Cronin v. Cent. Valley Sch. Dist.

456 P.3d 857

Michael F. CRONIN, Respondent,

v.CENTRAL VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.

No. 36666-9-III

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.

FILED JANUARY 30, 2020

Breean Lawrence Beggs, Paukert & Troppmann, PLLC, 522 W Riverside Ave. Ste. 560, Spokane, WA, 99201-0519, Paul Eric Clay, Stevens Clay, PS, 421 W Riverside Ave. Ste. 1575, Spokane, WA, 99201-0409, for Appellant.

Lawrence Jay Kuznetz, Sarah Nicole Harmon, Powell, Kuznetz & Parker, 316 W Boone Ave. Ste. 380, Spokane, WA, 99201-2346, for Respondent.

OPINION PUBLISHED IN PART

Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.

¶1 Central Valley School District appeals the trial court’s order and judgment finding it in contempt for intentionally violating a court order. The District argues the trial court lacked authority to hold it in contempt while it was seeking a stay of the underlying order in our court. We disagree.

¶2 RAP 8.1(b) permits a party to enforce a trial court decision or order pending appeal or review unless stayed pursuant to the provisions of RAP 8. One way for a party to enforce a trial court order is to request the trial court to hold the contumacious party in contempt. In the published part of this opinion, we hold that a trial court has authority to hold a contumacious party in contempt even while that party is seeking to stay the underlying order in an appellate court. We resolve the other issues raised by the District against it and affirm the trial court in all respects.

FACTS

¶3 This is the fourth appeal in this lengthy litigation. We limit our discussion of the facts and procedure to those necessary to resolve the issues before us.

Brief overview of facts and procedure predating this appeal

¶4 The District employed Michael Cronin as a teacher. In early 2012, the District provided Cronin notice of discharge and nonrenewal. Cronin, through an agent, appealed the discharge and requested a statutory hearing, but failed to explicitly appeal the nonrenewal. This ambiguity was clarified weeks later by Cronin’s attorney, who advised the District that Cronin wanted a statutory hearing on both discharge and nonrenewal. The District refused to give Cronin any statutory hearing and discontinued his wages and benefits.

¶5 Cronin brought a declaratory action, seeking a statutory hearing on the District’s determinations that sufficient cause existed for discharge and nonrenewal. The District asserted various reasons why Cronin’s request should be denied. These reasons were litigated in two prior summary judgment motions and two appeals to this court. In 2016, we remanded the case and directed the trial court to order the District to give Cronin his requested statutory hearing.

Arguments and rulings related to this appeal

¶6 On June 26, 2017, both parties again filed motions for summary judgment. Cronin argued he was entitled to: (1) reinstatement and back pay pending his statutory hearing, (2) double damages for the District’s willful and intentional withholding of wages, (3) reasonable attorney fees and costs, (4) an additional award because of the tax consequences of a lump sum wage award, and (5) the appointment of a statutory hearing officer.

¶7 The District argued: (1) it had authority to nonrenew Cronin’s contract based on his misconduct, (2) it had properly nonrenewed Cronin’s contract because he did not explicitly request a statutory hearing for nonrenewal, (3) its obligation to pay wages and benefits to Cronin ended with his 2011-2012 school year contract, and, (4) it did not willfully and intentionally withhold Cronin’s wages.

¶8 Cronin responded that the law of the case doctrine prohibited the District from relitigating whether he was entitled to a statutory hearing for nonrenewal. Cronin noted that our second unpublished decision ordered a statutory hearing on his discharge and nonrenewal.

¶9 On April 27, 2018, the parties argued their motions. The trial court orally ruled that the District must restore Cronin’s employment and reinstate his wages and benefits pending a statutory hearing. Its order was based on language in RCW 28A.405.210. In addition, the court granted Cronin’s request for reasonable attorney fees and costs, but denied his request for double damages and an additional award to compensate him for the increased tax consequences of a large lump sum payment. The District filed a request for reconsideration, which the court denied by written ruling.

