CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637
II. ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 639
A. Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 640
B. Illegal Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 642
C. Knowledge, Intent, and Participation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 643
D. Overt Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 644
III. DEFENSES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645
A. Statute of Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645
B. Variance or Constructive Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 646
C. Multiplicitous and Duplicitous Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 648
1. Multiplicitous Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 648
2. Duplicitous Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
D. Insufficient Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
E. Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 650
F. The Buyer-Seller Exception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651
G. Failed Affirmative Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 652
IV. CO-CONSPIRATOR HEARSAY RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 652
A. Evidentiary Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 653
B. Sixth Amendment Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 656
V. PARTIES AND LIABILITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 656
A. Vicarious Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 657
B. Joinder and Severance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 658
VI. SENTENCING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 659
I. INTRODUCTION
Under 18 U.S.C. § 371 it is a crime for two or more persons to conspire to com-
mit any offense against or to defraud the United States.
1
Other federal statutes
identify more specific conspiracy offenses,
2
but this Article focuses on general fed-
eral conspiracy under § 371. The general federal conspiracy statute differs from
more specific conspiracy statutes because it requires at least one conspirator to
1. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 224 (conspiracy to bribe in the context of sporting events); id. § 241 (conspiracy to
deprive persons of civil rights); id. § 1962(d) (conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (“RICO”) Act); id. § 2384 (seditious conspiracy); id. § 1951 (conspiracy to affect commerce by
robbery or extortion (Hobbs Act)); id. § 1512(k) (conspiracy to commit witness tampering); id. § 1349
(conspiracy to commit bank, wire, mail, securities and commodities, or health care fraud).
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commit an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
3
A conspiracy offense is treated separately because it poses a greater danger to
society than a substantive offense committed by a single individual; oftentimes
such offenses “involve[] deliberate plotting to subvert the laws” and “educating
and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices.”
4
A conspiracy is distinct from the substantive crime contemplated by the conspir-
acy.
5
Accordingly, a conspiracy offense may be charged regardless of whether the
underlying substantive offense actually occurred.
6
A defendant’s acquittal on a
conspiracy charge does not bar prosecution on the substantive offense.
7
Similarly,
an acquittal on the substantive offense does not necessarily bar conviction on the
conspiracy charge.
8
However, acquittal on the substantive offense may bar re-pros-
ecution on a conspiracy count under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
9
Under § 371, the overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy need not itself be proscribed
by criminal law.
10
While a conspiracy to violate a civil law must inflict actual damage on
the plaintiff, no such requirement exists for conspiracies to violate criminal laws.
11
Prosecutors bring conspiracy charges in a variety of situations because of their
strategic and evidentiary advantages.
12
A conspiracy charge enables the government
3. Compare § 371, with Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (explaining the RICO statute “[s]
ection 1962(d) . . . is even more comprehensive than the general conspiracy provision applicable to federal
crimes, § 371, since it contains no requirement of an overt or specific act to effect the conspiracy’s object.”).
4. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946) (quoting United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78,
88 (1915)); see also Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961) (“[C]ollective criminal agreement—
partnership in crime—presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action
both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability
that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.”).
5. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 389–90 (1992).
6. See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65 (1997) (noting that a “conspiracy is a distinct evil, dangerous to the public, and
so punishable in itself.” (quoting Callanan, 364 U.S. at 594)).
7. See, e.g., Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U.S. 5, 24 (2016) (holding acquittal on a conspiracy
charge did not bar retrial on the underlying bribery offense); United States v. Ward, 486 F.3d 1212, 1223 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“Conspiracy and mail fraud are not the same offense, and the fact that [the defendant] was acquitted
of conspiracy is not inconsistent with his being a member of a more limited mail fraud scheme.” (quoting United
States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 1294 n.4 (11th Cir. 1990))).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Zemlyansky, 908 F.3d 1, 10 (2d. Cir. 2018) (“As a general matter, a jury’s finding
that a defendant did not commit certain substantive crimes does not necessarily preclude the government from
later proving that he or she knowingly agreed to facilitate a racketeering scheme involving, or intended to
involve, the same substantive crimes”); United States v. DeKelaita, 875 F.3d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 2017).
9. Whether prosecution of the conspiracy charges is collaterally estopped may be determined by the scope of
the conspiracy charges. When the substantive charges and the conspiracy charge completely overlap, retrial on
the conspiracy charge is barred following acquittal on the substantive charges. See, e.g., United States v.
Crabtree, 878 F.3d 1274, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2018). If the conspiracy charges are broader in scope than the
substantive offenses for which the defendant was acquitted, conviction on the conspiracy charges is unlikely to
be barred. See, e.g., United States v. Frangos, 821 F. App’x. 81, 85 (3d. Cir. 2020).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 966 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Meredith, 685 F.3d 814,
825 (9th Cir. 2012).
11. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 650–52 (2008).
12. See, e.g., Shirley A. Selz, Conspiracy Law in Theory and Practice: Federal Conspiracy Prosecutions in
Chicago, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 35 (1977).
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