Crosby v. Mcdonald's of Guilderland, LLC

JOHNNY W. CROSBY, JR., Plaintiff, v. MCDONALD'S OF GUILDERLAND, LLC, FRAN DELEON, General Manager ofMcDonald's of Guilderland, LLC, formerly known as Fran "LNU," andMICHELL WOLF LLC, Defendants.

1:17-CV-1160 (MAD/DEP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

May 2, 2018

APPEARANCES:

KARPF, KARPF LAW FIRM -

BENSALEM OFFICE

3331 Street Road

Two Greenwood Square, Suite 128

Bensalem, Pennsylvania 19020

Attorney for Plaintiff

MAYNARD, O'CONNOR LAW

FIRM - ALBANY OFFICE

6 Tower Place

Albany, New York 12203

Attorneys for Defendants McDonald's

of Guilderland, LLC and Fran DeLeon

CARTER, CONBOY, CASE,

BLACKMORE, MALONEY &

LAIRD, P.C.

20 Corporate Woods Boulevard

Albany, New York 12211

Attorneys for Defendant Michell Wolf LLC

OF COUNSEL:

ADAM C. LEASE, ESQ.

ANDREA P. DEMERS, ESQ.

JUSTIN W. GRAY, ESQ.

MICHAEL J. MURPHY, ESQ.

BRIENNA L. CHRISTIANO, ESQ.

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 18, 2017, Plaintiff Johnny W. Crosby, Jr. ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint against Defendants McDonald's of Guilderland, LLC ("Guilderland") and Fran DeLeon in the Northern District of New York. See Dkt. No. 1. On October 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint that added Defendant Michell Wolf LLC ("MW") as a party and alleged unlawful employment practices under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. See Dkt. No. 6. Specifically, the Amended Complaint alleged three causes of action: (1) interference and retaliation in violation of the FMLA against all three Defendants, see id. at ¶¶ 30-38; (2) discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA against Guilderland and MW, see id. at ¶¶ 39-44; and (3) discrimination and retaliation in violation of the NYSHRL against Guilderland and MW, see id. at ¶¶ 45-47. On December 18, 2017, Defendants DeLeon and Guilderland filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. No. 22. On February 12, 2018, MW filed its own motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 37.

Currently before the Court are Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. For the following reason, the motions are denied.

II. BACKGROUND

On April 15, 2015, Plaintiff was hired to perform grill and maintenance work by the McDonald's franchise located at 1602 Western Avenue (the "Franchise") in Guilderland, New York. See Dkt. No. 6 at ¶¶ 11, 16-17. Plaintiff suffers from various disabilities and serious health conditions, including an inguinal hernia, which occasionally limit "Plaintiff's ability to work, stand, squat[,] and lift." Id. at ¶ 18. On occasion, Plaintiff would need accommodations, such as taking short breaks and time off for medical treatment, because of his disabilities. See id. at ¶ 20.Plaintiff had told Defendant DeLeon, a high level manager with authority to make decisions concerning the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment, about his disabilities. See id. at ¶¶ 10, 21. Despite his disabilities, Plaintiff performed well at his job during the course of his employment. See id. at ¶ 19.

In July 2016, Plaintiff took six weeks of FMLA qualifying leave for medical treatment. See id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff returned to work in mid-August 2016. See id.

On September 14, 2016, Plaintiff injured himself while performing freezer maintenance at the Franchise and went to the emergency room for treatment. See id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiff returned to work on September 15, 2016, and requested a light duty accommodation. See id. That day, Plaintiff's employment was terminated. See id. at ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant DeLeon told him "that he was terminated for reasons directly related to his health conditions." Id. On November 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Guilderland regarding Plaintiff's termination on September 15, 2016 (the "First Charge"). See id. at ¶ 25.

At all times during the course of Plaintiff's employment, the Franchise was owned by Guilderland. See id. at ¶¶ 8, 11. On January 2, 2017, MW purchased the Franchise from Guilderland. See id. at ¶ 11. Defendant DeLeon continued her managerial role under the new ownership. See id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff alleges that after the purchase, MW continued to operate the Franchise without interruption and with the same employees. See id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff further alleges that Guilderland and MW are interrelated entities because they have a common ownership and their management and finances are under centralized control. See id. at ¶ 13.

In February 2017, Plaintiff was offered to be rehired or reinstated by the Franchise at his previous level of compensation. See id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff completed an employment applicationand waited to be informed of his start date. See id. On May 1, 2017, Plaintiff was contacted by Lamar Johnson, the general manager in training, who told Plaintiff that the Franchise would not rehire him because Defendant DeLeon had advised the owners against rehiring him. See id. at ¶ 27.

On June 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC (the "Second Charge"), alleging that the Franchise terminated and refused to rehire him because of his health conditions. See id. at 12. In the Second Charge, Plaintiff identified Guilderland as his employer and used the Franchise's address as its location. See id.

On August 24, 2017, the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue for the Second Charge. See id. at 13. The EEOC sent a copy of the notice of right to sue to the Franchise and to Plaintiff's counsel. See id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the party's claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007). In considering the legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the pleading and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Although a court's review of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the facts presented in the pleading, the court may consider documents that are "integral" to that pleading, even if they are neither physically attached to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleading. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002)).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead "a short and plain statement of the claim," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual "heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (quotation omitted). Under this standard, the pleading's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level," see id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are "plausible on [their] face," id. at 570. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.''" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Ultimately, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has "not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed[,]" id. at 570.

B. Unlawful Termination

1. Time Bar

In order to pursue an ADA claim in federal court, a plaintiff ordinarily must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the appropriate state agency. See Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)). Defendants note that the ADA, which incorporates the administrative exhaustion requirements of Title VII, requires a plaintiff to "file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment action or, if the claimant has already filed the charge with a state or local equalemployment agency, within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory action." See Dkt. No. 22-4 at 5 (quoting Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, Defendants argue that because the Amended Complaint only includes a copy of the Second Charge, which was filed more than 180 days after Plaintiff was terminated on September 15, 2016, Plaintiff failed to bring his wrongful termination charge before the EEOC in a timely manner. See id. at 6.

The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff filed the First Charge in November 2016. A complaint does not need to attach copies of the EEOC charge in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement—specific allegations that the plaintiff filed charges with the EEOC are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See Spillman v. Carter, 918 F. Supp. 336, 341 (D. Kan. 1996); see also Campos v. Las Cruces Nursing Ctr., 828 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1271 (D.N.M. 2011) (dismissing where the complaint only stated that the plaintiff "timely filed charges . . .with the [EEOC] and satisfied all administrative requirements for filing this suit"). As the First Charge was filed well within 180 days of his termination and Defendants have not challenged the sufficiency of this allegation, the Amended Complaint has plausibly...