Crews ex rel. Crews v. Cnty. of Nassau

996 F.Supp.2d 186

Raheem CREWS, individually and as Parent of Shaheem Crews, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF NASSAU, et al., Defendants.

No. 06–CV–2610 (JFB)(GRB).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Feb. 11, 2014.

Frederick K. Brewington, Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington, Hempstead, NY, for Plaintiff.

Sherri Anne Jayson, Cuomo LLC, New York, NY, for the County defendants.

Mitchell Garber and Douglas LaBarbera, Worth, Longworth & London, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant Det. Lemma.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Plaintiff Raheem Crews (“plaintiff”) was arrested, detained, and prosecuted for a robbery he did not commit. After plaintiff's arrest, the lead detective on the case, defendant Nicholas Lemma (“Det. Lemma”), learned that plaintiff had been in jail at the time of the robbery (for an unrelated incident), but Det. Lemma kept this information to himself. Thereafter, plaintiff spent almost four additional months in jail before his alibi was confirmed, and the indictment against him was dismissed.

Now plaintiff, individually and as parent of Shaheem Crews, brings this civil rights action against the County of Nassau (the “County”), County Police Deputy Inspector Joseph Barbieri (“Dep. Insp. Barbieri”), County Police Detective Lieutenant Andrew Fal (“Det. Lt. Fal”), County Police Detective John Holland (“Det. Holland”), County Police Detective Donald Messe (“Det. Messe”), County Police Officer Ronald Annarumma (“Officer Annarumma”), County Assistant District Attorney Greg Madey (“ADA Madey”), County Assistant District Attorney Kevin Higgins (“ADA Higgins”) (collectively, the “County defendants”), and Det. Lemma (collectively, “defendants”).¹ Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“ Section 1983”) and New York state law, plaintiff alleges causes of action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff also brings the following causes of action under state law: assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”).² He seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.³

Presently before the Court are the County defendants' motion for summary judgment, Det. Lemma's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against Det. Lemma. For the reasons that follow, the County defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part, Det. Lemma's motion is granted in part and denied in part, and plaintiff's motion is denied. Specifically, first, summary judgment for all defendants is warranted on plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims because the robbery victim's identification of plaintiff in a photo array furnished defendants with the probable cause necessary to arrest plaintiff. Moreover, although plaintiff contends that there is evidence that one of the actual perpetrators of the robbery told certain defendants that plaintiff had not participated in the robbery, such evidence does not vitiate the probable cause established by the victim's identification of plaintiff, given the complete absence of any evidence that the identification procedure was suggestive. Second, the Court grants summary judgment to all individual defendants except Det. Lemma on plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim. With respect to Det. Lemma's liability for malicious prosecution, there is, inter alia, evidence that Det. Lemma became aware that plaintiff was in jail at the time of the robbery, but withheld that exculpatory evidence from prosecutors. In fact, in his deposition, Det. Lemma stated, “I kept it to myself and said ‘Let the chips fall where they may.’ ” (Decl. of Valerie M. Cartright (“Cartright Decl.”) Ex. G, Dep. of Nicholas Lemma, Feb. 24, 2009 (“Lemma Dep.”) 48.) Thus, Det. Lemma is not entitled to summary judgment on this claim. However, plaintiff is also not entitled to summary judgment because, based upon the record in this case, there is a genuine issue of disputed fact as to whether the withholding of the exculpatory information by Det. Lemma was done with malice, as required for a malicious prosecution claim. However, defendants ADA Madey and ADA Higgins are entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Further, all other defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because there is no evidence establishing that they ever learned of plaintiff's alibi for the robbery. As for the municipal liability claim against the County, a triable issue of fact exists concerning the County's failure to train or supervise Det. Lemma, such that a reasonable jury could find the County liable under Section 1983. In addition, the County could be held liable on plaintiff's corresponding state law malicious prosecution claim under a theory of respondeat superior. Third, all defendants except Officer Annarumma and the County are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's assault and battery claims, which plaintiff based on the degree of force used to handcuff him. A triable issue of fact exists concerning the degree of force Officer Annarumma use in arresting plaintiff, and the Court cannot determine at this juncture whether Officer Annarumma is entitled to qualified immunity. The County's liability hinges on Officer Annarumma's liability, on a theory of respondeat superior. However, no other defendants can be held liable for assault and battery, because there is no evidence of their involvement in plaintiff's handcuffing. Fourth, the Court grants summary judgment to all defendants on plaintiff's IIED and NIED claims, on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to produce medical evidence of his emotional distress, and that these claims are duplicative of his other claims.

