabotage, and write-ups." [Id. ¶ 2.V.]. The third and final round "of a more aggressiveform of retaliation" took place from August 5, 2013, through September 12, 2013, when Plaintiff was terminated from her employment, and involved using GDOT policies and procedures to use sick leave against her, "to deny and ignore reasonable accommodations for FMLA for my oncologist, daughters medical condition and back injury," denying attendance at meeting and issuing performance accusations. [Id. ¶ 2.VI.]. Plaintiff specifically alleges that from August 5, 2013, through August 19, 2013, she requested FMLA leave due to a back injury which was denied on August 21, 2013, including ignoring health accommodation for Plaintiff's daughter, violating the FMLA. [Id. ¶ 2.VI.a.]. And on September 10, 2013, Plaintiff was directed to move her office and denied assistance to do so in violation of the ADA. [Id. ¶ 2.VI.b.].³

After her termination, Plaintiff filed a second EEOC charge of discrimination on April 11, 2014. [Doc. 3, Exh. B ("3/11/14 EEOC Charge")]. Plaintiff alleged discrimination pursuant to Title VII based on her race and sex, retaliation pursuant to Title VII due to her complaints of discrimination that resulted in disciplinary write-ups, changes in job duties, work assignments and projects, denial of overtime and promotions, demotion, and denial of reasonable accommodation, and also includingviolating the ADA and denial of medical leave. [Id.]. On August 7, 2014, the EEOC issued right to sue letters on the 3/27/13 EEOC Charge and the 3/11/14 EEOC Charge. [Doc. 3, Exhs. C and D ("Right to Sue Letters")]. In both letters, Plaintiff was advised that, with respect to her Title VII and ADA claims, "Your lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice; or your right to sue based on this charge will be lost." [Id. (emphasis in original)]. With respect to Plaintiff's EPA claim, she was advised that such "suits must be filed in federal or state court within 2 years (3 years for wilful violations) of the alleged EPA underpayment." [Id.]. Plaintiff filed her complaint in the State Court of Fulton County on September 2, 2016. [Doc. 1; Complt.].

Additional facts will be set forth as necessary during discussion of Defendant's motion to dismiss.

II. Standard of Law

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include no requirement that a plaintiff detail the facts upon which the plaintiff bases a claim. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (as amended 2007). Accordingly, "[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailedfactual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of [her] 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted); accord Financial Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11^th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that "while notice pleading may not require that the pleader allege a specific fact to cover every element or allege with precision each element of a claim, it is still necessary that a complaint contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," i.e., they must do more than merely create a "'suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action,' on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). "Stated differently, the factual allegations in a complaint must 'possess enough heft' to set forth 'a plausible entitlement to relief[.]'" Stephens, 500 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966-67). A plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed if it does not contain "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant isliable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citation omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.

The court's inquiry at this stage of the proceedings focuses on whether the challenged pleadings "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). And, a court reviewing a motion to dismiss must keep in mind that a "motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted merely tests the sufficiency of the complaint; it does not decide the merits of the case." Wein v. American Huts, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765 (11^th Cir. 1984)). "Regardless of the alleged facts, however, a court may dismiss a complaint on a dispositive issue of law." Bernard v. Calejo, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (citing Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11^th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he court may dismiss a complaint . . . when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action.")); see also Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc., 459 F.3d 1304,1308 (11^th Cir. 2006) (same); Aque v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2009).

The law establishes that "[a] document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed' . . . and 'a pro se...