Crouell v. Turner

BRITTNEE CROUELL v. DEMOLA TURNER, ET AL.

No. 59

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2019

March 18, 2020

Circuit Court for Prince George's County

Case No. CAL17-17615

UNREPORTED

Berger, Reed, Friedman, JJ.

Opinion by Berger, J.

Concurring Opinion by Friedman, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

This appeal arises from a motor vehicle accident. Appellant, Britnee Crouell ("Crouell"), was driving Westbound on Martin Luther King Jr. Highway, when Appellee, Demola Turner ("Turner") crossed the center median strip and struck her vehicle head on. Crouell sustained serious injuries as a result of the accident. Turner was driving a commercial vehicle for his employer, Atlas Courier, Inc. at the time of the collision. The parties have stipulated that Turner was intoxicated at the time of the collision. Crouell filed suit against Turner, Atlas Express Courier, Inc. and Fred Scott, the owner of Atlas Express Courier, Inc. A jury awarded Crouell $314,470.45 for medical expenses, $2,500,000 in non-economic damages, and $3,000,000.00 in punitive damages. Pursuant to Maryland's statutory cap on non-economic damages, the trial court reduced the award of $2,500,000 to $830,000. Crouell appeals the constitutionality of the Maryland cap on non-economic damages.

Crouell presents three issues for our review, which we have rephrased slightly as follows:

1. Whether the Maryland cap on non-economic damages is an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether the Maryland cap on non-economic damages is an unconstitutional violation of an individual's right to a trial by jury contained in Articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

3. Whether the Maryland cap on non-economic damages is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers requirement contained in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

For the reasons that follow, we hold, that the Maryland cap on non-economic damages is constitutional.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The parties have stipulated to the following facts:

Britnee Crouell, a 27 year old female, was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident on May 9, 2017. She had just left her home in Lanham, Maryland and was driving westbound on Martin Luther King Jr. Highway. At the same time a commercial vehicle being driven by Demola Turner was heading eastbound on the same roadway, crossed the center median strip[,] and struck Ms. Crouell's vehicle.

Ms. Crouell's vehicle was overturned and came to rest on it[]s side. She was trapped inside the vehicle. Witnesses, including an off duty District of Columbia firefighter, secured the vehicle and Ms. Crouell[,] and called for immediate medical assistance. She was transported to Shock trauma where life saving measures were initiated.

Ms. Crouell's injuries included a near total amputation of her left upper arm. Multiple surgeries were performed and the doctors were able to save her life and her arm. However, Ms. Crouell thereafter began a significant, expensive[,] and life changing recovery process.

Ms. Crouell has undergone near continuous medical care since the time of the motor vehicle accident as doctors attempted to return function to her left upper extremity. Although her arm was salvaged through the heroic efforts of the physicians[,] she has virtually no use of her left arm or hand. She has also received significant and near continuous psychological treatment for the impact this accident and her injuries have had on her life.

The at fault driver, Demola Turner, was driving a commercial vehicle for his employer, Atlas Express Courier, Inc. His job generally involved making deliveries[,] and on the night in question[,] he had picked up a package at Dulles InternationalAirport and was heading back to the Atlas Express headquarters in Bowie, Maryland.

Mr. Turner had been drinking alcohol prior to making the delivery run on the evening of May 9, 2017. His employer was aware of this fact and was further aware, prior to hiring Mr. Turner, that he had a driving record which included charges for driving while intoxicated and having his license suspended. It was determined Mr. Turner was intoxicated at the time of the collision with Ms. Crouell.

Ms. Crouell filed suit against Mr. Turner, Atlas Express Courier, Inc. and Fred Scott, the owner of Atlas Express Courier, Inc. A jury trial was conducted and the jury found in favor of Ms. Crouell. The jury awarded [her] $314,470.45 for medical expenses, $2,500,000.00 for non-economic damages[,] and $3,000,000.00 for punitive damages. The punitive damages award was only as to Atlas Express Courier, Inc.

