Crovetti v. Domain Grp.

1

2022 IL App (1st) 211113-U

GREGORY CROVETTI and TRILOGY HOLDING, LTD., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DOMAIN GROUP, LTD. and GEORGE SOURI, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 1-21-1113

Court of Appeals of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division

September 30, 2022

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 07 CH 4703 Honorable Patrick J. Heneghan, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Connors concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

CUNNINGHAM, JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: The trial court's judgment reviving the default judgment and applying interest is affirmed.

¶ 2 On February 20, 2007, the plaintiffs-appellees, Gregory Crovetti and Trilogy Holding, Ltd. (collectively, the plaintiffs), filed a civil complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against the defendants-appellants, Domain Group Ltd. (Domain Group) and George Souri (collectively, the defendants). On July 11, 2007, an alias summons and complaint were served upon Mr. Souri. On January 3, 2008, the circuit court entered a default judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendants. On December 23, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a petition to revive the judgment as to the defendants, which the circuit court granted on March 10, 2015. Mr. Souri filed a motion to vacate the trial court's March 2015 order reviving the judgment, arguing that a scrivener's error in the the plaintiffs' 2014 petition made the court's order void.^[1] On March 8, 2021, after a hearing, the court vacated the order due to the "irreconcilable and conflicting information" contained in the plaintiffs' 2014 petition and finding that the court did not have jurisdiction to enter its 2015 order reviving the judgment. On March 11, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a subsequent petition to revive the 2008 judgment, since the previous revival was vacated, which the trial court granted on August 6, 2021. On September 3, 2021, Mr. Souri filed his notice of appeal. On appeal, Mr. Souri argues that: (1) the circuit court erred by reviving the judgment since it violated the doctrine of laches; and (2) the circuit court erred by applying interest to the payment during a time when the judgment was dormant. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 We will only present the facts necessary to resolve this appeal. For a full recitation of the facts and procedural history of the case, see Crovetti v. Domain Group, Ltd., 2022 IL App (1st) 210072-U. On February 20, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants alleging: breach of contract; breach of fiduciary duty; inducement of breach of fiduciary duty; conversion; common law fraud; and violation of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (815 ILCS 510/2 (West 2004)). The plaintiffs served each of the defendants.

¶ 5 Regarding service of process for Mr. Souri, the record reveals that he was served on July 11, 2007, via a third alias summons. On January 3, 2008, the circuit court entered a default judgment for the plaintiffs against the defendants. On December 23, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a petition to revive the January 3, 2008, judgment, alleging that the defendants had not paid anything towards the judgment or the statutory interest that had accrued from the judgment.^[2] In the plaintiffs' petition, the plaintiffs asserted that the 2008 default judgment was for $65,967.12. The petition made a scrivener's error, though, and alleged "[a]s of December 23, 2014, there remains due and owing to the Plaintiffs by the Defendants, jointly and severally, the amount of $5,404.62, which was calculated as follows." However, in the calculations section of the petition, it stated the judgment amount was $65,967.12; the statutory interest on the judgment was $41,365.44; and the "[a]mount remaining due on judgment" was $107,332.56. The parties would acknowledge in a subsequent hearing in 2021 that the petition should have stated the amount due was $107,332.56 instead of the $5,404.62 that was erroneously written in the petition. The plaintiffs in their petition further asked the trial court to find that interest accrued on the judgment at the statutory rate of $16.26 per day. On March 10, 2015, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' petition and revived the default judgment of $65,967.12 against the defendants and awarded interest, totaling $108,568.32, for the time the judgment was unpaid.

¶ 6 On May 14, 2019, Mr. Souri filed a petition to vacate the judgment entered on January 3, 2008, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2018). In that petition, Mr. Souri argued, that he was not served the summons nor the complaint and did not know about the judgment until he was served with a citation on May 7, 2019. After an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Souri's petition on October 27, 2020, the trial court denied Mr. Souri's section 2-1401 petition. The trial court further stated that it believed that Mr. Souri's father, who was a member of Mr. Souri's household at the time in question, was the individual who was served with the summons and complaint on July 11, 2007.The court then denied Mr. Souri's section 2-1401 petition seeking to vacate the January 3, 2008, judgment.^[3]

¶ 7 Mr. Souri filed a motion to vacate the revival judgment entered on March 10, 2015. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on March 8, 2021. The crux of Mr. Souri's argument in the hearing was that due to the conflicting numbers about the amount due by the defendants in the plaintiffs' 2014 petition to revive the judgment, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its March 10, 2015, order, making the order void. On March 8, 2021, the trial court vacated the March 2015 order, reviving the judgment, in its entirety, finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order previously. The parties did not appeal this issue.

¶ 8 On March 11, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a petition to revive the 2008 judgment including the statutory interest, removing the scrivener's error from their prior 2014 petition. On August 6, 2021, the trial court granted the petition to revive the judgment and awarded statutory interest. Mr. Souri filed a notice of appeal on September 3, 2021.

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 We note that we have jurisdiction to consider this matter as Mr. Souri filed a timely notice of appeal following the trial court's judgment. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 11 Mr. Souri presents the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs' petition to revive the 2008 judgment; and (2) whether the trial court erred by applying interest to the judgment. He first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the revival of the judgment because the revival violated the doctrine of laches.

¶ 12 Section 2-1602 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code), which covers the revival of judgments, states:

"[A] judgment may be revived by filing a petition to revive the judgment in the seventh year after its entry, or in the seventh year after its last revival, or in the twentieth year after its entry, or at any other time within 20 years after its entry if the judgment becomes dormant and by serving the petition and entering a court order for revival as provided in the following subsections." 735 ILCS 5/2-1602 (West 2020).

¶ 13 Mr. Souri's argument that the trial court erred in reviving the 2008 judgment is based on the doctrine of laches. Laches is" 'a neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with a lapse of time of more or less duration, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate to bar relief in equity.'" Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 195 Ill.2d 257, 270 (2001) (quoting Meyers v. Kissner, 149 Ill.2d 1, 12 (1992)). "Whether to apply laches rests within the trial court's discretion." Whitlock v. Hilander Foods, Inc., 308 Ill.App.3d 456, 464 (1999). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary or no reasonable person would have taken the same view. AT&T v. Lyons & Pinner Electric Co., 2014 IL App (2d) 130577, ¶ 21.

¶ 14 In this case, the plaintiffs filed a petition to revive the judgment on December 23, 2014, less than seven years after the default judgment was entered. Mr. Souri alleges that the plaintiffs made no efforts to enforce the judgment until May 2019. Mr. Souri argues this created prejudice, as he was unable to defend himself from a matter originally filed in 2007. That is the extent of Mr. Souri's argument, and he does not cite to any authority other than general rules of law regarding the laches doctrine and abuse of discretion. However, that alone, without authority to show how the court abused its discretion is not enough to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. October 1, 2020). See Ill. S.Ct R. 341(h)(7) ("Argument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on. *** Points not argued are forfeited."). Mr. Souri does not present a nexus between the decision to revive the judgment, the doctrine of laches, and caselaw or other authority on laches and how the court's decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. A court of review is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and to be cited by pertinent authority. People ex rel. Illinois Dept. of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56. A point not argued or supported by citation to relevant authority fails to satisfy the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(h...