Crigler v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc.

684 S.W.3d 470

TRAVIS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT, BY AND THROUGH Marya CRIGLER, Acting in Her Official Capacity as Chief Appraiser of Travis Central Appraisal District, Appellant

v.TEXAS DISPOSAL SYSTEMS LANDFILL, INC., Appellee

NO. 03-20-00122-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

Filed: June 22, 2022

FROM THE 200TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, NO. D-1-GN-19-006394, THE HONORABLE CATHERINE MAUZY, JUDGE PRESIDING

Mark R. Trachtenberg, Ryan Pitts, Haynes and Boone, LLP, 1221 McKinney St Ste 2100, Houston, TX 77010, Karen Evertson, Mary Sanchez, Evertson & Sanchez, P.C., 2107 Payne Avenue, Austin, TX 78757, for Appellant.

Wallace B. Jefferson, Melanie Plowman, Alexander Dubose & Jefferson LLP, 515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350, Austin, TX 78701-3562, Shane Rogers, Lorri Michel, Michel Gray LLC, 812 W. 11th Street, Suite 301, Austin, TX 78701, for Appellee.

Before Justices Goodwin, Triana, and Smith

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Melissa Goodwin, Justice

We withdraw the opinion and judgment issued on February 18, 2022; substitute the following opinion and judgment in their place; and deny appellee’s motion for rehearing.

Travis Central Appraisal District (TCAD) appeals the district court’s judgment granting pleas to the jurisdiction filed by Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. (the Landfill) and dismissing TCAD’s claims. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are undisputed. For tax year 2019, TCAD appraised the Landfill’s property at $21.2 million, and the Landfill protested with the Travis Appraisal Review Board (the ARB). The Landfill relied on two grounds—market value and unequal appraisal—but withdrew the market value ground the day before the ARB hearing. After the hearing, the ARB found that the appraisal was unequal and reduced the appraised value to $2.8 million.

TCAD, through its chief appraiser, appealed to the district court for a trial de novo, claiming that "the value set by the ARB" results in a "below market value and unequal appraised value." The Landfill filed a plea to the jurisdiction as to TCAD’s market value claim, arguing that "TCAD lacks an order determining market value to challenge on appeal" because the ARB determined only an unequal appraisal protest. The district court granted the plea, dismissing TCAD’s market value claim but leaving TCAD’s unequal appraisal claim. The Landfill filed another plea to the jurisdiction on TCAD’s remaining claim, arguing that TCAD improperly relied on a 2017 general resolution by its board of directors—issued two years before the ARB order—to satisfy Section 42.02(a)’s requirement to obtain written approval to appeal. See Tex. Tax Code § 42.02(a) (providing that chief appraiser is "entitled to appeal" "[o]n written approval of the board of directors of the appraisal district"). The district court granted the Landfill’s second plea, dismissing TCAD’s remaining claim and rendering a final judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

[1] In two issues, TCAD challenges the district court’s judgment granting the Landfill’s pleas to the jurisdiction, which we review de novo. See Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–28 (Tex. 2004) (describing standard). First, TCAD argues that Section 42.02(a)’s written approval requirement is not jurisdictional; that regardless, the 2017 general resolution satisfies the requirement; and that even if it is not satisfied, the district court should have abated rather than dismissed the cause. Second, TCAD claims that in a de novo appeal to the district court, TCAD is not "limited by the arguments that the property owner chooses to raise in the underlying administrative proceeding" and that therefore the district court had jurisdiction to consider its market value claim.

A. Section 42.02(a)’s Written Approval Requirement

We first consider TCAD’s challenge to the district court’s order granting the Landfill’s second plea to the jurisdiction. The Landfill’s second plea to the jurisdiction was based on Section 42.02(a), which provides, as relevant here: "On written approval of the board of directors of the appraisal district, the chief appraiser is entitled to appeal an order of the appraisal review board determining: (1) a taxpayer protest as provided by Subchapter C, Chapter 41[.]" Tex. Tax Code § 42.02(a). TCAD argues that "Section 42.02(a) contains ‘no explicit language’ suggesting any legislative intent, much less a clear intent, that the written-approval requirement be jurisdictional."

