Crouse v. Tex. State Senate

CHARITY COLLEEN CROUSE, Plaintiff, v. TEXAS STATE SENATE, Defendant.

No. 3:20-CV-00114-X (BH)

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

March 15, 2021

Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge^[1]

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the pro se plaintiff's complaint, received on January 16, 2020 (doc 3), should be DISMISSED without prejudice as barred by the Eleventh Amendment or, in the alternative, with prejudice for failure to state a claim and as frivolous.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Charity Colleen Crouse sues the Texas State Senate, seeking among other things, an order compelling a trial to impeach the members of the Texas State Senate “for permitting numerous unconstitutional pieces of legislation to move forward in the State of Texas as well as permitting the implementation of unconstitutional procedures regarding reporting on and in regards to third-party contracting in the State of Texas” and “attempt[ing] to pass off to the People of Texas responsibility for implementation of flagrantly unconstitutional laws under the auspices of ‘referenda' on amendments to the Texas Constitution.” (Doc. 3 at 2-3.)

Plaintiff appears to allege that, between March 24, 2017 and April 3, 2017, she was kidnapped under the “auspices” of a mental health detention by the State of Texas and declared to be mentally incompetent through a fraudulent mental health diagnosis. (Id. at 7.) She claims that this diagnosis was in retaliation for her attempt to report fraud, child abuse, and other crimes at a domestic violence shelter. (Id. at 6.) She also alleges that she was scheduled to appear in court to contest the illegal detention and to submit evidence in support of her original fraud and child abuse charges, but she was not released from confinement until after the courthouse had closed. (Id. at 7.)

Around that same time, Plaintiff found out that her grandfather had died in another state. (Id.) She appears to contend that his death was intentionally orchestrated by those in the public trust in Texas. (Id.) She also claims that due to the refusal of anyone in an official capacity to assist her in challenging the illegal detention and mental health diagnosis, the “vestiture of benefits...tangible and intangible, ” relating to her grandfather's estate has been impacted. (Id.) Instead of helping her, people in the public trust within the State of Texas allegedly “aided and abetted a conspiracy to commit fraud and child abuse, as well as other crimes.” (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that while living in Houston in May 2017, after contacting members of the Texas Medical Board and State Bar of Texas, she contacted local members of the Texas Senate and House of Representatives. (Id. at 3.) She again contacted members of the Texas Senate and House of Representatives on August 2, 2017. (Id.) She received no response and instead was “witness to abuses of the Texas Constitution, ” including efforts to implement unconstitutional amendments to the Texas Constitution. (Id.) However, at no point did members of the Texas Senate call for impeachment of any other officer in the state government for their failure to challenge these unconstitutional laws or otherwise protect the people of Texas from their consequences. (Id.) This failure, according to Plaintiff, represents a breach of the contract between the citizens of Texas and their government that is the Texas Constitution. (Id.)

Plaintiff also claims that in September 2017, following a declaration of a State of Emergency in the State of Texas, numerous legislative changes were implemented under fraudulent pretenses and done in a manner that “aided and abetted the murders of numerous Texas citizens, including members of law enforcement.” (Id. at 8.) These facts-and an attendant cover up, which include efforts to defraud the People of Texas of their personal private property and access to due process-constitute a “levying of war” upon the “State” under the Texas Constitution. (Id.) She takes particular issue with legislation taking effect on January 20, 2020, “giving the Attorney General of Texas special exception to negotiate terms with third-party contractors.” (Id. at 4.) She claims that this legislation was implemented after “more than three years of [Plaintiff] actively reporting to public government agencies in the State of Texas, including the Texas Insurance Commission” (Id. at 9.)^[2] But rather than help her, these agents “defaulted on their sureties” and refused to honor reporting timelines while Plaintiff's property was expropriated in violation of Article 1, Section 17(d) of the Texas Constitution, which generally provides that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation. (Id.) This legislation allegedly increased access by third-party contractors to the property of the People of Texas and Texas citizens and also further prevented the People of Texas and Texas citizens from exercising their constitutional rights to due process. (Id. at 10.)

Plaintiff claims that the timeline of the implementation of these laws shows that the acting representatives of the government of Texas intended to defraud her of her personal private property, making it available for illegal redistribution with others with whom they had engaged “via contract in violation of their duty to uphold the Bill of Rights of the Texas Constitution in exercise of their ministerial duties.” (Id.)

Although the precise nature of the relief Plaintiff seeks is unclear, she does ask for the following forms of injunctive relief: (1) a “reform in the manner of impeachment of the current members of the Texas State Senate for refusal to honor their contract with the People of Texas and a move to call immediately for new elections to commence in the State of Texas”; (2) an injunction on all laws, specifically those concerning third-party contractors, set to take effect on January 1, 2020, pending a review of their constitutionality; (3) an injunction on the implementation of all “Constitutional Amendments” concerning additional tax law changes in the State of Texas set to take effect on January 1, 2020; and (4) a further injunction against the continued implementation of “SB 151 and HB 2763 of 2019 and SB 4 and SB 15 of 2017” pending a review of their constitutionality. (Id. at 5.) No process has been issued in this case.

II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING

Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis, her complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides for sua sponte dismissal if the Court finds the complaint “frivolous or malicious” or if it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28. Courts follow the same analysis in determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curium). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

III. SECTION 1983

Although not totally clear, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging that the Texas State Senate, under the color of state law, violated her rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, her claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States” and “afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as constitutional norms.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) she has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” “This withdrawal of jurisdiction effectively confers an immunity from suit.” P.R Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993). Therefore, “an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). This immunity applies to both federal and state law claims brought in federal court. See Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2013) (determining that sovereign immunity bars both federal and state law claims brought in federal court); Robertson v. McShan, No. 05-20055, 2005 WL 2673516, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 2005) (per curium) (finding that Eleventh Amendment immunity divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear federal and state law claims). However, “[s]uits for injunctive or declaratory relief are allowed against a state official acting in violation of federal law if...