Crenshaw v. The State Of Tex., 01-09-00791-CR

CHRISTOPHER CRENSHAW, Appellant

v.THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

NO. 01-09-00791-CR

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

Opinion issued: January 27, 2011

On Appeal from the 185th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1172270

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Christopher Crenshaw, appeals from a judgment sentencing him to life imprisonment for capital murder. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (West Supp. 2010). Appellant pleaded not guilty to the jury. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court assessed his punishment. In five issues, appellantchallenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to suppress his oral statements, the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to suppress the revolver, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the motions to suppress, and that his trial counsel was not ineffective. We affirm.

Background

On the evening of November 29, 2007, Carltrell Odom and two of his friends, Raul Duran and Vinny Lemus, were having a conversation in the parking lot of Odom's apartment complex when a group of four young men approached and surrounded them. One yelled, "This is a [expletive] robbery," and they pulled out guns, ordering Odom and his friends to the ground. One of the men took Duran's cell phone. As Odom moved to the ground, one of the attackers, Allan Nickerson, struck Odom on the head with a handgun. Odom pushed the gun away him from his face and began running away. Nickerson chased, shooting at him. The first round missed, but the second landed in Odom's back. With Odom on the ground, Nickerson approached and fired a third round in the back of Odom's head, killing him. A black sedan approached, and the four men entered and drove away.

Upon learning that Duran's cell phone had been stolen in the robbery, the police tracked the phone to Nickerson's home. Nickerson agreed to go to thepolice station to discuss the previous night's incident. Nickerson admitted being present at the scene of the robbery and indicated that appellant, age fifteen, had been with him. Before being transported to the police station, Nickerson directed the police to appellant's apartment complex, where they arrived at approximately 4:00 a.m. Once there, Sergeant Huynh spoke with Michelle Crenshaw, appellant's mother, who was outside sitting in her car getting ready to leave for work. Sergeant Huynh explained that he was conducting a follow-up in a murder investigation. He asked if appellant was home and if he could speak to him. She answered affirmatively, handed her keys to Sergeant Huynh, and directed him to her apartment. Sergeant Huynh gave the keys to his partner, Sergeant Newcomb. Sergeant Newcomb, who was dressed in a suit, entered the apartment and spoke with appellant, who had been sleeping in one of the bedrooms that he shared with his brother. Sergeant Newcomb was accompanied by three uniformed officers. After speaking to appellant, Sergeant Newcomb asked appellant and his brother to come with them to the homicide office to talk about the investigation. Both appellant and his brother agreed to talk and accompany the police. Appellant's mother also consented to her sons accompanying the police to the police station.

After handing the key to Sergeant Newcomb, Sergeant Huynh returned to speak with appellant's mother. At 4:15 a.m., she signed a written consent form authorizing the police to search her apartment. After obtaining the written consent, Sergeant Huynh conducted a search of the bedroom shared by appellant and his brother where he recovered a revolver and some marijuana inside a shoebox. Although Nickerson had not mentioned that appellant had the revolver, at this point, the police already suspected that a revolver might have been used to kill Odom as there were no bullet casings found at the crime scene. Later testing revealed that this was the same revolver used to kill Odom.

Appellant was handcuffed as required by police department policy and was transported in a marked patrol car to the Harris County Criminal Justice Center. The police later testified that at this point, they did not have probable cause and appellant was not under arrest. Nevertheless, they brought appellant to a magistrate judge to have the Miranda-based warnings read to appellant in case he ended up making an incriminating statement. At approximately 5:07 a.m., at the requested of the magistrate judge, the police officers removed appellant's handcuffs. The magistrate judge began by informing appellant that he had "been accused of the offense of capital murder... on a complaint made by the State of Texas." After being read the Miranda-based warnings, appellant indicated that he understood his rights.

Appellant was again handcuffed. As they were walking out of the Criminal Justice Center, appellant began, without prompting, to tell Sergeant Roberts what happened. Sergeant Roberts had to stop appellant to tell him to wait until theywere in a position to record his statement. Appellant was transported in the same marked patrol car to the homicide office where he was seated in an interrogation room and his handcuffs were removed. When Sergeant Roberts entered the interrogation room, but before he began recording, appellant again started, without prompting, to tell what had happened only to again be stopped.

At 5:28 a.m., Sergeant Roberts and his partner began interviewing appellant for an initial session, which lasted fifty-five minutes. Early on, Sergeant Roberts told appellant that two of his "buddies" who had been with him the previous night were down the hall, already telling the police a lot. Appellant admitted that he and four others had planned the robbery the day before because they "needed the money... to put something in our stomach[s]." The previous night, one person waited in the car while appellant and three others approached Odom, Vinny, and Lemus. Appellant admitted that the revolver found in the shoebox was the gun that the shooter used and that it was placed in his backpack after the shooting. Appellant also admitted that he brought the revolver, already loaded, that night. Appellant identified the shooter by a false name.

Appellant remained in the interrogation room for the remainder of the day where he was provided with food, drink, and opportunities to use the bathroom. There is no evidence that, during the fifteen hours in between the two interviewsessions, appellant was ever informed that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave. Similarly, there is no evidence that appellant ever asked to leave.

After completing the initial interview session, Sergeant Roberts met with the other investigators and learned that, in a simultaneously conduced interview, Allan Nickerson had given a more accurate account of what happened during the incident. As the police were preparing to transport appellant to juvenile detention, Sergeant Roberts mentioned to appellant that Nickerson had told them the truth. Appellant looked down and said he needed to talk with Sergeant Roberts and his partner again so he could tell them the truth about what really happened. At 9:38 p.m., Sergeant Roberts and his partner intervied appellant for a second session, which lasted fifteen minutes. During the second interview session, appellant restated what had happened the previous night, this time providing the shooter's real name.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first and second issues, appellant challenges the evidence as legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for capital murder as a party. In particular, appellant challenges the evidence for the predicate offense of capital murder by claiming that the evidence fails to show that the shooter intended to kill Odom. Appellant also challenges the evidence establishing his guilt as a party byasserting the evidence fails to show he should have anticipated a murder to result from the robbery.

A. Standard of Review

This Court now reviews both legal and factual sufficiency challenges using the same standard of review. Ervin v. State, No. 01-10-00054-CR, 2010 WL 4619329, at *2-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 2010, pet. filed) (construing majority holding of Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). Under this standard, evidence is insufficient to support a conviction if considering all the record evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, no rational factfinder could have found that each essential element of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient under this standard in two circumstances: (1) the record contains no evidence, or merely a "modicum" of evidence, probative of an element of the offense; or (2) the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314, 318 n.11, 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2786, 2789 & n.11; Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518; Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. Additionally, the evidence is insufficient as a matterof law if the acts alleged do not constitute the criminal offense charged. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750.

If an appellate court finds the evidence insufficient under this standard, it must reverse the judgment and enter an order of acquittal. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2218 (1982). An appellate court determines whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Clayton v. State, 235...