1. Jurisdictional Prerequisite

Until 2000, Texas law was that "where a cause of action is derived from a statute," "‘strict compliance with all statutory prerequisites is necessary to vest a trial court with jurisdiction.’" Texas Mut. Ins. v. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d 284, 286 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 510 (Tex. 2012)). But beginning with Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76–77 (Tex. 2000), the focus shifted: "The classification of a matter as one of jurisdiction … opens the way to making judgments vulnerable to delayed attack for a variety of irregularities that perhaps better ought to be sealed in a judgment," and "the modern direction of policy is to reduce the vulnerability of final judgments to attack on the ground that the tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction." In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Dubai, 12 S.W.3d at 76); see also Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 286 ("We see no reason that this focus should also not apply to judicial appeals from administrative rulings."). Thus, "the focus post-Dubai is to strengthen the finality of judgments and reduce the possibility of delayed attacks." Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 286.

Notwithstanding this shift in focus, the Landfill argues that Section 42.02(a)’s requirement is jurisdictional under Appraisal Review Board v. International Church of Foursquare Gospel, 719 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam), and that Foursquare Gospel’s holding was reaffirmed by Matagorda County Appraisal District v. Coastal Liquids Partners, L.P., 165 S.W.3d 329, 831 n.5 (Tex. 2005), and Cameron Appraisal District v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502–03 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). Foursquare Gospel’s holding, however, is narrower than the Landfill asserts and does not control here. The Foursquare Gospel Court concluded that a taxpayer’s compliance with a requirement from another statutory provision—"to include the … Appraisal District as a party within 45 days after receiving notice that a final order had been entered"—was jurisdictional. 719 S.W.2d at 161. The Foursquare Gospel Court neither addressed the statutory requirements for a chief appraiser—rather than a taxpayer—to appeal nor considered whether the written approval requirement is jurisdictional. Twenty years later, in a footnote aside, the Matagorda Court broadly stated, "While we held twenty years ago that compliance with the statutory requirements for appeal from an appraisal review is jurisdictional, we have yet to address whether that holding survives Dubai[.]" 165 S.W.3d at 331 n.5 (citation omitted). And in an unremarkable statement regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Rourk Court noted, "[W]e have repeatedly held that ‘a taxpayer’s failure to pursue an appraisal review board proceeding deprives the courts of jurisdiction to decide most matters relating to ad valorem taxes.’" 194 S.W.3d at 502 (quoting Matagorda, 165 S.W.3d at 331). Matagorda and Rourk did not speak to Section 42.02(a)’s requirement, and to the extent that they could be construed as implying that Foursquare Gospel’s holding should be extended to any and all statutory requirements—including those for a chief appraiser and not just the taxpayer—for an appeal from an appraisal review board’s order, those statements are nonbinding obiter dicta. See Seger v. Yorkshire Ins., 503 S.W.3d 388, 399 (Tex. 2016) ("Obiter dictum is not binding as precedent."). Because there is no controlling precedent as to whether Section 42.02(a)’s written approval requirement for the chief appraiser to appeal is jurisdictional, we apply the post-Dubai standard in considering whether the requirement is jurisdictional. See Mosley v. Texas Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, 593 S.W.3d 250, 261 n.3 (Tex. 2019) ("[W]e emphasize that Dubai and its progeny remain the standard for prospective decisions concerning whether a statutory prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action is mandatory or jurisdictional.").

[2] We begin with the presumption that the Legislature did not intend to make Section 42.02(a)’s requirement jurisdictional; "a presumption overcome only by clear legislative intent to the contrary." City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2009); see also Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tex. 2014) ("We resist classifying a provision as jurisdictional absent clear legislative intent to that effect."). To ascertain clear legislative intent that a statutory requirement be jurisdictional, we examine the statute’s plain language and apply statutory interpretation principles, considering the specified consequences for noncompliance, the purpose of the statute, and the consequences of alternative constructions. See Chicas, 593 S.W.3d at 287.

Considering the plain language first, we note that the Legislature knows how to use unequivocal language to make statutory requirements jurisdictional, see, e.g., Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 33.171(d) (providing that "notice requirement" "is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the institution of suit"), but Section 42.02(a) lacks such unequivocal language, see Tex. Tax Code § 42.02(a); Texas Mut. Ins. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 453 (Tex. 2012) ("We presume the silence is a careful, purposeful, and deliberate choice."). The Legislature has also straightforwardly mandated that "[s]tatutory...