¶10 On June 29, 2018, the court entered its order on summary judgment. The order provided in relevant part:

a. The Court grants Plaintiff’s request to restore his employment. Judgment shall be entered against Defendant for back wages and benefits owed Plaintiff from September 1, 2012, to the date of this order.^[1]

b. Plaintiff’s wages and benefits shall be immediately reinstated effective the date of this order and shall continue until such time as a written decision by a statutory hearing officer determines after a hearing on the merits whether the Defendant has proved sufficient cause for either discharge or nonrenewal of Plaintiff from his employment with Defendant.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 321. The order set an August date for presentment of a monetary judgment.

¶11 On July 17, 2018, the District filed a motion to stay the portions of the June 29 order that required it to restore Cronin’s employment and to reinstate his wages and benefits.

¶12 On August 23, 2018, the trial court entered judgment setting the amounts for back pay, prejudgment interest, attorney fees, together with findings and conclusions supporting the amounts. The trial court also denied the District’s motion to partially stay its June 29 order.

¶13 On August 28, 2018, the District filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s June 29 order. This appeal was the subject of our third decision.

¶14 On September 7, 2018, Cronin moved the trial court for an order of contempt because the District had yet to restore Cronin’s employment and reinstate his pay. Cronin asked for double damages and attorney fees on the basis that the District’s refusal to pay his wages and benefits constituted a willful withholding.

¶15 On September 11, 2018, four days after Cronin’s motion for contempt, the District filed a motion to stay with this court. The District then responded to Cronin’s motion for contempt and asserted it could not be held in contempt while it was seeking a stay of the order in our court.

¶16 On September 21, 2018, the trial court heard argument on Cronin’s motion for contempt. The trial court noted its concern about entering a contempt order that could later be inconsistent with an order from this court. The court reserved ruling on Cronin’s motion until this court ruled on the District’s pending motion to stay. The trial court advised Cronin he could re-note his motion if this court denied the District’s motion to stay.

¶17 On November 30, 2018, our court commissioner denied the District’s motion. It construed the trial court’s order restoring Cronin’s employment as not requiring the District to actually place Cronin in the classroom, but as requiring the District only to pay Cronin’s wages and benefits. Our court commissioner implied that requiring the District to pay Cronin’s wages and benefits could not be stayed under RAP 8.1(b)(1) because it was not a money judgment. It also declined to issue a stay under RAP 8.1(b)(3), concluding that the burden on the District of paying Cronin’s wages for a few months was less than the burden on Cronin of nonpayment.

¶18 On December 21, 2018, the statutory hearing officer issued its decision, finding there was sufficient cause for the District to discharge and nonrenew Cronin.

¶19 On December 28, 2018, the District filed a motion in this court to modify the court commissioner’s ruling denying the District’s motion to stay. We later denied the District’s motion.

¶20 Before we denied the District’s motion, Cronin renewed his motion for contempt. The District responded that the trial court’s order restoring Cronin’s employment had become moot because the hearing officer’s findings precluded Cronin’s employment from being restored.

¶21 On January 10, 2019, the trial court heard argument on Cronin’s renewed motion for contempt. The trial court recognized that its June 29 order explicitly required the District to restore Cronin’s employment, the District had knowledge of the order, the District failed to restore Cronin’s employment, and the District did not have a reasonable excuse because the order had not been stayed. The trial court orally found the District in contempt of its June 29 order, ordered the District to pay a remedial sanction until it paid Cronin what he was owed under that order and assessed double damages for nonpayment of wages, in addition to reasonable attorney fees and prejudgment interest.

¶22 On February 1, 2019, the trial court entered findings, conclusions, and an order effectuating its January 10 oral ruling. On February 15, 2019, the trial court heard argument from the parties as to the amounts owed for Cronin’s wages and benefits, double damages, prejudgment interest, remedial sanctions, and reasonable attorney fees. On February 27, 2019, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the order and judgment on contempt for the amounts owed.

¶23 Specifically, the trial court ordered double damages on Cronin’s wages and benefits from June 29, 2018, through December 21, 2018, because of the District’s willful and wrongful withholding of wages. The trial court also ordered the District to pay the sums under the order and judgment within 30 days of its entry and, if the District did not pay within 30 days, the order assessed a per diem penalty of $100 dollars from the date of the order until the District paid the judgment in full.

¶24 The District appealed the trial court’s February 1, 2019 and February 27, 2019 orders and judgments.

ANALYSIS

¶25 The District raises four arguments on appeal: (1) it cannot be found in contempt for not complying with the trial court’s order while...