Crouse v. Dickhaut

THOMAS CROUSE, Petitioner,

v.THOMAS DICKHAUT, Respondent.

C.A. No. 07-12004-MLW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

March 13, 2013

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WOLF, D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Thomas Crouse, pro se, petitioned this court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. Crouse was convicted in 2002 of murder in the first degree and arson of a dwelling by a jury sitting in the Middlesex Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. His convictions were subsequently affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. This court has carefully reviewed the record and memoranda submitted by the parties. For the reasons stated in this Memorandum and Order, the petition is being denied.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The procedural history, which is not in dispute, is as follows.

On June 27, 2001, a Middlesex County grand jury returned an indictment charging the petitioner with murder in the first degree and arson of a dwelling. The charges arose out of the death of a fourteen-year-old girl, Kelly Hancock, and the burning of afunction room at the Malden Mills condominium complex in Malden. On September 27, 2002, after a trial by jury in Middlesex Superior Court, the petitioner was convicted of both charges. With respect to the conviction of murder in the first degree, the jury convicted the petitioner on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.¹

Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (the "SJC"). On October 23, 2006, that court affirmed the convictions. See Commonwealth v. Crouse, 447 Mass. 558 (2006).

On October 22, 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. The petition was filed within the one-year statute of limitations set by 28 U.S.C. §2244(d).

On February 29, 2008,² respondent Thomas Dickhaut, superintendent of the Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center, moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that (1) the petitioner had failed to exhaust his claims - in particular Claim D of the Petition - in state court as required by 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1); and (2) the Petition improperly includes legal argumentation. In an August 29, 2008 Memorandum and Order, the court denied the motionto dismiss without prejudice. See Memorandum and Order of August 29, 2008 at 1-2, 9. Specifically, the court found that the record was insufficient to assess the respondent's exhaustion argument, and the court rejected the respondent's contention concerning improper legal argumentation. See id. The court ordered the respondent to submit the complete state court record so that it could properly assess the exhaustion issue. Id. at 9.

On October 28, 2008, the respondent answered the Petition and submitted an appendix containing materials from the state court record in the petitioner's case.³ See 28 U.S.C. §2254 Rule 5(c). The materials provided were relevant to the respondent's exhaustion argument, and to the claims raised in the Petition generally. See id. On August 10, 2009, the respondent moved for judgment on the pleadings, reiterating his exhaustion argument.

On August 15, 2011, having reviewed the materials submitted by the respondent, the court issued a Memorandum and Order finding that the petitioner had not exhausted Claim D of the Petition in the state courts.⁴ Aug. 15, 2011 Order at 3 (Docket No. 25); see28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1). Accordingly, the court ordered the petitioner to either request deletion of Claim D or move for a stay to permit exhaustion of Claim D in state court. Aug. 15, 2011 Order at 9. The petitioner moved to delete Claim D and the court allowed the motion.

On November 18, 2011, the respondent submitted a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petition, arguing that the remaining claims in the Petition did not demonstrate an entitlement to habeas relief, and that the Petition should, therefore, be denied. The petitioner submitted an opposition to the respondent's memorandum, reiterating the arguments made in his Petition.

III. HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. §2254

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), establishes the deferential standard of review applied by a habeas court for the review of a state court judgment that is rendered "on the merits." See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d).⁵ However, this standard does not apply to all state court judgments: if the state court fails to address the merits of a federal claim, this court reviews that claim de novo. See id. However, the state courts need not explicitly cite federal precedent or give detailed reasons for rejecting a claim for the federal claim to be deemed addressed "on the merits." See Lyons v. Brady, 666 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 2012). Rather, "[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). In addition, a federal claim is deemed adjudicated on the merits if the state court applies "'a state law standard that is at least as protective of the defendant's rights as its federal counterpart.'" Kirwan v. Spencer, 631 F.3d 582, 587 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Young v. Murphy, 615 F.3d 59, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2010)).

Under AEDPA, the court must determine whether the decision below: (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the SupremeCourt of the United States; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d); DeBurgo v. St. Amand, 587 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Foxworth v. St. Amand, 570 F.3d 414, 425 (1st Cir. 2009) (defining unreasonable application of clearly established federal law); Whitney v. Spencer, No. 07-10820-MLW, 2011 WL 4625352 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2011). In doing so, the court relies on the facts found by the state courts, supplemented with other facts from the record that are consistent with the state court's findings. See Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2006), Whitney, 2011 WL 4625352, at *1. The court must presume that the state court's factual determinations are correct unless the petitioner rebuts this "presumption of correctness" by coming forward with "clear and convincing evidence" to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); Coombs v. Maine, 202 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2000); see also DeBurgo, 587 F.3d at 62 (stating that federal court is "bound to 'accept the state court findings of fact unless [petitioner] convinces [the court], by clear and convincing evidence, that they are in error"); Lynch, 438 F.3d at 39 (same). This presumption of correctness applies whether the factual finding is made by a state trial court or a state appellate court. See Teti v. Bender, 507 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2007).

IV. FACTS

Crouse does not challenge any state court factual determinations. Rather, he asserts various errors of law.⁶ The following is an overview of the facts of the case as recited by the SJC, supplemented where necessary with additional undisputed facts from the record. See Lynch, 438 F.3d at 39. Certain facts are reserved for the discussion below of specific claims.

On July 18, 2000, at 5:30 a.m., the petitioner was seen crossing the parking lot of the Malden Mills condominium complex, pulling a child's wagon. Crouse, 447 Mass. at 560. The petitioner lived at Malden Mills with his girlfriend and two children. Id. The petitioner's Chevrolet Blazer was parked in the space reserved for visitors. Id. Just after 6:00 a.m., the petitioner went to a nearby Mobil station, where he paid cash for five dollars worth of gasoline. Id. Surveillance cameras showed him lifting the tailgate window of his Blazer and putting the gasoline nozzle into the right rear cargo area. Id. The petitioner was then seen returning to Malden Mills less than two minutes later and, about five minutes after that, driving out of the parking lot at a high rate of speed. Id.

At 6:19 a.m., the fire alarm rang at Malden Mills. Id.Firefighters arrived within minutes and found the basement function room full of smoke. Id. The sprinkler had been activated. Id. The room was in disarray, and there were bloodstains on the burned carpet and furniture. Id. Bloodstains and swipe markings along the wall were consistent with a bloody object being moved along the wall toward the door. Id.

Around 7:00 a.m., the petitioner, his girlfriend, and the children arrived at his girlfriend's home in Manchester, New Hampshire. Id. at 560. The petitioner's stepfather alerted police to his presence in New Hampshire. Id. at 561. The police traveled to New Hampshire, where they interviewed the petitioner and his girlfriend. Id. The petitioner told police that on the previous night, he had not left his home after 8:00 p.m. Id.

Among the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth at the petitioner's trial were his cell phone records, which showed him making calls to his home telephone after 8:00 p.m on the night of the murder.⁷ Id. at 560-61. The records also showed numerous calls made on the cell phone from Manchester the following morning, and "a great number" of calls to and from the phone on the following day, July 19, 2000. Id. In one call on July 19, 2000, the petitioner stated to a friend that he was "in trouble." Id.Three days later, that friend's girlfriend observed deep, red scratch marks on the petitioner's chest. Id.

In October 2000, the police obtained a search warrant for the petitioner's Blazer. Id. at 561. Small bloodstains were found in the Blazer. Id. at 561-62.

In April 2001, skeletal remains were found by a jogger in Hookset, New Hampshire. Id. at 562. The remains could not be identified, other than that they belonged to a Caucasian female. Id. However, DNA from the remains matched DNA from the blood...