I. Background

A. Facts

The following facts are taken from the parties' depositions, declarations, exhibits, and respective Local Rule 56.1 statements of facts. Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005). Unless otherwise noted, where a party's Rule 56.1 statement is cited, that fact is undisputed or the opposing party has not pointed to any evidence in the record to contradict it.⁴

1. Robbery of Levi Smith

On March 26, 2005, Levi Smith (“Smith”) called 911 to report that he had been robbed at knifepoint. (County's 56.1 Statement ¶ 41.) In a supporting deposition given to the Nassau County Police Department (“NCPD”), Smith described the perpetrators as three African–American men who were approximately seventeen to eighteen years old. ( Id. ¶¶ 42–43.) According to Smith, one of the young men was wearing a black and orange jacket, and another was wearing a black jacket with orange lining. ( Id. ¶ 43; Decl. of Sherri A. Jayson (“Jayson Decl.”) Ex. 9, Supporting Dep. of Levi Smith, Mar. 26, 2005.)

At the time, Det. Lt. Fal was the commanding officer for the NCPD First Precinct detectives (County's 56.1 Statement ¶ 31), and Det. Lemma was one of the detectives under Det. Lt. Fal's command (Lemma's 56.1 Statement ¶ 6). On March 28, 2005, Det. Lemma was responsible for the intake of cases transferred to the detective's unit for investigation, and Det. Lemma assigned the Smith robbery to himself. (County's 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 30, 45; Lemma Dep. at 11–12.) During his investigation, Det. Lemma learned that Naquarn Hughlett (“Hughlett”) might have been one of the three young men involved in the robbery. (County's 56.1 Statement ¶ 46.) Det. Lemma presented Smith with a photo array that included a picture of Hughlett, and Smith identified Hughlett as one of the young men who had robbed him. (Lemma's 56.1 Statement ¶ 6; Lemma Dep. at 30–31.)

2. Hughlett's Arrest and Interrogation

Hughlett was arrested on May 26, 2005. (County's 56.1 Statement ¶ 47.) He was taken to the First Precinct, where he gave a statement to Det. Lemma and others concerning his involvement in the Smith robbery. (Lemma Dep. at 32–34.) It is undisputed that Hughlett admitted to his participation in the crime and signed a written statement identifying “Eastside” and “Tray Pound” as the two other perpetrators of the robbery. (County's 56.1 Statement ¶ 48; Lemma's 56.1 Statement ¶ 6.) Hughlett's statement also indicates that “East Side” was wearing a black jacketwith orange lining during the robbery. (County's 56.1 Statement ¶ 49; Cartright Decl. Ex. N, Statement of Naquarn Hughlett, May 26, 2005.)

There is conflicting evidence, however, about what Hughlett actually communicated to investigating officials after his arrest. According to Det. Lemma, Hughlett implicated two other men with the nicknames “Eastside” and “Tray Pound,” which corresponds to the written statement that Hughlett signed. (Lemma Dep. at 34.) Hughlett has provided a different account of what happened before and after his arrest, first in a sworn video statement made on December 9, 2005, and later in a deposition on March 28, 2012.

In his video statement, Hughlett explained that, several weeks before his arrest, he and plaintiff had been standing in front of a delicatessen when police officers approached them and asked for identification. (Cartright Decl. Ex. GG, Videotaped Statement of Naquarn Hughlett, Dec. 9, 2005 (“Hughlett Video Statement”) 3.) The officer told plaintiff that they would “lock him up” next time if he failed to report to probation. ( Id.) Thereafter, a few days before his arrest, Hughlett observed a police detective taking pictures of him and his friends, among whom were plaintiff and Lorenzo Miller (“Miller”). ( Id. at 4.) The detective told the group that if the police returned, they would know “who they're coming to get.” ( Id.) Then, on May 26, 2005, the police arrested Hughlett. ( Id. at 5.) Plaintiff was with Hughlett at the time of Hughlett's arrest, but plaintiff himself was not arrested. ( Id.)

According to...