Crider v. Acquisitions

RONNIQUE CRIDER, RAYMOND DALE CRIDER, Plaintiffs, v. PACIFIC ACQUISITIONS & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-03498-NC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

November 3, 2015

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO RONNIQUE CRIDER; DENYING MOTION AS TO RAYMOND CRIDER

Re: Dkt. No. 28

Husband and wife Raymond and Ronnique Crider allege that Pacific Acquisitions & Associates, LLC harassed Ronnique at her workplace by calling her repeatedly to collect a consumer debt. Pacific is no longer a company in good standing, so the Criders move for default judgment, claiming Pacific violated the federal and state Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The Criders request an award of statutory and emotional damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. The Court finds that Ronnique Crider has sufficiently stated a claim that she was subject to the protection under the FDCPA and RFDCPA, and was a victim of Pacific's unlawful acts. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motion for default judgment as to Ronnique Crider and awards her $16,209.00. However, the Court finds that Raymond Crider is not a debt holder and was not the target of Pacific's debt collection actions, and is not entitled to default judgment. The Court DENIES the motion for default judgment as to Raymond Crider.

I. BACKGROUND

The Criders are married and both worked at Saint Mary's College in Moraga, California in February 2014. Dkt. No. 1, Complaint at ¶ 2. Ronnique Crider has debt on a credit card used exclusively by her for personal, family, or household purposes. Dkt. No. 31 at ¶ 2. Pacific is a Delaware LLC, and its primary business is debt collection. Complaint at ¶ 12. Pacific attempted to collect on Ronnique's credit card debt. Dkt. No. 31 at ¶ 2. On February 23, 2014, an employee from Pacific called Ronnique's office and spoke with a student worker. Complaint at ¶ 2. Pacific asked the student worker several questions in order to get more information about her, including who the worker's direct supervisor was. Id. Ronnique overheard the conversation, took the phone from the student, and told the Pacific employee not to call her at work. Id. The caller told Ronnique that he could do whatever he wanted, and that he was going to come out to her place of employment and serve her. Id. Pacific called Ronnique again that same day and left the following message on her work phone:

Yes, uh, this message is for Ronnique Crider. This is, uh, Miles Gordon calling from Pacific Acquisitions & Associates contacting you in regards to uh your claim that's been forwarded to my immediate attention. I did not hear back from you. Uh, my next step will be to go ahead and give uh Michael Viola a call and go over this information with him uh so that we can go ahead and get you the documentation we need to get out to your place of employment. My office number is 855-715-7569. You'll refer to the claim number of 6898. I have not heard back from you. I'm giving you the benefit of the doubt and uh, will wait to see if I hear back from you. If I don't hear back from you by today at 3:00 p.m. PST I will move forward. I know I have the correct uh email, I hear you stating your name so I don't know what the discrepancy is, but I will move forward after today.

Id. at ¶ 3.

Ronnique told Raymond about the phone calls from Pacific. Id. at ¶ 2. The next day, Raymond drafted a letter requesting Pacific not to call Ronnique at work, not to call her co-workers, and not to come to her place of employment. Id at ¶ 4. Ronnique signed the letter and faxed it to Pacific in the morning. Id. Later that day, Pacific called Ronnique at work again and left the following voicemail:

This message is for Ronnique Crider. This is, uh, Miles Gordon calling from Pacific Acquisitions & Associates contacting you in regards to your, uh, claim that's been forwarded to my immediate attention. There has been a complaint filed against you. I am planning on getting you out the, uh, documents that we need to get to you at your place of employment. I can be reached at my office number of 855-715-7569. Uh, you'll refer to the claim number of 6898-C as in cat; A as in apple 2593. If I don't hear back from you then basically I'll give Mike a call and go over some information with him, clarify some information and then go ahead and move forward with this. Uh it would definitely be in your best interest to contact me as soon as you get this message. Once again, this is Miles Gordon calling from Pacific Acquisitions & Associates.

Id. at ¶ 5. The Criders allege that these messages caused fear, anxiety, and emotional distress because they were worried Pacific would contact Ronnique's supervisor, and that word would spread to Raymond's colleagues, which would have a negative impact on their employment. Id. at ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 28 at 8.

On August 1, 2014, Ronnique and Raymond Crider sued Pacific for violating (1) California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("RFDCPA"); (2) intrusion upon seclusion; (3) the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"); (4) negligence; and (5) negligent training and supervision. On December 8, 2014, Pacific answered the complaint, represented by counsel. Dkt. No. 9. The parties conducted discovery in this case, and shortly before a mediation conference in June 2015, Pacific's counsel notified the Court that the company was no longer in good standing with the state of Delaware, so counsel lacked the capacity to represent Pacific. Dkt. No. 22 at 2. The Criders filed a motion to strike defendant's answer and enter default, which the Court granted. Dkt. Nos. 25, 27. The Criders now move for default judgment against Pacific, seeking $1,000 in statutory damages for a violation of the FDCPA, $1,000 in statutory damages for a violation of the RFDCPA, $15,000 in emotional distress damages, $11,250 in attorneys' fees, and $459.00 in advance costs. Dkt. No. 28 at 11.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Default may be entered against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend an action and against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After entry of default, the Court has discretion to grant default judgment on the merits of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In deciding whether to grant default judgment, the Court considers the following factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the sufficiency of the complaint; (3) the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The factual allegations of the complaint, except those concerning damages, are deemed admitted by the non-responding parties. Shanghai Automation Instrument, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 995; see also Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[t]he general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true").

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

When presented with a motion for default judgment, the Court has "an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties." In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the complaint alleges violations of the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claim under the RFDCPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Both parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court, prior to Pacific's default. Dkt. No. 13 at 5.

Additionally, because Pacific appeared in this lawsuit and answered the complaint, the Court finds that service was proper and that personal jurisdiction over Pacific is appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (a party waives objections to service and personaljurisdiction by failing to object in a motion to dismiss).

B. Default Judgment

1. Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint

Under the second and third Eitel factors, in deciding whether to grant default judgment, the Court must examine the merits of the plaintiffs' substantive claims and the sufficiency of the complaint. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. At this stage, the Court takes "the well-pleaded factual allegations" in the complaint as true; however, the "defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law." DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007). "[N]ecessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default." Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of No. America, 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). In their supplemental motion for default judgment, the Criders state that they are dismissing their claims for intrusion upon seclusion, negligence, and negligent supervision. Thus, the remaining claims are (a) a violation of the RFDCPA; and (b) a violation of the FDCPA.

a. RFDCPA Claims

The Criders allege that Pacific violated the RFDCPA by threatening to call Ronnique's supervisor. Cal. Civ. Code. § 1788.17. To qualify for protection under the RFDCPA, plaintiffs must be "debtors" as the term is defined in California Civil Code § 1788.2(h) ("a natural person from whom a debt collector seeks to collect a consumer debt which is due and owing or alleged to be due and owing from such person"). Additionally, defendants must be "debt collectors," defined as "any person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on behalf of himself or herself or other engages in debt collection." Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(c). Here, the Criders allege in the complaint that they are debtors, and that Pacific is a debt collector. However, in the supplemental briefing, only Ronnique...