Case Law Crawley v. State

Crawley v. State

Document Cited Authorities (5) Cited in (20) Related

Kevin Wild, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

VAIDIK, Judge.

Case Summary

Cathy Crawley appeals her conviction for Class C felony operating a motor vehicle after driving privileges are forfeited for life. Although nobody witnessed Crawley operate the motor vehicle, we conclude that the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Crawley operated the motor vehicle. We therefore affirm her conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

The evidence most favorable to the judgment reveals that Donald Jones had a tiki bar in the backyard of his southeast Indianapolis home, which served as a hangout for many of his friends. Crawley dated Jones' friend, Jason Clark, and as a result of this relationship, she visited Jones' house several times to hang out. After Crawley and Clark stopped dating, Crawley still visited Jones' house on a few occasions. After Crawley came to Jones' house with some people that Jones did not know, Jones told Crawley that she could only come to his house with Clark or another man, Dave Beman.

Around 4:30 or 5:00 a.m. on November 26, 2008, which was the day before Thanksgiving, Jones' live-in girlfriend woke him up because she heard a sound in the backyard. Jones got dressed and went to the back door. When Jones opened the door, he saw Crawley standing there "soaking wet" wearing boxer shorts, a tank top, and no shoes. Tr. p. 11. Jones was "very shocked" to see Crawley, whom he considered an acquaintance, because he had not seen her in four to six weeks and there was no party at his house the previous night. Id. Jones then looked over and noticed that his Jacuzzi was running. Jones asked Crawley what she was doing and who she was with, but Crawley did not respond. Jones repeated his inquiry, and Crawley asked, "Do you know where my car's at?" Id. at 13. Jones said no, wondering if this was a guessing game or a bet. After checking one of the driveways which flanked Jones' house, Crawley again asked, "Do you know where my car's at?" Id. Again, Jones said no. After running to Jones' other driveway, Crawley returned to Jones and said, "I think my car's in your pool." Id. Jones responded, "You gotta be kidding me." Id. Jones then turned on his flood lights and saw a car backed into his pool. State's Ex. 1, 2. Jones had an above-ground pool that was dug three feet into the ground and surrounded by a recently-constructed wooden deck. The pool was partially drained for the winter. Jones was "very upset" about the car in his pool. Tr. p. 13.

Jones brought Crawley into his house and instructed his girlfriend to retrieve some dry clothes for her. In the meantime, Jones inspected the Jacuzzi area and found Crawley's jacket, her purse, and four cigarette butts. Strangely, there were no shoes or pants. Once Crawley had dry clothes on, they sat down at the kitchen table, and Jones began asking Crawley questions, including why she was there and who she was with. When Crawley responded that she was there with Clark, Jones knew that to be untrue because Clark, one of Jones' best friends, was in Michigan. So, Jones again asked Crawley if she was there with anybody else, and this time she said no. Because Crawley could barely walk and kept almost falling out of her chair, Jones believed that she had consumed alcohol. Also, Crawley said she took five or six Klonopin. Jones then asked Crawley whose car it was. Jones proceeded to the car and discovered that it was registered to Tim Siddons. Jones asked Crawley for Siddons' phone number, and Crawley gave it to him. Siddons was at work, so Jones left a message for him. When Jones told Crawley that he was going to call the police because of the extensive damage to his property, Crawley asked him not to do so, promising that Siddons' insurance would pay for it. Crawley, who lived with her father at the time, then gave Jones her father's telephone number.

Jones called Crawley's father, Jere Crawley. Crawley got on the phone to talk to her father and asked him if it was day or night. When Jere arrived to pick up Crawley, she was "[p]retty confused." Id. at 52. While Crawley was waiting in her father's truck, Jones showed Jere the damage to his pool and said that unless Jere wanted to assume responsibility for the damage, he was going to call the police. Jere said, "I guess you got to do what you got to do." Id. at 24. Jones called the police after Jere and Crawley left.

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Kevin Joyce arrived at Jones' house around 7:15 a.m. and observed a "Chevrolet Cavalier partially submerged in a partially above ground swimming pool." Id. at 30. Officer Joyce then looked inside the purse which was located next to the Jacuzzi and found an identification card belonging to Crawley. Officer Joyce ran a BMV check on Crawley, which revealed that she was a Habitual Traffic Offender for Life. Officer Joyce then contacted the owner of the vehicle, Siddons, who stated that he had given Crawley his car approximately three weeks ago because she needed transportation to work and a way to get her daughter; however, she had refused to return his car. Officer Joyce then went to Crawley's house and arrested her. At the time of her arrest, Crawley's hair was still wet, her gait was unsteady, her speech was slurred, and her eyes were bloodshot.