After the jury rendered its verdict[,] the trial court, in accordance with Maryland law, applied the cap on non-economic damages[,] reducing the non-economic damage award from $2,500,000 to $830,000. Appellant's counsel fully and completely preserved any objection to the constitutionality of the cap.

On appeal, Crouell solely challenges the constitutionality of Maryland's statutory cap on non-economic damages.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court of Appeals has articulated that "[e]valuating the constitutionality of an act of the Maryland General Assembly is a question of law." DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 62 (2010). Additionally, "the interpretation of the Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights is a question of law. Id. We, therefore, "review theissues de novo to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulings on these matters." Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604 (2004).

DISCUSSION

The General Assembly has enacted a cap on non-economic damages related to personal injury or wrongful death. Md. Code (2006, 2013 Repl. Vol.) § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ"). Non-economic damages in a personal injury action include damages for "pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, or other nonpecuniary injury." CJ § 11-108(a)(2)(i)(1). In an action for wrongful death, non-economic damages include "mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, care, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education, or other noneconomic damages authorized under Title 3, Subtitle 9 of this article." CJ § 11-108(a)(2)(i)(2). A jury may not be informed of the limitation on damages. CJ § 11-108(d)(1). Pursuant to the statute, damages arising out of an action after October 1, 1994 may not exceed $500,000. CJ § 11-108(b)(2)(i). The cap increases by $15,000 on October 1 of each year. CJ § 11-108(b)(2)(ii). If the jury awards an amount in excess of the cap, the court must reduce the amount to conform to the cap. CJ § 11-108(d)(2)(i).

Crouell challenges the constitutionality of the cap on three grounds. She first argues that the cap is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause. Crouell urges us to ignore the precedent set in Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 362 (1992) because the factual assumptions about the insurance industry which the Court relied uponhave proven to be untrue. Second, Crouell asserts that the cap is an unconstitutional violation of an individual's right to a trial by jury, protected by Articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. She argues that the Court of Appeals, in Murphy, improperly equated the jury determination of damage awards to an issue of law, rather than an issue of fact. She, therefore, urges us to reconsider this improper conclusion. Third, Crouell argues that the determination of whether or not a verdict is excessive is inherently a judicial, not a legislative function. The cap, therefore, violates the separation of powers doctrine. Demola Turner, in response, asserts that Maryland Courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the cap and that stare decisis controls this Court's decision. We agree.

The Court of Appeals has expressly rejected Crouell's first two constitutional arguments. In Murphy, supra, 325 Md. at 355, the injured appellant argued that the cap violated the equal protection clause because it created "a classification between less seriously injured tort plaintiffs who are entitled to keep everything which the jury awards and more seriously injured tort plaintiffs[,]" who's award of damages are subject to the cap."¹ A heightened degree of scrutiny, therefore, should be applied. Id. In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals held that a legislative cap "upon the amount of noneconomic damages which can be awarded to a tort plaintiff does not implicate such animportant 'right' as to trigger any enhanced scrutiny." Id. at 362. Moreover, the cap represented "the type of economic regulation which has regularly been reviewed under the traditional rational basis test by this Court and by the Supreme Court." Id. Analyzing the cap under a rational basis standard, the Court concluded the following:

The General Assembly's objective in enacting the cap was to assure the availability of sufficient liability insurance, at a reasonable cost, in order to cover claims for personal injuries to members of the public. This is obviously a legitimate legislative objective. A cap on noneconomic damages may lead to greater ease in calculating premiums, thus making the market more attractive to insurers, and ultimately may lead to reduced premiums, making insurance more affordable for individuals and organizations performing needed services. The cap, therefore, is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative objective.²

Id. at 369-70.

The Murphy Court additionally rejected the argument that the cap violates the right to a jury trial, protected by Articles 5 and 23 of the Declaration of Rights.³ Id. at 370. The injured appellant...