The State charged Crawley with Class C felony operating a motor vehicle after driving privileges are forfeited for life. A bench trial was held, during which Crawley presented the testimony of her friend, Elizabeth Frazier. Frazier testified that she was with Crawley "right before Thanksgiving." Id. at 72. Frazier said that Crawley came over to her house around midnight with a man she did not know, had a few drinks, and left around 5:00 or 5:15 a.m. Id. at 64, 65. When Crawley left, she was "[t]ired and sluggish." Id. at 72. According to Crawley, the man was "definitely" in the driver's seat of the car when they left. Id. at 64. The trial court found Crawley guilty as charged. The court reasoned:

It's fairly clear to me that the defendant had the car in her possession. ... With regard to who drove the car it comes down to whether or not I can believe what [Jones] says that you told him [that she was alone at his house] or Ms. Frazier who just testified. And there were a couple things about Ms. Frazier's testimony that bothered me. One, she was really sure that it was about five or five-fifteen when she was waving goodbye to you holding her cat, however, the testimony was that it was four thirty or five that this was all happening at [Jones'] house. Now, she could have been wrong about that but she was pretty adamant in her testimony about that. She also, I think she was trying to be really helpful but I don't think she really has any idea what day it was that you were there with this person whose name she didn't know where you were there all night long because when I asked her how she knew the date she said she didn't really know the date, she said that she didn't find out about it for some time until later, some friends called and told her what happened and so basically, after she was questioned on cross and re-direct about that on my question, it became the very next day but I don't really think that was it. I don't think she really knows what day it was, you know, I think it was probably habit that you were there spending the night with her and there were, since it happened on many occasions, probably difficult for her to figure out which day particularly it was that this happened. I don't know, just wasn't, it was pretty clear to me that she was trying to be helpful with regard to what day it was. She did say she knew for sure it was a couple days before Thanksgiving which I don't think necessarily fits with the facts as they're presented. The thing I think is the most telling of circumstantial evidence for me is that your purse was wet. Officer testified that the purse was wet. There was testimony that you were soaking wet. Now that could have been from getting into a Jacuzzi but even a pretty intoxicated person wouldn't get in a Jacuzzi with their purse, however, if they were backing out and backed into the pool and had to get out of the car it would be natural to take the purse and to me, that circumstantial evidence points ... surely and unerringly to the fact that you were the driver of the car that day.

Id. at 83-85. The trial court sentenced Crawley to four years with two years suspended to probation. Crawley now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Crawley contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts must only consider the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.2007). It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient. Id. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it "most favorably to the trial court's ruling." Id. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless "no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 146-47 (quotation omitted). It is therefore not necessary that the evidence "overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Id. at 147 (quotation omitted). "[T]he evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the [judgment]." Id. (quotation omitted). A conviction may be based...

5 cases
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2018
Corbin v. State
"...be in actual physical control of a vehicle, motorboat, off-road vehicle, or snowmobile." I.C. § 9-13-2-117.5(a). In Crawley v. State, 920 N.E.2d 808, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied , we listed four factors that could be used to determine whether a person "operated" a vehicle: "(1) ..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2010
Wright v. State
"...Rather, the State must show that the defendant drove, or was in actual physical control of, a motor vehicle. See Crawley v. State, 920 N.E.2d 808, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; Hampton v. State, 681 N.E.2d 250, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Several factors may be examined to determi..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2021
Bargerhuff v. State
"...was observed operating the vehicle before he or she was discovered; and (4) the position of the automatic transmission." 920 N.E.2d 808, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. As the aforementioned factors are not exhaustive, any additional evidence that points to a reasonable inference o..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2010
Jennings v. State Of Ind., 87A01-1002-CR-34
"...Rather, the State must show that the defendant drove, or was in actual physical control of, a motor vehicle. Crawley v. State, 920 N.E.2d 808, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Several factors may be examined to determine whether a defendant has "operated" a vehicle: (1) the location..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2015
Purnell v. State
"...evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that Purnell was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Crawley v. State, 920 N.E.2d 808, 813 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant had operated a motor vehicle although no one saw the defendant drive t..."

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5 cases
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2018
Corbin v. State
"...be in actual physical control of a vehicle, motorboat, off-road vehicle, or snowmobile." I.C. § 9-13-2-117.5(a). In Crawley v. State, 920 N.E.2d 808, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied , we listed four factors that could be used to determine whether a person "operated" a vehicle: "(1) ..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2010
Wright v. State
"...Rather, the State must show that the defendant drove, or was in actual physical control of, a motor vehicle. See Crawley v. State, 920 N.E.2d 808, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; Hampton v. State, 681 N.E.2d 250, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Several factors may be examined to determi..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2021
Bargerhuff v. State
"...was observed operating the vehicle before he or she was discovered; and (4) the position of the automatic transmission." 920 N.E.2d 808, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. As the aforementioned factors are not exhaustive, any additional evidence that points to a reasonable inference o..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2010
Jennings v. State Of Ind., 87A01-1002-CR-34
"...Rather, the State must show that the defendant drove, or was in actual physical control of, a motor vehicle. Crawley v. State, 920 N.E.2d 808, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Several factors may be examined to determine whether a defendant has "operated" a vehicle: (1) the location..."
Document | Indiana Appellate Court – 2015
Purnell v. State
"...evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that Purnell was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Crawley v. State, 920 N.E.2d 808, 813 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant had operated a motor vehicle although no one saw the defendant drive t..."

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  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

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